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property.” For enslaved blacks, being “property” meant that you were owned by,
controlled by, could be abused by, and bought and sold by your owner. (As an
enslaved black, you were also generally denied property ownership rights.) Your
freedom, your labor, and even your body were attributes that your master legally
controlled. For enslaved black women, this meant that white men owned and
controlled your sexuality, often using you to bear their children. White masters
owned their mixed-race children they fathered with their enslaved black women!
This article analyzes how the American legal system regulated
miscegenation, from the perspective of the black woman’s property rights. It
describes and analyzes the black woman’s property rights against the white man’s
American Dream, the “property-enslavement-sexual” paradigm: cheap land,
cheap labor, and cheap sex. It describes and analyzes the law’s regulation of
white men who attempted to bestow upon their black women and children inter
vivos and causa mortis legacies. How antebellum southern legislatures and courts
managed the property rights of black women illustrates the relationship between
sex, race, status, and wealth acquisition. This article also analyzes the little known
anomaly of the law’s treatment of “free” black women, who successfully
negotiated past enslavement, and who themselves owned plantations, large homes,
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and enslaved blacks: the “black mistress.”
This article concludes that the roots of Grutter are in the Nineteenth Century
antebellum South’s legal treatment of blacks as white property. And that Justice
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter treats aspiring African-American students
(mainly women), applying to America’s elite public universities and professional
schools, as intellectually-inferior “diversity commodity”: there merely to serve the
white majority’s (mainly men) needs. In summary, both Grutter and its
Nineteenth-Century roots, regulate the sexual-racial economies of property, treat
blackness as white property, reflect Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence”
principle, and serve to reinforce a greater social and economic order: the
continued domination, supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.
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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
subconscious, even the prejudices of judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes3

Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and
after Brown, this principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides:

3

OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). See JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE

SLAVE COMMUNITY, PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979) [hereinafter
BLASSINGAME], Preface to the Second Edition, at vii, restating Holmes’ analysis in terms of
history of American slavery: “Intriguing, complex, opaque: these are descriptive terms easily
applied to American slavery. The more the student of the peculiar institution reads, the more
conviction grows that antebellum Southerners persisted in deviating from the beliefs and
behavioral patterns historians have ascribed to them.”
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The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites.
– Professor Derrick Bell4

I. INTRODUCTION

A.

GRUTTER ON SEX, RACE, STATUS, AND WEALTH

This is an article about sex5, race6, status7, and wealth8 in American society.9

4

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence

Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1979-1980) [hereinafter BELL].
5

“Sex” is defined as “[e]ither of the two divisions of organic beings distinguished as male

and female respectively; the males or the females (of a species, etc. of the human race) viewed
collectively.” THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VOL. XV, 107 (2nd ed. 1989) [hereinafter
OXFORD DICTIONARY]. This article defines “sex” as the broad division of gender, male and
female, as well as the physical and emotional relationship between people, regardless of gender.
The author uses sex in the content of the American antebellum South, and does not deny or
choose to ignore trans-gender issues.
6

“Race” is defined as “[o]ne of the great divisions of mankind, having certain physical

peculiarities in common. The term is often used imprecisely; even among anthropologists there
is no generally accepted classification or terminology.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. XIII, supra
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note 5, at 69. This article defines “race,” following the American antebellum southern tradition,
as “black,” generally enslaved people of African descent, and “white,” generally free people of
European descent. The author recognizes this use reflects the values of a political economy that
has benefitted and continues to benefit from such racial polarization.
7

“Status” is defined as “Law. The legal standing or position of a person as determined by

his membership of some class of persons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain
limitations; condition in respect, e.g. of liberty or servitude, marriage or celibacy, infancy or
majority.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. XVI, supra note 5, at 573. This article defines “status,”
in the context of the American antebellum South, to emphasize the social value that white society
placed on groups, based upon the political economy of sex and race. In particular, how powerful
white men perceived another group’s utility to them.
The author believes that status is an important factor when analyzing sex and race. While
the African-American community is not economically monolithic, as discussed infra, there are
many shared “black experiences” that derive from white stereotypes of African Americans. For
example, a successful African-American female brain surgeon certainly enjoys greater financial
and societal benefits than that of an impoverished, inner-city black welfare mother who is a high
school dropout. Yet they both share in the experience of being victims of police “racial
profiling,” based upon the police’s perception of them as criminal element. See generally
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the ‘War on
Drugs’ Was a ‘War on Blacks,’ 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381 (2002).
Similarly, in the antebellum South, although all blacks faced racially-based
discrimination, their status were not the same. See generally BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 249
(“The behavior of the black slave was intimately bound up with the nature of the antebellum
plantation, the behavior of masters, the white man’s perceptions and misperceptions, and a
multitude of factors which influenced personal relations.”) For example, the vast majority of
blacks were enslaved, yet there were a minority, approximately ten percent, who were legally
“free.” See generally IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS, THE FREE NEGRO IN THE
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More specifically, it is about how sex, race, and status affect the acquisition,
development, and retention of wealth.10 It exhibits how an analysis of legal

ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974) [hereinafter BERLIN].
8

“Wealth” is defined as “Economics. A collective term for those things the abundant

possession of which (by a person or a community) constitutes riches, or ‘wealth’ in the popular
sense.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. XX, supra note 5, at 42. This article uses “wealth” as
synonymous with the full rights of U.S. citizenship and capital accumulation, especially all rights
of private property ownership, and wealth creation and transference, including that of intellectual
or intangible property and government “entitlements.” The author recognizes that “wealth” is
synonymous with “greed,” the root of all evil, including the root of the American enslavement
system.
9

This article adopts Professor Adrienne Davis’s terms “enslavement” and “enslaved,”

rather than “slavery” and “slave” to describe the political-economic-sexual economy in which
blacks were legally and often physically held in bondage. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law
of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 223 at n. 4 (1999)
[hereinafter DAVIS] (“I do so in order to highlight the fact that people are not born into servitude.
Others force such conditions onto them, with the assistance of state-sanctioned, and often statesponsored, violence and coercion. Enslavement is not a one-time determination of status; rather,
it must be enforced and maintained on an ongoing basis.”)
10

See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112

YALE L.J. 1473 (2003) (presenting society’s attempts to divide the world strictly into black and
white, and to erase racially-mixed people from legal classification).
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principles regulating miscegenation, specifically pertaining to sexual relations11

11

See PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, 122-24 (1993) [hereinafter

KOLCHIN] (“The close contact that existed between masters and slaves worked special hardship
on slave women, who were vulnerable to sexual as well as labor exploitation.... South Carolina
ideologue William Harper turned it into a virtue, insisting that it helped account for the absence
of Southern prostitution and the purity of white women. Patrician diarist Mary Boykins Chesnut,
by contrast, countered that in fact ‘we live surrounded by prostitutes.... Like the patriarchs of old
our men all live in one house with their wives and concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in
every family exactly resemble the white children.’ Chesnut’s resentment was directed at the
wrongs she saw committed against white (sic) women...but to the equally bitter ex-slave
autobiographer Harriet Jacobs, the victims were black (sic) women forced to endure the shameful
indignities ‘inflicted by fiends who bear the shape of men.’ (sic) As Chesnut and Jacobs
recognized, and Harper implicitly conceded, no slave woman was safe from unwanted sexual
advances.
Of course, not all advances were entirely unwanted. There were slave women who
maintained long-term relationships with white men that came close to common-law marriages.
[This author disagrees with this source, that longevity in an abusive relationship equates to
consent, especially when the victim is already legal property of the other party in the
“relationship.”]....
Far more often, however, slaves who had sex with whites did so against their will,
whether the victims of outright rape or of the powerlessness that made resistance to advances
futile and the use of force in such advances unnecessary.... Sex between white men and black
women was a routine feature of life on many, perhaps most, slaveholdings, as masters, their
teenage sons, and on large holdings their overseers took advantage of the situation to engage in
the kind of casual, emotionless sex on demand unavailable from white women. What was
routine and causal to white men caused anguish to black women, anguish graphically described
by Harriet Jacobs in her searing autobiography, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, ‘I cannot tell
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between wealthy white men 12 and black13 women 14 in the antebellum South,15
how much I suffered in the presence of these wrongs,’ she wrote, ‘nor how I am still pained by
the retrospect.’” (Footnotes omitted.))
12

Who were these “wealthy white males” in the antebellum South, and why are they

significant to understanding sexual-racial economies? In the antebellum South, “wealth” was
viewed by the number of enslaved blacks one owned. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 30-1 (1956) [hereinafter STAMPP] (“The
planter aristocracy was limited to some ten thousand families who lived off the labor of gangs
(sic) of more than fifty slaves. The extreme wealthy families who owned more than a hundred
slaves numbered less than three thousand, a tint fraction of the southern population.”). It is
generally accepted that owning fifty or more slaves constituted a “large” holding. ROBERT
WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS:

THE ECONOMICS OF

AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 200 (1974) [hereinafter FOGEL & ENGERMAN]. See generally
WILLIAM KAUFFMAN SCARBOROUGH, MASTERS OF THE BIG HOUSE: ELITE SLAVEHOLDERS OF
THE MID-NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH

(2003) [hereinafter SCARBOROUGH] (presenting a

comprehensive analysis of the demographics, backgrounds, and thinking of this elite superclass).
While black enslavement was concentrated on several large plantations, it was, at the
same time, widespread and intimate: the majority of the four million enslaved blacks, counted in
the 1860 U.S. Federal Census, were owned by “resident” masters, in small holdings. KOLCHIN,
supra note 11, at 93, 101.
The planter aristocracy added to wealth, with political power. KOLCHIN, infra, 183-84
(“More and more, slaveholders–and the defense of slaveholders’ interests–dominated Southern
politics.... Reinforcing the hegemonic hold of slaveholding interests over Southern politics was
the simple numerical preponderance of slaveholders in Southern government.... A majority of
legislators in every slave state except Missouri, Arkansas, and Delaware were slave owners in
1860; typically, about three-quarters of deep-South legislators and two-thirds of upper-South
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legislators owned slaves. At the gubernatorial level, slaveholding was virtually universal.... [t]he
slaveholding character of most Southern politicians greatly facilitated the identification of
Southern interests with slaveholding interests, both in their own minds and in the minds of
others. Southern politics increasingly revolved around the defense of slavery, which was cast as
defense of the South itself.”)
One might believe that white men, especially wealthy and powerful white men, rarely
chose black women, especially enslaved black women, as their sexual partners. Yet our history
is filled with miscegenational relationships, involving rich and powerful white men and black,
sometimes enslaved, women. Some noteworthy ones include that of President Thomas
Jefferson’s sexual relationship with Sally Hemming (see WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER
BLACK 546 (1968), Chapter 6, detailing Jefferson’s long-term sexual relationship with Sally
Hemming, one of his enslaved black women). They also include Vice President Richard M.
Johnson (under President Martin Van Buren) who had an open, long-term relationship with a
black woman, and provided for their mulatto children. And most recent, it is now known that
Senator Strom Thurmond had a sexual encounter with Carrie Butler, that produced their
daughter, Essie Mae Washington-Williams (see Michael Janofsky, Thurmond Kin Acknowledge
Black Daughter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com (last visited, Dec. 16,
2003)). See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES, SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 41-59 (2003) [hereinafter KENNEDY].
13

“Black(s)” is defined as “[h]aving an extremely dark skin; strictly applied to negroes

and negritos, and other dark-skinned races; often loosely, to non-Europeans races, little darker
that many Europeans.... Of or pertaining to the negro race.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. II,
supra note 5, at 238. For purposes of this article, the term “black(s)” refers to people of African
heritage, who, in the American enslavement system, were generally enslaved. The term “black”
is synonymous with the terms “Negro,” “colored,” “black,” and “mulatto,” as those terms were
used in the 1830, 1840, 1850, and 1860 United States Census. “Black” is a term unoffensive to
most contemporary African Americans, especially compared to terms often used by some whites
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in the antebellum period (and afterwards) including “Negro” and “nigger.” For an intriguing and
brilliant analysis of the history and legacy of a racially-charged word, see RANDALL KENNEDY,
NIGGER, THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME WORD (2002).
Unlike Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, this author has chosen not to capitalize the word
“black,” seeking to highlight skin color and to contrast “white,” which is generally not
capitalized. In doing so, the author does not disagree with Professor Crenshaw’s view that
“Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as
such, require denotation as a proper noun.” See Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331, 1332 n.2 (1987-1988).

The term “black(s)” in this article does not refer to skin color, as

by operation of law, any “drop of black blood” (any black ancestry) resulted in a person being
classified as “black,” or “Negro,” meaning not white. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ISIDORE
STARR, THE NEGRO IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 3-13 (1967). The enslavement economy used
racial classification to promote enslavement over freedom. See generally COLOR AND RACE
(John Hope Franklin ed., 1968); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1487 (1999-2000).
In Louisiana, racial classifications were taken to another level. Free blacks were often
referred to as “persons of color” or “gens de couleur.” There were also many levels of raciallybased classification based on the mixture of black and white “blood” (although we know that
blood only has one red color). This article is not concerned with the debate over the effect that
skin color or ethnicity may have had on the status or social acceptability by whites of certain free
blacks who might have looked and acted “European,” although the author does not deny that skin
color may be a “status” issue. A black’s skin color alone did not determine status in the
antebellum South, as there were clearly dark-complexioned blacks who were free and owned
enslaved blacks. In addition, there were clearly light- or white-complexioned blacks (and even
reportedly white people) who were enslaved and treated as such. See VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ,
WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986).
Racial classification, that is “black” and “white” (and formerly “colored”), remains a
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closely guarded legal phenomenon in contemporary America. See recent debate over
California’s Proposition 54, a failed and heated attempt to change the California constitution to
delete racial classifications from official records. See generally Tanya Kateri Hernandez,
“Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classification in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD.
L. REV. 97 (1998) (exploring the contemporary legal ramifications of the multiracial category
movement, proposed by “monoracial” black and white parents of biracial children). (Racial
classification is legally more significant than gender classification, as seen in a Louisiana statute,
by which a person, who “changes” his or her sex, can legally have the “sex” designation (e.g.,
from “male” to “female”) changed on his/her birth certificate. See 40 La. Rev. Stat. § 62,
“Issuance of New Birth Certificate after Anatomical Change of Sex by Surgery.” There is no
corresponding provision for a person to change their race on their birth certificate.
14

This article will focus primarily on the adult relationships between wealthy white

masters and “adult” enslaved or free black women, both of legal age of consent. (There is doubt
whether black women ever “consent” to these relationships. First, the law gave such
overwhelming power and authority that white masters made their sexual advances difficult to
resist. Second, the law provided no remedy for the rape of an enslaved black woman. And, third,
the law failed to provide an enslaved black the legal capacity to consent, negativing their
humanity and will.) Some historians, such as Eugene Genovese, have concluded that these illicit
relationships began with rape and may have ended with love. EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 415 (1974) [hereinafter GENOVESE, ROLL].
(“Many white men who began by taking a slave girl in an act of sexual exploitation ended loving
her and the children she bore.”) Tragically, many of these relationships began with adult white
men raping underage enslaved black girls. See Lisa Haberman, The Seduction of Power: An
Analogy of Incest and Antebellum Slavery, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.307, at 313 -19 (2002)
(noting the similar relationship in the law’s treatment of enslaved blacks and that of wives and
children, which in each case, many times led to sexual exploitation).
There is consensus that some enslaved black women were purchased specifically to be
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white men’s sex toys, although perhaps not a widespread reason for all purchases of black
women. See ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY,
EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE PLANTATION REGIME
193-4 (2nd ed. 1969) [hereinafter PHILLIPS] (“The slaves whom the dealer preferred to buy for
distant sale.... Demonstrable talents in artisanry (sic) would of course enhance a man’s value;
and unusual good looks on the part of a young woman might stimulate the bidding of men
interested in concubinage. Episodes of the latter sort were occasionally reported.... Concubinage
itself was fairly frequent, particularly in southern Louisiana; but no frequency of purchases for it
as a predominant purpose can be demonstrated from authentic records.”)
A romantic view of these miscegenational relationships can be found in the account of a
white Tennessee schoolteacher. Showing his deep love for his black wife and their children, in a
petition to the American Colonization Society, he asked for permission to migrate to Liberia:
“My wife is a Quadroon of New Orleans... we have been married for five years and have two
children, who being only 1/8 African, are blue-eyed, and flaxen hair; and nearly as ‘pale faced’
as myself. Still, they are coloured and that is a word of tremendous import in North America!...
I will go anywhere... to avoid so hateful an alternative.” BERLIN, supra note 7, at 267.
Other white men-black women relationships existed, some legitimate and some
“illegitimate.” There was the wealthy white master’s relationship with his mulatto daughter,
who is herein referred to as the “black princess,” the offspring of a white master and a black
woman, free or enslaved. By law, the black princess was owned by her white father, as she
maintained the legal status of her enslaved mother. For example, the first recorded Virginia
“slave code” statute, in 1662, firmly dealt with the legal status of mixed race offspring:
“Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got (sic) by an Englishman upon a negro
woman should be slave or free, Be it therefore enacted... that all children borne in this country
shall be held bond (sic) or free only according to the condition of the mother.” JOHN H.
RUSSELL, THE FREE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA, 1619-1865, 19 n. 8 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1969)
(1913) [hereinafter RUSSELL] (citing Hening, vol. ii, p. 170). See also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1121 (6th ed. 1990), under the term “partus sequitur ventrem.” (“The offspring of a
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provides great insight into the very nature of the regulation of wealth transference
and property rights, including a better understanding of contemporary
constitutional issues involving race and gender. This article’s focus on the
relationship between miscegenation and wealth transference represents an unusual
and exciting interdisciplinary approach to the contemporary debate on society’s
obligations to African Americans. Legal scholarship has peeked at how Critical
Race Theory can illuminate the truth in the development of the American legal
system.16 This article’s approach serves to open the door to an increased use of

slave belongs to the mother, or follows the condition of the mother.”). The white father and
master had to both acknowledge and emancipate his black princess to give her “free” status,
along with inheritance rights. In addition to relations with the black mistress, wealthy white
masters had relationships with older black women, free or enslaved; some of whom reared him
and breast fed him, as a surrogate mother.
15

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 28 (referring to the 1830-1860 time period as the “ante-

bellum” enslavement period).
16

See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIAL AND

PROBLEMS (2003) (utilizing Critical Race Theory in developing a black letter law case book). See
also DAVIS, supra note 9 (analyzing the relationship of race, sex, and inheritance law, and
describing the legal obstacles to black devisees in the antebellum South); Anthony R. Chase,
Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1
(1995) [hereinafter CHASE] (taking a Critical Race Theory approach to analyzing the
development of contract law); Mary Frances Berry, Judging Morality: Sexual Behavior and
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Critical Race Theory to solve contemporary legal problems.
This article seeks to explain the majority opinion in the recent Supreme
Court’s “anti-affirmative action”17 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.18 It seeks to

Legal Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South, 78 J. AM. HIST. 835 (1991)
(analyzing legal attitudes towards concubinage and inheritance); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 45-50
(1981) [hereinafter TUSHNET] (describing how commercial law was influenced by enslavement,
such as the fellow-servant rule); and Frederick Wertheim, Slavery and the Fellow-Servant Rule:
An Antebellum Dilemma, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1112 (1986) (describing enslavement’s effect on the
fellow-servant rule). One Critical-Race-Theorist defined it as “the work of progressive legal
scholars of color who are attempting to develop a jurisprudence that accounts for the role of
racism in American law and that works towards the elimination of racism as part of a larger goal
of eliminating all forms of oppression.” Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False
Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1763 n.3 (1990). See generally CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al.,
eds., 1995).
This article seeks to marry Critical Race Theory with Feminist sensitivities to promote
the observation that anticipated this article’s position, made by DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY, RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 23 (1997), wherein she
states: “The social order by powerful white men was founded on two inseparable ingredients: the
dehumanization of Africans on the basis of race, and the control of women’s sexuality and
reproduction. The American legal system is rooted in this monstrous combination of racial and
gender domination.”
17

Grutter is an “anti-affirmative action” decision because, even though hailed as a victory

for racial and ethnic-based “affirmative action” at state universities and professional schools, the
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do so by analyzing the legal history of miscegenation and of black women’s
property rights in the antebellum South. It is within that analysis that this article
expects to find the roots of the majority’s rationale in Grutter.
Tying the Grutter rationale to laws regulating miscegenation and black
women’s property rights in the antebellum South, needs some introductory
explanation. From a critical perspective, Grutteris a case about property, wealth
transference, and miscegenation, when seen through the rationale of Justice
O’Connor’s swing-vote opinion.19 First, Grutteris a case about privilege and

Supreme Court’s justification was not to act affirmatively to benefit African-American and other
racially and ethnicly “disadvantaged” students, but, rather, it was to enhance the educational
experience of the affluent majority white student population. See infra, note 19. Compare a
positive interpretation of Grutter, P

ATRICIA GURIN, JEFFREY S.

LEHMAN, AND EARL LEWIS,

DEFENDING DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (2004). The
author is particularly grateful to Cornell University President (formerly Dean, University of
Michigan Law School) Jeffrey S. Lehman for sending an advance chapter, entitled, “The
Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Discussions of Affirmative Action from
Bakke to Grutter.”
18

123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).

19

Justice O’Connor’s fifth vote is generally regarded as the decisive tiebreaker in that

case. See Evan Thomas, Stuart Taylor Jr., Debra Rosenberg & Eleanor Clift, Center Court: She
helped America seek a middle ground on the thorny subject of race. Sandra Day O’Connor’s
brand of justice, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8639381. First, Justice
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wealth transference. Wealth is the capital accumulation of “privilege” and
“property”20 interests. It has been widely recognized that access to prestigious

O’Connor reiterates Justice Powell’s view in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), establishing “strict scrutiny” of racial or ethnic-based state actions: “In Justice Powell’s
view, when governmental decisions ‘touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, he is
entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.’ Id. at 299, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Under this
existing standard, only one of the interests asserted by the university survived Justice Powell’s
scrutiny.” Second, Justice O’Connor agrees with Justice Powell’s rejection as a compelling
argument that African-Americans deserved to have an equal opportunity to attend professional
(medical) degree granting schools. She states that Justice Powell first rejected an interest in
“‘reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medicine and in the
medical profession’” as an unlawful interest in racial balancing. Id. at 306-07, 98 S. Ct. 2733.
Second, Justice Powell rejected an interest in remedying societal discrimination because such
measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties “who bear no
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions programs are thought
to have suffered.” Id. at 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733. And third, Justice Powell rejected an interest in
“increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved,”
concluding that even if such an interest could be compelling in some circumstances, the program
under review was not “geared to promote that goal.” Id. at 306, 310, 98 S. Ct. 2733. Justice
Powell approved the university’s use of race to further only one interest: “the attainment of a
diverse student body.” Id. at 311, 98 S. Ct. 2733.
20

“Property” has historically been seen as a legal interest in a thing, and almost

synonymous with the thing, such as land. That legal interest became “reified” or abstracted, as
to be no longer reflective of a tangible object. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of
the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
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universities, like Yale, Stanford, and the University of Michigan, is one of the
greatest sources of wealth creation in contemporary society, especially their
professional school programs.21
Second, Grutter is about “property,” in that African Americans who apply to
elite predominately white universities and professional schools are judicially

325 (1980) (analyzing the “dephysicalization” of property and the resultant broadening of
property law to include valuable interests not traditionally treated or considered as property.)
Compare William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) (showing how the
racial sexual economy impacts legal development). Query: Did this “dephysicalization” or
“reification” occur in response to the classification of enslaved blacks as “property?” One
answer can be found in the view of JUDGE A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 15 (1978)
[hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM] (explaining “how the American legal process was able to set its
conscience aside and, by pragmatic toadying (sic) to economic ‘needs,’ rationalize a regression
of human rights for blacks.”)
Today, “property” is legally enforceable interests over wealth including intangibles such
as intellectual property (copyrights and patents), investment vehicles (stocks and bonds),
education (law and medical degrees and licenses), and arguably governmental benefits (social
security and welfare). See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
Hence, the contemporary issue of African-American access to quality higher education,
“affirmative action” is a property law issue.
21

See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383

(1993).
Page 23 of 302

Blackness as Property
reduced to “white property,” or “diversity commodity.”22 In Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, the only legal justification for African Americans attending America’s
elite public (and arguably) private universities and professional schools, is to
provide “a diverse student body” to enhance the learning environment of the
affluent white majority.23 This view reduces African Americans to white property

22

The author coins this phase to refer to African-American students on white college

campuses, who, in the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court in Grutter, are not entitled as
tax-paying citizens to seek a quality education at their state’s “flagship” universities and
professional schools. The Grutter Court’s only legal justification for minority students’ presence
on white campuses is that they merely enhance the experience of the white student majority.
(Query: Should the white student majority pay the African-American students’ tuition, as the
white students are the prime beneficiaries of the experience?)
23

123 S.Ct. at 2340 (Justice O’Connor):

These benefits (of diversity; author’s words of explanation, not Justice
O’Connor’s direct words) are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.... What is more, high-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘a highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps... is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its
principle mission to provide national security.’... The primary sources for the
Nation’s officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already admitted to
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in three ways: The Gruttermajority fails to recognize African -American selfdetermination as a consideration, negating their free will. The Grutter majority
appears to accept as its premise the “African-American inferiority stereotype.”24

participating colleges and universities.... At present, ‘the military cannot achieve
an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the
service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and
admissions policies.’... To fulfill its mission, the military ‘must be selective in
admissions for training and education for the officer corps, and it must train and
educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse
setting.’... We agree that ‘it requires only a small step from this analysis to
conclude that our country’s other most selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective.’ (References omitted.)
24

That stereotype of “inferiority” is based mainly upon performance on “standardized”

examinations, such as the LSAT test for law school applicants. It is irrefutable that Justice
O’Connor’s Grutteropinion stigmatizes all racial minorities who apply to, and attend,
predominately white, elite public (and arguably private) institutions as less qualified than many,
if not most, of their white counterparts. Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2344 (O’Connor, as part of her
discussion of the “termination” point of affirmative action): “What is more, the Law School
actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race. The Law School frequently
accepts nonminority (sic) applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented
(sic) minority applicants (and other nonminority (sic) applicants who were rejected.” And again,
at 2346-7, Justice O’Connor refers to the lower scores of minority students: “It has been 25 years
since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity
in the context of higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high
grades and test scores have indeed increased.” (She also referenced lower minority grades at
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That is, that African-American applicants need “affirmative action,” because they
are inherently unqualified to compete with white students at elite state universities
and professional schools. And the Grutter majority empowers white America to
judge whether African-American applicants are worthy recipients of white
generosity.
And, third, the Grutter case is about miscegenation. It is specifically
concerned with a limited number of African-Americans, primarily women, seeking
access into predominantly white, elite public universities and professional
schools.25 As white men make up the largest single gender group on elite public

2344, “Justice Kennedy speculates that ‘race is likely outcome determinative for many members
of minority groups’ who do not fall within the upper range of LSAT scores and grades.”)
At the same time, Justice O’Connor was aware that there were less stigmatizing
alternatives to increase the number of minority at the University of Michigan Law School, but
chose to ignore them: “The District Court took the Law School to task for failing to consider
race-neutral alternatives such as ‘using a lottery system’ or ‘decreasing the emphasis for all
applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores’.... So too with the suggestion that the Law
School imply lower admissions standards for all students, a drastic remedy that would require the
Law School to become a much different institution and sacrifice a vital component of its
educational mission.” Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2345 (O’Connor).
25

See The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, at

www.jbhe.com/latest/112703_blacks_law_schools.html (last visited December 16, 2003)
[hereinafter JOURNAL] (reporting that “black women are now 60 percent of all AfricanPage 26 of 302
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university campuses, when we discuss integrating those campuses with primarily
black women, we must consider the issue of miscegenation. (Of course, there are
other racial-gender relationships, including white men and black men, white
women and black men, and white women and black women, that exist on elite
university campuses.)
The thesis of this article, then, is that Justice O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter
has its roots in southern antebellum laws regulating and negotiating the sexualracial economies of property acquisition and transfers from white men to black
women, including testamentary transfers and intestate succession, and, consistent
with Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle, serves to reinforce
a greater social and economic order (as the law did in the antebellum South): the
domination, supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.
An overview of the article’s layout is appropriate here. Part I establishes the
Americans law school enrollments.... At both the University of California at Berkeley and the
University of Virginia, black women are more than 70 percent of all black students.” See also
The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, at
www.jbhe.com/latest/120403_grads_MedicalSchool.html (last visited December 16, 2003)
(reporting that “Beginning in 1989, and for every year since then, black women have been the
majority of all blacks completing medical school. In 2001 they made up 60.5 percent of all
blacks who graduated from medical school.... Black women are 61 percent of all black students
at Johns Hopkins University, believed to be the best medical school in the nation.”)
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critical value of a case study of the law of miscegenation and black women’s
property rights, relative to contemporary constitutional law race and gender issues
and its validity in evaluating Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence”
principle. Part II presents and analyzes the legal principles that the white masters
developed to control the world they made, one that effectively married America’s
antebellum private property ownership, enslavement, and sexual paradigms; their
“American Dream.” Part III describes and analyzes how, in the antebellum
American South, legislatures regulated miscegenation, and how sex, race, and
status affect the doctrinal mechanisms that governed private property transactions
including the acquisition, control, and transfer of property. Part IV describes and
analyzes how and why antebellum Southern courts, particularly in the more
permissive legislative regime of Louisiana, restricted white men’s ability to
transfer, by will, wealth to their enslaved black female sexual partners. Part V
describes and analyzes the paradox in the existence and success of the “black
mistress,” black women who the law allowed certain property law privileges,
including the right to own land and enslaved blacks in the antebellum South, and
how their legal experience challenges Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence”
principle. Part VI provides a postscript to the black mistress, describing her role in
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the post-bellum civil rights movement. And Part VII describes and evaluates the
concept of “blackness as white property” in contemporary society.
This article concludes that the legal treatments of miscegenation and of
black women’s property rights, in the antebellum South, are the roots to Justice
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter, and that both reflect and support Professor Bell’s
“interest-convergence” principle. That is, that the law regulating and negotiating
the sexual-racial economies of property acquisition and transfers, including
testamentary transfers and intestate succession between white men and black
women, served to reinforce a greater social and economic order in the antebellum
South: the domination, supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.

B.

BELL’S “INTEREST-CONVERGENCE” PRINCIPLE TESTED BY
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF MISCEGENATION

This article utilizes Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence”
principle as a vital tool. Relative to Critical Race Theory, Professor Bell has
observed: “Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after
Brown, this principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in
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achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the
interests of whites.”26 This article tests the application of Bell’s “interest
convergence” principle to the development of the antebellum South’s law of
miscegenation and the black women’s property rights, or simply white to black
wealth transference.
This article conducts an interdisciplinary analysis of sex, race, status, and
private property by examining the law’s role in black women’s property ownership
in the antebellum South. (It also exposes and explodes certain myths and
stereotypes about enslavement and the status of black women within the
enslavement.) This article examines nineteenth-century statutes and cases
involving black women’s27 property and inheritance rights, including those of

26

BELL, supra note 4.

27

This article expressly singles out African-American women in its treatment of the

subject for various reasons. First, as discussed later, black women made up a significant
percentage of the free population. BERLIN, supra note 7, at 151 (“Of all slaves, the black
concubines and children of slaveholders were most assured of emancipation.”) Id. at 177 (“In
contrast to the white and slave populations, there were many more Negro women than men in the
South. The great preponderance of free Negro women was confined almost entirely to the cities.
There the combined effects of manumission and migratory patterns played havoc with the sexual
balance. Urban emancipators tended to bestow favors on women, partly because slave women
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free28 black women who owned property, including land and their ownership of
enslaved blacks.29 In this article, these rare, privileged, and affluent class of free

outnumbered slave men in the cities and partly because close intermingling encouraged sexual
liaisons which sometimes led to manumission.... [T]he greater mobility of free Negro men
allowed a disproportionate number of them to leave the South.”) Second, some black women
held significant tracts of land and large numbers of slaves. Third, miscegenation, particularly
black women’s relationships with white men, is an essential element for understanding this piece
of legal history.
The author’s focus on the relationship between white men and black women is not meant
to lessen the importance of other miscegenational relationships in the antebellum South, or to be
blind to their existence. For example, there were also free black men who played a significant
role in American history. Consistent with Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle,
black men were manumitted mainly due to military service and other heroic deeds that served the
interests of wealthy white males. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 428 (“Among the more
romantic liberations was that of Pierre Chastang of Mobile who, in recognition of public service
in the war of 1812 and the yellow fever epidemic of 1819 was bought and freed by popular
subscription....” (Footnote omitted.)) Needless to say, there were sexual relationships between
free black men and white women, particularly in the urban areas. See, e.g., JOHN W.
BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS 1860-1880 (1973) [hereinafter BLASSINGAME, BLACK]
(especially Chapter 7 on sexual relations between blacks and whites).
28

These blacks, living in the southern enslavement states, were legally “free,” not legally

enslaved and were not someone’s property. See generally BERLIN, supra note 7.
29

See LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN THE SOUTH, 1790-1915,

86-87 (1990) [hereinafter SCHWENINGER]:
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[F]ree women of color... as a group... controlled a substantial proportion of the
total black wealth. In 1850, they owned $2,033,500 worth of real estate or 27
percent of the total $7,668,100; in 1860, they owned $2,782,700 of the
$12,841,600 in real property, or 22 percent. As with men there was a sharp
contrast between the Lower South, where, according to the census, 561 free
women of color owned a total of $1,671,400 in 1850, or $2,979 per realty holder,
and the Upper South, where 695 black women controlled only $362,100, or an
average of only $521 each. In 1860, 694 women in the Lower South owned
$1,870,200, or $2,695 per owner, while in the Upper South 1,223 owned
$912,500, or $746 apiece. Some of these women–especially in Louisiana and
Virginia where half of them lived–were widows of prosperous free men of color
or former mistresses of wealthy whites, but in the Upper South most were simply
industrious women who had spent many years accumulating small amounts of
property. On both sections a few Negro women had made the journey from
slavery to freedom to landownership in a single lifetime.... Yet, despite these
difficulties, free black women accumulated significant amounts of property. In
addition, they owned more real estate, on average, than Negro men: in 1850, their
average realty holding stood at $1,619 compared with $1,144 for men; a decade
later the gap had narrowed but women still possessed larger average (sic) estates
than their male counterparts. By then, one out of five Negro real estate owners in
the South was female.
For empirical evidence that southern blacks did, in fact, own enslaved blacks, see FREE
NEGRO OWNERS OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830 TOGETHER WITH ABSENTEE
OWNERSHIP OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830 (Carter G. Woodson, compiler and editor,
1924) [hereinafter WOODSON], and Carter G. Woodson, Free Negro Owners of Slaves in the
United States in 1830, 9 J. NEGRO HIST. 41-85 (1924) (both compiling and analyzing the United
States 1830 Population Census to list by states the names of free black heads of families and the
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black women is referred to as the “black mistress.”30 This article seeks to explain
number of slaves they owned). Compare LUTHER PORTER JACKSON, FREE NEGRO LABOR AND
PROPERTY HOLDING IN VIRGINIA, 1830-1860, 201, 202 n.5 (Atheneum 1968) (1942) [hereinafter
JACKSON] (noting “a few serious errors” in Woodson’s work, such as “Many of the largest
slaveholders listed in the Virginia section... were not Negroes but white persons.... The number
of slaves credited to each individual in this compilation varies from 18 to 71. Free Negroes in
Virginia never owned slaves on so large a scale.”) See also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 433-36
(“...a negro planter in St. Paul’s Parish, South Carolina, was reported before the close of the
eighteenth century to have two hundred slaves as well as a white wife and son-in-law, and the
returns of the first federal census appear to corroborate it.... In Louisiana colored planters on a
considerable scale became fairly common.... In rural Virginia and Maryland also there were free
colored slaveholders in considerable numbers.”)
Not all free blacks, of course, owned enslaved blacks. Most of them, like the majority of
antebellum southern whites, were poor and owned no property of any kind. The majority of free
blacks who did own enslaved blacks owned only a few, leading to the observation “that by far
the larger portion of free Negro owners of slaves were the possessors of this human chattel for
benevolent reasons. There are numerous examples of free Negroes having purchased relatives or
friends to ease their lot.” JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA, 17901860, 160 (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1971) (1943) [hereinafter FRANKLIN].
30

The author expressly uses the term “black mistress” to describe black women who

owned land and enslaved blacks, even though in antebellum society, the term “mistress” denoted
white women who ran plantation households. See DAVIS, supra note 9, 220 n.17 (describing her
views on various words labeling black women). As will be discussed later, this article takes
issue with Professor Davis’s observation that the role of running a plantation was “specifically
denied to black women.” Id. at n.17. Within the term “black mistress,” the author intends to
include the “black princess,” the female offspring of white slaveholding masters and black
women, free or enslaved. See FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, THE COTTON KINGDOM: A
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TRAVELLER’S OBSERVATIONS ON COTTON AND SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAN SLAVE STATES 23536 (Arthur M. Schlesinger ed., 1953) (“There is one, among the multitudinous classifications of
society in New Orleans, which is a very peculiar... result.... I refer to a class composed of
illegitimate offsprings of white men and coloured women (mulattoes or quadroons), who, from
habits of early life, the advantages of education and the use of wealth, are too much superior to
the negroes, in general to associate with them, and are not allowed by law, or popular prejudice,
to marry white people. The girls are frequently sent to Paris to be educated, and are very
accomplished. They are generally pretty, often handsome. I have rarely, if ever, met more
beautiful women than one or two whom I saw by chance, in the streets.”)
This author is greatly in debt to Professor Davis for setting the bar of legal scholarship on
the subject of sex, race, and testamentary transfer at such a high level so as to challenge to
greatness anyone with the fortitude to enter into the arena. Professor Davis “chose to focus on
(black) women who suffered under the disabilities of slavery to reveal the contradictions and
evolution of private law doctrine as it struggled to manage the racial economics of sex.” DAVIS,
supra note 9, at 228. (Emphasis added.) Professor Davis’s work focused on relationships
between white men and enslaved black women, admittedly leaving out white men’s relationships
with free black women (id. at 228). This article covers white men’s relationships with enslaved
and with free black women. The author is especially interested in focusing on the relationships
between free women of color and wealthy white men is that those relationships support the
author’s sub-thesis that some black women were not helpless or defenseless, and were, in fact,
mistresses of their own faith and drivers of their own destiny.
The term “black mistress” plays on our historically flawed, fictionalized picture of the
drama of the master-enslaved relationship. As this study will show, there were a few free blacks,
who like their white “aristocratic,” wealthy counterparts, were in the “planter” class. For these
“black mistresses,” there was the greatest status difference with the enslaved population. Black
mistresses were also the greatest challenge to enslavement’s white supremacy premise. Black
mistresses, then, were free black women who owned land and twenty or more enslaved blacks.
See ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE
Page 34 of 302

Blackness as Property
the legal paradox of the black mistress’s property rights.
In the antebellum American South, legislatures and courts had to decide how
sex, race, and status affected the doctrinal mechanisms that governed interracial
private property transactions, including the acquisition, control, and transfer of
property. How these legislatures and courts handled black women’s property
rights illuminates principles of sex, race, status, and property (wealth inheritance)
law that may help us understand contemporary gender and race issues relative to
wealth transference. In addition to key cases, this article effectively utilizes
primary legal research sources, including the United States Census schedules, the
private property transactions recorded in courthouses such as conveyances,
mortgages, donation records, and probate records to provide a rich, yet little
known, glimpse into this peculiar anomaly of American society.
This article serves to answer three probing questions about the relationship
between sex, race, status, and private property law: First, why did the law allow
some blacks to be freed and to remain free, despite the general legal proposition of
enslavement law that all blacks be enslaved? Second, why did the law allow free

WOMEN IN THE OLD SOUTH 86 (1988) [hereinafter FOX-GENOVESE] (defining “planters” as a
person owning more than twenty); compare KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at xiii (1993) (defining
“planters,” as a person owning twelve or more enslaved blacks).
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blacks to own private property, despite the general legal proposition that enslaved
blacks were not allowed to own property? And third, why have American-African
women been stereotyped as un-industrious, helpless victims of white domination,
despite a history of self-determination and achievement? These questions and their
answers will be approached from a study of the legal history of the antebellum,
southern, black woman’s private property ownership and the law of miscegenation.
How, then, does Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle facilitate
our understanding of how and why the law generally failed to provide white men
the right to marry black women, and to alienate, inter vivos and causa mortis, their
private property, to their black women and their children? It would appear,
according to Professor Bell’s principle, that whoever provided the greatest
“service” to wealthy white men received the greatest legal benefits, including
property rights. An analysis of this question requires us to evaluate both the law of
miscegenation, particularly as it relates to white men’s ability to dispose of
legacies to black women, and the legal history of free black women, who owned
property in the antebellum South.
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C.

WEALTH AND RACIAL/SEXUAL STEREOTYPES

Private property ownership is perhaps the hallmark of American society.31
Its relationship to sex and race provides a compelling opportunity to evaluate
private property ownership’s role in the development of our legal system. The first
American revolution was arguably tied to the struggle for control of property,
particularly land.32 The second American struggle for freedom that culminated
with the Civil War, was tied to another form of private property ownership, that of
enslaved black human beings.33 In the enslavement political economy,34 private

31

See Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.

691 (1937-1938) (documenting primary of property law in the legal order, and concluding that
the doctrinal concern for vested property rights was “the basic doctrine of American
constitutional law.”)
32

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973) [hereinafter

FRIEDMAN], especially Chapter IV, “The Law of Person Status: Wives, Paupers, and the Slaves”
and Chapter V, “The American Law of Property.”
33

See generally DAVID M. POTTER, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS

(Yale Univ. Press, 6th ed 1971) (1942) (analyzing and documenting the attitudes of the
Republicans to the threat of secession and the actions of President Lincoln between his election
as President and the fall of Fort Sumter).
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ownership of enslaved blacks represented a very substantial investment in capital.35

34

The term “enslavement political economy” or “enslavement economy” reflects the

plantation society of EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN
THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF THE SLAVE SOUTH

15-16 (1965) (“The essential element in this

distinct civilization was the slaveholders’ domination, made possible by their command of labor.
Slavery provided the basis for a special Southern economy and social life, special problems and
tensions, and special laws of development.”)
35

See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 14, at 4 (“Slavery was not a system irrationally

kept in existence by plantation owners who failed to perceive or were indifferent to their best
economic interests. The purchase of a slave was generally a highly profitable investment which
yielded rates of return that compared favorably with the most outstanding investment
opportunities in manufacturing.”) See also ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, LIFE AND LABOR IN THE OLD
SOUTH 185, 185 n. 4 (Little, Brown and Company 1963) (1929) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, LIFE]
(“The universal disposition is to purchase. It is the first use for savings, and the negro purchased
is the last possession to be parted with,” quoting a writer of a well-read southern agricultural
journal, James B. D. DeBow, on the primacy of investing in slave property. DeBow’s Review,
XXX, 74 (January, 1861)). “An expert accountant has well defined the property of a master in
his slave as an annuity extending throughout the slave’s working life and amounting to the
annual surplus which the labor of the slave produced over and above the cost of his
maintenance.” PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 359, 359 n.1, citing Arthur H. Gibson, Human
Economics (1909), at 202 (sic).
Enslaved black labor was often viewed as a commodity, like chattel. See, e.g., PHILLIPS,
LIFE , infra at 176-177 (presenting a price-curve chart for prime field hands, plotted from four
nineteenth-century enslavement markets, including New Orleans, Charleston, Virginia, and
Georgia, showing the average price being $1,300 over a thirty-year time-span, with a high of
$1,800 in 1860).
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Therefore, one peculiar aspect of the development of American property law is its
relationship to the institution of enslavement.36 The third and current American
revolution will arguably focus on economic disparities and wealth redistribution.37
“Whiteness” has come to represent a positive property right in America’s
political and economic wealth.38 The opposite could be said about “blackness:” a
negative property right in America’s legacy, starting with a history of blacks as

36

See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2000) [hereinafter

“BELL, RACE”].
37

See Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts: Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO.

L. J. 2531 (2001); Charles J. Ogletree, Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Lecture of Constitutional Law:
The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051 (2003). (The National Coalition
of Blacks for Reparations in America (“N’COBRA”) is an umbrella organization of more than a
dozen groups seeking to advance the campaign for reparations.) See generally SHOULD AMERICA
PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS (Raymond A. Winbush, ed.) (2003).
38

See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1993)

(examining how whiteness, initially constructed as a form of racial identity, evolved into a form
of property, historically and presently acknowledged and protected in American law, noting that
race or racism alone did not operate to oppress blacks; instead “the interaction between concepts
of race and property, played a critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic
subordination.”) It is, as a result of her inspiring work and thought-provoking analysis, that this
article adds “sexual oppression” to the analytical picture and parodies the title of her note-worthy
thesis. (Imitation is the highest form of compliment!)
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whites’ enslaved property, to second-class citizenship status following the Civil
War, and still facing a wealth and education gap compared to white Americans.39
African Americans today are still seeking full legal equality under property
law,40 following a recent history that includes racially-restrictive covenants.41 It

39

African-American legal history is one of a continuing struggle for full and equal rights

as U.S. citizens, without the shackles of racial and gender discrimination. See generally BELL,
RACE, supra note 36. The Reconstruction Congress recognized the need to bestow full U.S.
citizenship benefits on African Americans, including the right to property, the right to contract,
the right to the benefits of one’s labor, and attempted to do so through the 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, XIV, and XV.
40

See generally BELL, RACE, supra note 36, especially Chapter 8, “Property Barriers and

Fair Housing Laws” (outlining and analyzing the legal history of housing discrimination).
41

See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as cited in BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at

372 (wherein the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a restrictive covenant in a deed
stating, “it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time
against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other
purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race.”) See also, the Federal Fair Housing Act,
enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-31, as cited in BELL,
RACE, supra note 36, at 398 (1994) (making it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent or otherwise
make unavailable a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
familial status, or handicap).
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has been shown that the basis for today’s racial wealth gap42 is rooted in America’s
enslavement of African Americans, followed by continuing racial discrimination
and victimization.43 It appears that we are still living the legacy of our raciallyoppressive past.
To better understand the law’s relationship to wealth creation and the

42

See Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998, Apr. 2000, at

http://www.levy.org/docs/wrkpap/papers/300.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004) (showing that in
1998, the median net worth of African Americans was $10,000, compared to $81,700 of white
Americans, and, when housing is excluded, $1,200 for African Americans, compared to $37,600
for white Americans.) See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING
AFRICAN AMERICAN, HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY (2004).
43

See A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The ‘Law Only as an Enemy’: The

Legitimatization of Racial Powerlessness through the Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of
Virginia, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 975 (1992) [hereinafter HIGGINBOTHAM & JACOBS] (recognizing “a
nexus between the brutal centuries of colonial slavery and racial polarization and anxieties today.
The poisonous legacy of legalized oppression based upon the matter of color can never be
adequately purged from our society if we act as if slave laws never existed.”) See also CLAUD
ANDERSON, BLACK LABOR, WHITE WEALTH: THE SEARCH FOR POWER AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
(1994); Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, Joint Center Data Bank, available at
http://www.jointcenter.org./DB (for statistical data showing the nature of the racial wealth gap).
See generally RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000);
GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Essay:
Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.- C.L.L.
REV. 279 (2003).
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challenges to full wealth equity that African Americans face, it is appropriate to
introduce the “racial ladder” analogy.44 At the bottom level of the ladder was
enslavement, where enslaved black women, as will be later described, had no
property rights and, indeed, were themselves property, subject to many types of
personal abuse, including sexual. At the top rung of the ladder was freedom,
where wealthy white men or “masters” enjoyed all legal private property law
benefits. Freedom’s legal citizenship benefits included the right to purchase, sell,
own, alienate, abandon, manumit (in the case of enslaved property), lease (as lessor
or lessee), gift (both inter vivos and causa mortis), contract (sale and concurrent
ownership including marriage), inherit (both by will and through the intestate
laws), create non-possessory interests (e.g., easements), collateralize (to secure
financing), and the like. A legal history of enslaved blacks’ struggles to obtain the
full civil benefits of freedom is an important lesson in America’s history and
valuable in understanding contemporary constitutional rights issues. It also helps
legal scholars better understand the development and the nature of property rights.
Relative to property rights, there is a ten step or “rung” process from

44

The author refers to the various levels of American citizenship as the “racial ladder,”

because it helps the reader visualize the different levels or “rungs” of citizenship, from “alien”
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enslavement to freedom that enslaved black women had to negotiate. Step One
was manumission. This was the legal process through which an enslaved black
obtained “free” legal status.45 Step Two was the right to contract, especially for
one’s labor.46 Step Three was the right to receive gifts, inter vivos, and by
inheritance. Step Four was the right of succession, to inherit through operation of
intestate succession law, as well as the right to be recognized as a legitimate heir.
Step Five was the right to acquire land as property in one’s own name.47 Step Six
(or enslaved) status to full citizenship status (or free).
45

See generally JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE, REMAINING FREE,

MANUMISSION AND ENSLAVEMENT IN NEW ORLEANS, 1846-1862 ( 2003) [hereinafter SCHAFER,
FREE]. Manumission often resulted from the magnanimous (although usually self-serving) act of
a white master. But it also resulted from the hard-fought efforts of enslaved blacks through the
use of “freedom suits.” See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. and F. Michael Higginbotham,
“Yearning to Breathe Free”: Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in
Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1213 (1993).
46

See generally CHASE, supra note 16 (taking a Critical Race Theory approach to

analyzing the development of contract law).
47

Recognizing that enslavement had deprived enslaved blacks and sometimes free blacks

of property rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Section One, expressly
provided for the right to contract for property and other property rights:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of
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was the right to acquire other types of property, including enslaved blacks. Step
Seven was the right to mortgage property and borrow money. Step Eight was the
right to gift property, inter vivos and causa mortis. Step Nine was the right to
participate in open commerce. And Step Ten was the right to marry, especially
across racial lines.48 An analysis of these ten steps will provide a greater
appreciation of the forthcoming study of the regulation of miscegenation and of
the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.”

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
48

There are many legal benefits that derive from a legally-recognized marriage that were

denied black women who had relationships with white men. See William Reppy, Property and
Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA.
L. REV. 1677, 1678 (1984) [hereinafter REPPY] (analyzing some benefits of marriage, including
enforcement of property rights contracts, that achieve income tax, gift tax, or estate tax benefits).
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black women’s property rights.
African Americans share a history that is intrinsically tied to the
development of American property law.49 In the early colonial days, blacks were
often treated as indentured servants, who had some property rights and, most
importantly, ended their indenture with the completion of a term of years of
service.50 Yet there is evidence that early in our nation’s history, blacks were

49

See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN, HISTORICAL ORIGINS

OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES

(1974) [hereinafter JORDAN]; Donald Aquinas Lancaster, Jr.,

The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States of America’s Sanction of Slavery and Segregation:
A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analysis of African American Reparations, 43 HOW. L.J.
171 (2000).
50

There is evidence that blacks were not legally “slaves” in colonial America, as they had

the same status as white indentured servants. “In the records of the county courts (of Virginia)
for 1632 to 1661 negroes were designated as “servants,” “negro servants,” or simply as
“negroes,” but never in the records which we examined were they termed “slaves.” RUSSELL,
supra note 14, at 24 (citing for examples or illustrations M.S. Court Records of Accomac
County, 1632-1640, pp. 55, 152 et seq.; Lower Norfolk County, 1637-1646, 1646-1651; also
citing the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, “...they lived on a footing with the whites, who, as well
as themselves, were under the absolute direction of the president.” Jefferson Report, 119n.)
RUSSELL, supra note 14, at 23-24.

Thus for the first two generations the negroes were few, they were
employed alongside the white servants, and in many cases were members
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legally classified and treated as “property,” under their master’s control.51
of their masters’ households... and even their legal status was during the
early decades indefinite.... The first comers were slaves in the hands of
their maritime sellers; but they were not fully slaves in the hands of their
Virginia buyers, for they were neither law nor custom then establishing the
institution of slavery in the colony.... In the country court records prior to
1661 the negroes are called negro servants or merely negroes–never, it
appears, definitely slaves.... Some of the blacks were in fact liberated by
the courts as having served out the terms fixed by their indentures or by
the custom of the country.

PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 75.
51

See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, 62

(1996) [hereinafter MORRIS], especially Part II, “Slaves as Property,” (pointing out that, despite
moral objections, enslaved blacks themselves were held as “property,” not just their labor). See
also STAMPP, supra note 15, at 201 (“(Regarding the dehumanizing effects of reducing people to
property) The laws, after all, were not abstractions; they were written by practical men who
expected them to be applied to real situations. Accordingly, slaves were (sic) bartered, deeded,
devised, pledged, seized, and auctioned. They were awarded as prizes in lotteries and raffles;
they were wagered at gaming tables and horse races. They were, in short, property in fact as
well as in law.” (Emphasis added.))
Unfortunately, American enslavement predates the American Revolution and the
Constitutional Conventions. See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 20, and EDMUND S.
MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA
(1975) (describing often-heated debates over the role of enslavement in a free United States
society). See also WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, 1760-1830,
50-51 (1975) [hereinafter NELSON] ([Even in the Prerevolutionary (1760-1775), “Northern free
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For the enslaved, it must have been devastating to be someone’s private
property.52 It meant that you were owned by, controlled by, could be abused by,

state” of Massachusetts] “The law also regarded many laborers as a form of property. Many
cases confirm the widely known fact that slaves were regarded as “Property.”... What is less
known is that indentured servants, apprentices, and even children were similarly regarded....”)
In addition, once established, special effort was made to maintain the enslavement
economy. For example, a Louisiana statute provided for a master’s absolute control over his or
her enslaved blacks: “The condition of a slave being merely a passive one, his subordination to
his master and to all who represent him, is not susceptible of any modification or restriction....
[H]e owes to his master, and to all his family, a respect without bounds, and an absolute
obedience, and he is consequently to execute all the orders which he receives from him, his said
master, or from them.” CODE NOIR or BLACK CODE of Louisiana, Acts Passed at the First
Session of the First Legislature of the Territory of New Orleans, § 18 (1806) (repealed 1868)
[hereinafter BLACK CODE]. See generally Bill Quigley & Maha Zaki, The Significance of Race:
Legislative Racial Discrimination in Louisiana, 24 S.U. L. REV. 145 (1997) [hereinafter
QUIGLEY].
52

See BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 297 (describing the psychological effect on black

families separated by sale):

Added to the slave’s fear of the lash was the dread of being separated from loved ones.
To be sold away from his relatives or stand by and see a mother, a sister, a brother, a
wife, or a child torn away from him was easily the most traumatic event of his life.
Strong men pleaded, with tears in their eyes, for their master to spare their loved ones.
Mothers screamed and clung grimly to their children only to be kicked away by the slave
trader.... Angry, despondent, and overcome by grief, the slaves frequently never
recovered from the shock of separation. Many became remorse and indifferent to their
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and be bought, sold53 and devised by your owner.54 As private property, being an
enslaved black, meant absolute loyalty to your master; your enslaved family came

work. Others went insane, talked to themselves, and had hallucinations about their loved
ones.... William Wells Brown described one slave woman who was so despondent over
being forced to leave her husband that she drowned herself.
53

PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 373 (describing the market for enslaved blacks and showing

the incredible prices paid for them):

At the middle of the (eighteen) forties, with a rising cotton market, there began a strong
and sustained advance, persistent throughout the fifties and carrying slave prices to
unexampled heights. By 1856, the phenomenon was receiving comment in the
newspapers far and wide. In the early months of that year the Republican of St. Louis
reported field hand sales in Pike County, Missouri, at $1,250 to $1,550; the Herald of
Lake Providence, Louisiana, recorded the auction of General L.C. Polk’s slaves at which
‘negro men ranged from $1,500 to $1,635, women and girls from $1,250 to $1,550,
children in proportion–all cash’ (sic).... (Emphasis added.)
54

See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howe) 393, 449-52 (1857) (wherein the United

States Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the enslaved Dred Scott’s long residence with his
owner in a “free” territory did not automatically emancipate him. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion
for the Court in Dred Scott stated that “the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution” and that the Fifth Amendment Due Process and Just Compensation
clauses prevented Congress from outlawing enslavement as that would deprive enslavers of their
property.”) Id. at 449-52.
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second, if at all.55 Being an enslaved black woman meant that you were your
master’s sexual property as well.56 It also meant that your children, including

55

FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 12, at 128, 130 (“[W]hile the existence of slave

marriages was explicitly denied under the legal codes of the states, they were not only
recognized but actively promoted under plantation codes.... Of course, not all planters, and not
all of their overseers, were men who lived by the moral codes of their day. That many of these
men sought sex outside of the confines of their wives’ bed is beyond question. To satisfy their
desires they took on mistresses and concubines, seduced girls of tender ages, and patronized
prostitutes.”)
56

See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 124 (In the words of one former enslaved woman,

Harriet Jacobs, in her searing autobiography, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL, told of the
abuse a black enslaved women received from her white male masters: “I cannot tell how much I
suffered in the presence of these wrongs or how I am still pained by the retrospect.”) Former
slave, prolific writer, and public orator, Frederick Douglass declared that the “slave woman is at
the mercy of the fathers, sons or brothers of her master.” FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE
AND MY FREEDOM

60 (1855). See also, PHILLIPS, LIFE, supra note 35, at 162 (“A slave could

own no property unless by sanction of his master, nor make a contract without his master’s
approval. His mating was mere concubinage in law, though in case of subsequent emancipation
it would become a binding marriage. The rape of a female slave was not a crime, but a mere
trespass upon the master’s property!”) See generally BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 172-73
(analyzing the negative impact miscegenation had on the black family: “Generally, however, the
women had no choice but to submit to the sexual advances of white men. Henry Bibb (author of
a slave autobiography, Adventures) wrote that ‘a poor slave’s wife can never be... true to her
husband contrary to the will of her master. She can neither be pure or virtuous, contrary to the
will of her master. She dare not refuse to be reduced to a state of adultery at the will of her
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those fathered by your white master, were enslaved.57 In addition, enslaved
blacks were legally prohibited from owning property,58 including the “property” of

master....’” (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.) The punishment for not submitting to the
master’s sexual demands ranged from infliction of physical harm to separation through sale of
either the husband or wife. Id. at 173-74.)
57

There is some controversy over the extent to which white men fathered children with

their enslaved black women, although all agree that the “practice” was extensive. In order to get
a fuller picture of when white men fathered children with black women, one must look to three
circumstances. The first and the most horrible was when a wealthy white master forcibly raped
his unwilling, and all too often underage, enslaved black woman. The second was when a
wealthy white master participated in “consensual” sexual intercourse with an enslaved woman.
And the third was when a wealthy white man participated in consensual sexual intercourse with a
free black woman. See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 178-79 (noting that according to the 1860 U.S.
Census, 10.4% of the enslaved population was of mixed racial ancestry, while 40.8% of the free
black population was. With 4 million enslaved blacks and about 400,000 free blacks, this meant
that there were about 600,000 blacks of mixed ancestry (enslaved and free), or about 15% were
racially mixed. Statistical data and analysis concerning skin color as evidence of racial
parentage are tainted by three questionable factors: First, no criterion for “mulatto” was given to
the census takers, hence one must speculate on the accuracy and consistent use of that term.
Second, one cannot assume that the offspring of a white man and a black woman would always
produce a child whose skin is lighter than its black mother. And third, one cannot rule out that
some “mulatto” children were the offspring of white women and black men, or of enslaved or
free mulatto men or women with enslaved or free black men or women.)
58

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 512 (“The law, for example, conceded no property

rights to the slaves, and some statutes specifically forbade their possession of horses....”) See
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their labor.59 Added to the legal prohibitions they faced, enslaved blacks also
suffered from the emotional, psychological, physiological, economic, sociological,
and spiritual impacts of being someone’s property.60 African Americans are still
generally ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1991)
[hereinafter SHAW] (summarizing the legal status of enslaved blacks: “For all practical purposes,
the legal status of a slave could be described very succinctly. He was the absolute property of
his owner, possessing almost no rights of his own. To be more specific, he had no right to
choose his own employment, to own property, to make contracts with any person, to select his
place of residence, to marry or to enjoy genuine family life, to become educated, to inherit
property or to utilize the system of justice in any way.”) See also, QUIGLEY, supra note 51, at
159 (“A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. The master may sell
him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor
acquire anything but what must belong to his master.” (citing the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code,
Art. 35, p.6., Id. n.104.)) “Slaves were not allowed to own anything other than what the master
allowed, and anything that the slave had belonged to the master. Slaves could not will anything
to anyone.... Slaves could not donate or inherit or bequeath, but they could be donated, inherited
or bequeathed to others.” Id. at 176 (Footnotes omitted.)
59

The “property” right to the fruits of one’s labor was generally denied to enslaved

blacks, contrary to the “labor theory” of property of the famous philosopher John Locke (16321704). See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT, Book II, Ch. V (c. 1690), a slightly
modernized version states: “Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men,
yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The
labor of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are property his.” as cited in JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15-16 (1998) [hereinafter DUKEMINIER].
60

See generally BLASSINGAME, supra note 3 (presenting a picture of the human face of
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haunted by the legal vestiges of having been whites’ legal property through much
of American legal history.61 Hence, African Americans have a strange relationship
with the legal history of private property.
Therefore, this article does additional duty. It also presents and discredits a
major “gender-race” enslavement myth that continues to cloud the contemporary
American mind, as stereotypes of sex, race, and property paradigms. That
enslavement myth is that of the “helpless, defenseless black woman.” The myth
proposes that throughout enslavement and after, black women were helpless and
defenseless victims of the whims of their white masters. This article hopes to shed

enslavement from the enslaved black’s perspective, successfully utilizing slave autobiographies,
slave narratives, and interviews of previously enslaved blacks, in the 1930's Writers Project of
the United States Work Progress Administration).
61

See, e.g., OWEN FISS, A WAY OUT: AMERICA’S GHETTO’S AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM

113 (Joshua Cohen et al., eds., 2003) [hereinafter FISS] (noting the vestiges of enslavement, Jim
Crow segregation, and welfare policies have created poor black ghettos that cry out for “a bold
program of reconstruction.”); MICHAEL K. BROWN, DAVID WELLMAN, MARTIN CARNOY,
ELLIOTT CURRIED, TROY DUSTER, DAVID B. OPPENHEIMER, & MARJORIE M. SHULTZ,
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003) [hereinafter BROWN]
(showing how “durable racial inequality” persists today as the cumulative effects of inequality
on blacks and the long-term positive effects of institutional discrimination on whites: e.g., the
ratio of black to white income is 62 percent, but the ratio black to white median net worth is just
8 percent); AMERICANS FROM AFRICA: SLAVERY AND ITS AFTERMATH (Peter I. Rose ed., 1970).
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some new light on the myth and hopes to show that in reality, many black women
were often masters of their own destinies and were capable business leaders, while
many others were innocent and irresponsible victims of legally-sanctioned white
physical and sexual oppression.

D. WHY THIS CASE STUDY IS RELEVANT

Perhaps the uninitiated critic would find this study of the regulation of
miscegenation and of antebellum black women’s property ownership too marginal
to have any material effect, at least as it relates to our understanding of American
property law principles,62 as well as its constitutional issues. Additionally, one
might doubt that black women owned property in the antebellum South.63 Yet this

62

The author recalls the Yale History Department’s skeptical reaction to his Scholars of

the House proposal to study blacks who owned slaves: “Great project, Crusto, but you cannot
research something that did not exist.”
63

The plight of enslaved and free black women must be viewed from the unfortunately

low legal and social status that women in general (including married white women) held in
Nineteenth Century American society. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 179-201,
Chapter 6, “The Law of Personal Status: Wives, Paupers, and Slaves.” For example, on the issue
of rape of enslaved black women, sadly, even in modern times, it was not criminal for a husband
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article will prove the skeptics wrong on both fronts. And it tutors legal scholars on
important sexual and racial aspects of our private property system that underpin
contemporary policy debates.
One may anticipate criticism to this article along several lines of argument.
First, what role does legal history have for contemporary legal problems? Second,
why look at private property transactions and private case law, including sales,
inter vivos transfers, and testamentary transfers, when public law in the form of
state statutes are of primary importance? Third, why be concerned with a very
limited universe of cases (e.g., white men and black women) of a very limited
subset of an already marginal population (e.g., free black women owners of
property, in an enslavement society where most blacks were enslaved)? Here are
some answers for the critics.
First, legal history has proven to be a great source of wisdom in analyzing
and solving contemporary legal issues.64 The famous civil rights jurist, Judge

to rape his wife. See, e.g., Statev. Haines , 51 La. Ann. 731 (La. 1899) (Louisiana law prohibited
a wife from charging her husband with rape “on account of her matrimonial consent which she
has given, and which she cannot retract.”)
64

Contemporary debate on sex and race in the law have often benefitted from a historical

analysis. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 13 (3rd ed. 1974)
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John Minor Wisdom, mastered the technique of using legal history to tackle
contemporary racial (and other) problems, as represented in his majority opinion in
the landmark voting rights case, United States v. Louisiana.65 Although this case
was not directly a traditional “property” right case, Judge Wisdom’s opinion serves
two purposes. First, in his use of legal history (and arguably Critical Race

[hereinafter WOODWARD, STRANGE] (noting that the roots of Jim Crow segregation can be found
in the treatment of free blacks in enslavement states, such as “[d]enied full rights and privileges
of citizens, derived of equality in the courts, and restricted in their freedom of assembly and
freedom of movement....”)
65

225 F. Supp. 353, 1963 U. S. Dist., LEXIS 10307 (E.D. La. 1963). In United States v.

Louisiana, the majority (2-1) held that the Louisiana State Constitution’s “interpretation test”
(requiring that an applicant for voter registration “be able to understand and give a reasonable
interpretation of any section of [the Louisiana or Unites States] Constitution[s] when read to him
by the registrar” (LA. CONST. of 1921, art VIII, §1(d) (amended 1960) (emphasis added)) was a
“sophisticated scheme to disfranchise Negroes,” and was “unconstitutional as written and as
administered.” Id. at 356. See Barry Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of
History, 60 TUL. L. REV. 314, 324 (1985) (“Historical research provides the stone and mortar
from which Judge Wisdom’s opinions were crafted. History provides the ‘facts’ upon which the
judgement of unconstitutionality is premised.”) See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES
(1981); HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1981 (1984); and FRANK T.
READ AND LUCY S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP
SOUTH (1978) (describing Judge Wisdom’s distinctive judicial style, especially in landmark
desegregation decisions of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals).
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Theory), Judge Wisdom documents that “by 1860, free blacks66 in Louisiana

66

“Free blacks” refer to people living in the American enslavement states who were of

African ancestry and who were not enslaved, but were legally “free.” Enslaved blacks became
“free” through a legal act of “manumission.” (There were other means of becoming “free”
including migrating to a “free” state, for example, through use of the Underground Railroad.)
Manumission was common throughout the history of American enslavement, often occurring at
the death of the wealthy white master, by act of will, subject to full payments of mortgages for
which enslaved blacks served as collateral. See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 426-29 (“John
Randolph’s will set free nearly four hundred in 1833 (Virginia); Monroe Edward of Louisiana
manumitted 160 by deed in 1840; and George W.P. Custis of Virginia liberated his two or three
hundred at his death in 1857.” (Footnotes omitted and emphasis added.)) See also, SCHAFER,
FREE, supra note 45.
Contrary to the norm, some enslaved blacks were able to obtain money, often with the
permission of their master(s), and allowed or encouraged to “purchase” their freedom. See, e.g.,
PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 427-28 (“John McDonogh... of New Orleans... made a unique bargain
with his whole force of slaves... by which they were collectively to earn their freedom and their
passage to Liberia by the overtime work of Saturday afternoons.... The plan was carried to
completion on schedule...they left America in 1842, some eighty in number.... McDonogh
wrote: ‘... I can say with truth and heartfelt satisfaction that a more virtuous people does not exist
in any country.’” (Footnotes omitted.))
Of course, there were “free blacks” who lived in “free,” northern states, but they are not
the focus of this study. As to their legal status and condition, see, e.g., KOLCHIN, supra note 11,
at 82 (“Northern blacks, although free, were objects of both legal discrimination and vicious
hostility. Excluded from most public schools, denied the right to vote (except in Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, and-if they could meet a property requirementNew York), forbidden by (sporadically enforced) law from entering many states, jeered at and at
times physically attacked by whites who refused to work with them or live near them, blacks
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owned real property and slaves valued at $50 million.”67 And second, Judge
Wisdom introduces the basis for the thesis of this article, in that the
disenfranchising “interpretation test” was a part of Louisiana’s “historic policy and
the white citizens’ firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state and
local government by denying to Negroes the right to vote.”68 Following the
“Wisdom model” of using legal history to address contemporary constitutional
issues, in addition to Critical Race Theory, this article uses legal history to reflect

quickly came to appreciate the difference between freedom and equality.”)
67

As a part of his legal history analysis of African-American disenfranchisement, Judge

John Minor Wisdom wrote:

Thus, from the Code Noir of 1724 until 1864, the organic law of the state
ordained that only free white males could vote or hold office. This was in a state
where there were thousands of free men of color. Many of these were well
educated and owned slaves. Except for suffrage, they possessed the civil and
legal rights of white citizens. (Emphasis added.)

Id. at 363. Judge Wisdom, using census figures and other primary sources, noted, “In 1810 New
Orleans had 8,001 white persons, 5,727 free persons of color, 10,824 slaves.... A battalion of
gens de couleur fought at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. In 1860, Louisiana free blacks
owned real property and slaves valued at $50,000,000.” Id. at 363-64, n.9. (Emphasis added.)
68

Id. at 363.
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on the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter. (Critics of the majority opinion of
Grutter, on the basis of “historical amnesia,” would find support in another of
Judge Wisdom’s famous civil rights decisions, that of the integration of the thenracially segregated University of Mississippi at Oxford, by James Meredith, a
black man, over thirty years prior to Grutter.69)
Second, the analysis of private law transactions and private case law, such as
those involving disputes over inter vivos and causa mortis legacies, have proven to
be an important “window on a more general economy of race, status, and sex
operative in the antebellum period and postbellum South.”70 The legal history of
the property rights, from both its public and private law aspects, is perhaps an
accurate barometer of what was actually occurring in nineteenth century society.
But statutory or public law alone often is a poor reflection of life. Rather than

69

Meredith v. Fair, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962); see Mitchell F. Crusto, The Supreme

Court’s “New” Federalism: An Anti-Rights Agenda?, 16 GA. ST. U .L. REV. 517 (2000);
Mitchell F. Crusto, Federalism and Civil Rights: The Meredith Case, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J.301
(1989).
70

See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 225, 288 (pioneering analysis of the legal history of private

law in wealth transfer: “The claim of this article is that the ideological messages and
distributional consequences of private law are at least as important-if not more important-than
the public law criminalization of a particular kind of relationship.”)
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present a clear picture of the norm, it often is an attempt to change the norm. This
may be especially true of sexual and racial norms. For example, if white men and
black women were not involved sexually, why would there be a need to pass a
state statute prohibiting them from marrying?71
This article starts with the principles of private property, then presents the
statutory norms of enslavement to show the context and the legal obstacles that
enslaved black women faced in that economy system. It then plots the doctrinal
axes of private property ownership, enslavement, and sexual paradigms that
governed life for the greater majority of southern black women, in order to chart
the property-enslavement-sexual legal matrix. This apparently harmless and

71

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down, as unconstitutional,

theretofore criminal bans on interracial marriage in Virginia and in fifteen other states and the
District of Columbia). Cf. (sic) The Virginia judge who had upheld the state’s antimiscegenation laws, in Loving, justified his decision based upon God’s will to separate the races:
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay (sic) and red, and he placed them
on separate continents.... The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the
races to mix.”) Id. at 3. See MYRDAL GUNNAR, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 606

(1944) (observing that anti-miscegenation laws had “the highest

place in the white man’s rank order of social segregation and discrimination.”) As this article
will show, that may have been true as to the white man’s laws, but it did not reflect the white
man’s sexual behavior. See also Robert A. Destro, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v.
Virginia After Thirty Years Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207 (1998).
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pervasive matrix was the engine that created wealth, status, and entitlements, while
at the same time it constructed barriers, obstacles, and disabilities. It was and is
the foundation of our present sexual-racial economy.
Third, as to the small number of black mistresses, the uninitiated would like
to believe that they were nonexistent. The free black population was a significant
feature of southern society.72 And free black women outnumbered free black
men.73 The small number of black mistresses must be viewed in the context of the

72

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 45-50 (observing “The spectacular increase in

manumissions and runaways and the influx of West Indian people of color altered the size and
character of the Southern free Negro caste. The change can best be viewed in Maryland.
Between 1755 and 1790 the free Negro population of Maryland grew 300 percent to about 8,000,
and in the following ten years it more than doubled. By 1810, almost one-quarter of Maryland’s
Negroes were free, and they numbered nearly 34,000; this was the largest free Negro population
of any state in the nation.... By 1810, the 108,000 free Negroes were the fastest-growing element
in the Southern population.”) (“The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 brought a large number of free
Negroes with American borders.... The free Negro population of the Gulf region was almost
entirely the product of extramarital unions between white men and black women.” Id. at 10809.) Combining the enslaved and the free groups, the black population in most of the South
outnumbered the white population.
73

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 177 (“In contrast to the white and slave population, there

were many more free Negro women than men in the South. The great preponderance of free
Negro women were confined almost entirely to the cities.... Urban emancipators tended to
bestow favors on women, partly because slave women outnumbered slave men in the cities and
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times. In the antebellum South, only a small minority of the population, white or
black, owned property, and particularly owned enslaved blacks.74
And, then, there is the question of the relevance of studying the antebellum
South to understand the development of American law. (This article relies heavily
on Louisiana sources, dating between 1830 and 1860, as Louisiana’s significant
economic growth and prosperity, following the Louisiana Purchase in 1803,
represents a critical developmental stage in America’s history.75) Some might
partly because close intermingling encouraged sexual liaisons which sometimes led to
manumission.”)
74

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 30 (noting that the “planter aristocracy was limited to

some ten thousand families who lived off the labor of gangs (sic) of more than fifty slaves.”)
KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 180-84 (“As historian Gavin Wright demonstrated, the average
wealth of slaveholders in the Cotton South in 1860 ($24,748) was 13.9 times the average wealth
of non-slaveholders ($1,781); slaveholders owned 93.1 percent of the region’s agricultural
wealth.”)
75

It has been suggested that Louisiana is not representative of southern enslavement:

DAVIS, supra note 9, n.152 (“Louisiana, for instance, had its own distinctive sexual economy of
slavery that was consonant with its more liberal attitudes toward sexuality and the ideology of a
civil law system.”) Yet the black mistress anomaly described in this article was not limited to
Louisiana. It occurred in each and every enslavement state in this country (as well as in other
countries). See WOODSON, supra note 29. See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 117-20:

The great majority of the area’s affluent free persons of color–in 1860 nearly two out of
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three–were residents of Louisiana. Despite declines in New Orleans and a few other
parishes, they remained by far the richest group of African descent in the United States,
controlling substantially more property than prosperous free Negroes in the other states of
the Lower South combined.... Even in New Orleans, where anti-free black sentiment
seemed most pronounced, this was true. According to the credit reports of R.G. Dun and
Company, Pierre Casenave, who invented a secret embalming process, was able to
increase his income during the period 1850-1857 from $10,000 to $40,000 each year....
By 1860, five of the ten wealthiest free persons of color in the South–Bernard Soulie,
Dumas, Lacroix, grocer J. Camps, worth an estimated $86,000, and landlord Francois
Edmond Dupry–claimed the Crescent City as their place of residence.... [I]n Louisiana...
farmers and plantation owners controlled a total of $1,850,000 worth of land, 24 percent
of the property owned by Negroes in the entire South.... In 1850, the average realty
holdings among these affluent mulattoes were worth $10,221, more than ten times the
average for whites (including nonproperty owners) in the nation. (Footnotes omitted.)

Louisiana was a great land of opportunity for many. See SCARBOROUGH, supra note 12,
at 126-27 (“The quintessential example of the transition from commercial to agricultural
capitalism occurred just before the Civil War when John Burnside, a wealthy New Orleans
merchant, purchased Houmas, the vast Ascension Parish sugar estate of John Preston, for a
reported $1,000,000. An immigrant from Northern Ireland, Burnside had come to America as a
teenager and had started life in this country as a grocer’s clerk for Virginia merchant Andrew
Beirne. Subsequently, he moved to New Orleans and established a mercantile business in
partnership with Oliver Beirne, the son of his former employer. After Beirne’s retirement in
1847, Burnside assumed full control of the firm, now known as John Burnside and Company,
and five years later, he began acquiring sugar plantations. The Houma estate, which contained
12,000 acres of cultivable land and 550 slaves, was termed by one observer ‘the finest property
possessed by any single proprietor in America.’ It became the nucleus of a multimillion-dollar
sugar empire that endured long after the end of the Civil War. At his death in 1881, the bachelor
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believe that the Northern states constituted the “real” American society, and that
the Southern states represented only a marginal aspect of American life. Nothing
could be further from the truth. This is especially true when it comes to the law of
enslavement. Enslavement was a major driving force in the economic
development of this country,76 and many Founding Fathers were slaveholders,
including Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.
As this article evidences, our contemporary world is greatly influenced, if
not controlled, by the vestiges of our property-enslavement-sexual legal history.
One cannot adequately begin to understand and improve the plight of the African

Burnside left an estate valued at some $8,000,000.” (Footnotes omitted.))
76

Especially in the twenty years prior to the Civil War, the Southern economy grew at a

faster pace than that of the North. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR
CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 87 (1989) (“If we treat the North and
South as separate nations and rank them among the countries of the world in 1860, the South was
more prosperous than France, Germany, Denmark, or any of the countries of Europe except
England.”) Compare KOLCHIN, supra note 11, 174-76:

Such a conclusion, although technically accurate, provides an incomplete and distorted
picture of the slave economy.... Even measured in terms of per capita income, the
statistic most supportive of Southern development, the Southern economy lagged behind
the Northern: in 1860, the South’s per capita income stood at $103, while the North’s
totaled $141. In all other aspects, the contrast was considerably more striking.
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American until we understand the African-American’s property experience. We
begin this journey with a presentation of the development of the white man’s
American Dream.

II.

BLACK AS PROPERTY: THE “AMERICAN DREAM” OF CHEAP
LAND, CHEAP LABOR, AND CHEAP SEX
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property or
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
– William Blackstone77

Through the lens of black women’s private property ownership, this article
seeks to provide a unique perspective on sex, race, status, and private property law.

77

2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1766). See

generally on property, DAVID SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(1992); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); and MARY JANE RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993).
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It analyzes an enigma challenging three complementary paradigms: the private
property paradigm, the enslavement paradigm, and the sexual paradigm. The
private property paradigm promoted legal protection of private ownership. The
enslavement paradigm promoted the enslavement economy and the perpetual legal
status of blacks as both enslaved and property-less. The sexual paradigm was a byproduct of the enslavement paradigm, namely, that white men exploited black
women’s sexuality as white men’s sexual property. These three paradigms
complemented one another and shared a quintessential nexus: white males
generating wealth and sexual prowess, through cheap land, the exploitation of
enslaved blacks’ labor, and exploitation of black women’s labor and sexuality.
Black women, who were free and property owners, were an enigma that challenged
the nexus connecting the paradigms. One study of the private property rights of
free black women is to analyze the antithesis of the property-enslavement-sexual
political economy of the antebellum South.

A.

CHEAP LAND: THE AMERICAN PRIVATE PROPERTY
OWNERSHIP PARADIGM
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In order to understand the context in which wealthy white men or “masters”
and black women interacted in the antebellum South, e.g., the sexual economy, it is
necessary to understand the legal world that the masters created: the “American
Dream.” If one believes that law serves the interests of the powerful in society,
then, in the antebellum South, the law served the interests of the white male
master. The question is, what did powerful white men want in antebellum America
(and colonial America)? The simple answer was primarily the ownership, use, and
fruits of property, particularly land.78
The common law, along with a cluster of privileges and rights, and indeed,
the social system, revolved around private land ownership.79 What is interesting is

78

See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920)

[hereinafter TURNER] (presenting a ground-breaking view of the role of “frontier” on the
American psyche).
79

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 202. See EDWARD E. CHASE, PROPERTY LAW, CASES,

MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 3 n.7 (2002) [hereinafter E. CHASE] (“A.M. Honore likewise
distinguished between the rights of exclusion and of use and enjoyment, listing the incidents of
ownership as follows:
(1) the right to exclusive possession; (2) the right to personal use and
enjoyment; (3) the right to manage use by others; (4) the right to the
income from use by others; (5) the right to the capital value, including
alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction; (6) the right to security
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how American common law principles deviated from English principles to serve
the unique needs of the American masters.80 These American property law

(that is, immunity from expropriation); (7) the power of transmissibility by
gift, devise, or descent; (8) the lack of any term on these gifts; (9) the duty
to refrain from using the object in ways that harm others; and (10) the
liability to execution for repayment of debts; and (11) residual rights on
the reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets (sic),
111 Harv. L.R. (sic) 621, 663 n.187 (1998), citing Honore, A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence (sic) 107, 112-128 (sic) (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (emphasis added) (sic).”)
To that list, one might add (12) the right to encumber, by mortgage, liens, and covenants;
(13) the right to use as collateral; (14) the right of an insurable interest; (15) the right to shared
ownership; and (16) the right of bailment. See the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, AM. L. INST.,
Res. Prop. §§ 1-10 (1936) (analyzing “property” based upon four basic legal relations, “right–
duty,” “privilege–absence of right,” “power–liability,” and “immunity–disability,” derived from
W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23-124 (1923)). Compare the Hohfeldian
approach to that of the European civil law, e.g., the Louisiana Civil Code (derived from the
French Code Napoleon) that states: “Ownership is the right that confers on a person direct,
immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN., art. 477 (1980).
80

Compare, e.g., the issue of right of or delivery of possession in leasehold law. See

DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 459, 461-62, citing Hannah v. Dusch, “The English rule is that in
the absence of stipulations to the contrary, there is in every lease an implied covenant on the part
of the landlord that the premises shall be open to entry by the tenant the time fixed by the lease
for the beginning of his term.... [Under the American rule,] the landlord is not bound to put the
tenant into actual possession, but is bound only to put him in legal possession, so that no obstacle
in the form of superior right of possession will be interposed to prevent the tenant from obtaining
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principles involved the settlement and development of American title to land.81
To support the master’s hunger for cheap land, early in its history, American
law developed the paradigm of land as a private commodity: to be freely marketed
(bought and sold), exploited, and freely willed.82 These private property law

actual possession of the demised premises.”) See generally NELSON, supra note 51; Morton J.
Horowitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974)
(showing that the modern will theory of contract did not appear until the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries with the spread of markets).
81

As to the constitutional development procuring white control of native-American title to

land, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (wherein the court functionally
disenfranchised native Americans from title to land they “occupied” (unless the United States
government had expressly given specific recognition of title to specific lands): “Indian
inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in
the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring absolute title to others.”
See also Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21
STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s struggle over the Indian land title
issue).
82

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 206-15 (analyzing the transformation of land as a

commodity, including changes in common tenancy presumption, the simplification of
conveyancing, and efficiencies of land remedies: “‘The title of our lands,’ wrote Jesse Root
proudly in 1798, ‘is free, clear and absolute, and every proprietor of land is a prince in his own
domains, and lord paramount of the fee.’” (Footnote omitted.)) See also, NELSON, supra note 51,
at 159 (analyzing postrevolutionary Massachusetts (1780-1830) property law cases, concluded:
“The most important way in which nineteenth-century courts promoted economic development
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principles make up the American property paradigm, three pivotal aspects of which
are of particular importance. The first is the abolishment of the law of
primogeniture. This allowed the private owners of land to disinherit blood
relatives or would-be “heirs” and to will their property to “strangers.”83 Hence,
Americanization of English common law principles made land more alienable,
more like a commodity.
The second private property principle is the abolishment of the rule
prohibiting foreigners, or “aliens,” from owning land. The English common law
prohibited such ownership. Such a limitation would not facilitate the “melting pot”
of the white ethnic minorities that were already a part of colonial America. Hence,
the American rule took the position that prohibiting alien land ownership
“‘originated in ages of barbarism, out of the hatred and jealousy with which
in property cases was to overturn inherited rules that had conferred monopolistic privileges on
initial users of valuable economic resources.”)
83

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 205-06 (“Land-law reform was well under way even

before the Revolution. After the Revolution, legislatures carried on the work of dismantling the
feudal past.... Primogeniture, dead in most of New England, vanished from the South by 1800.”)
Compare, Louisiana law that throughout the 19th Century maintained its civil law
- rooted “forced
heirship” rights of legitimate children. See generally Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Roman Sources
and Constitutional Mandates: The Alpha and Omega of Louisiana Laws on Concubinage and
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foreigners were regarded... [To] those [aliens] who are actually resident amongst
us, the best policy’ would be ‘encourage their industry by giving them all
reasonable facilities in the acquisition of property.’”84 This principle was
especially significant to the integration into the United States of the people residing
in the newly-acquired territory of the Louisiana Purchase, many of whom would
have been considered “aliens” of French, Spanish, and even native American
descent.85
The third private property principle is the tightening of the law of
perpetuities, through the abolition of the fee tail, and the invalidation of future
interests, that unduly “suspended” the “power of alienation.”86 This attitude was
part and parcel of the new American private property paradigm, that private
property be easily alienable, free of land monopolies and land dynasties. This was
reflected in the observation of Chancellor James Kent of New York State (1776-

Natural Children, 56 LA. L. REV. 317 (1995-1996) [hereinafter LORIO].
84

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 209 n.18, citing 1 AM. JURIST 87-88 (1829).

85

See generally GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF

LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975).
86

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 210-11.
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1847):

Entailments are recommended in monarchical
governments, as a protection to the power and influence
of the landed aristocracy; but such a policy has no
application to republican establishments, where wealth
does not form a permanent distinction, and under which
every individual of every family has his equal rights, and
is equally invited, by the genius of the institutions, to
depend upon his own merit and exertions. Every family,
stripped of artificial supports is obligated, in this country,
to repose upon the virtues of its descendants for the
perpetuity of its fame.87

Such was the American private property paradigm. It promoted availability
of cheap land (usually at the expense of native Americans) through its free

87

KENT, COMMENTARIES, Vol. IV 12 (2nd ed., 1832), as quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note

32, at 210-11 n.21-22.
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alienation under law, without encumbrances and other undue restraints on
alienation. It maximized land utilization and promoted land as a commodity,
allowing “aliens” to own land. And it supported the egalitarian view that land
should be for the meritorious living, free from family control even at death,
through the causa mortis transfer to strangers. Therefore, white male masters had a
vested interest in the availability of cheap land, laws promoting free alienation, and
free control over the use and disposal of private property.

B.

CHEAP LABOR: THE AMERICAN ENSLAVEMENT
PARADIGM

Next, in order to understand the context of the relationships between wealthy
white men and black women, it is necessary to present the law of enslavement. As
white masters obtained their primary dream of cheap, freely alienable land, what
was the next item on their dream list? Consistent with the private property
paradigm that promoted the availability of cheap land, white masters needed cheap
labor to develop that land, to enhance the “American Dream.” While cheap labor
in northern states was eventually provided through the influx of Irish and European
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immigrant labor, cheap labor in the southern states came mainly in the form of
enslaved blacks.88
Apparently, the development of the American private property law paradigm
is consistent was the development of the American enslavement system. Early in
our colonial history, blacks were tied intrinsically to land. For example, in 1705,
Virginia law stated that enslaved blacks were legally classified as “real estate,”
governed by the same laws as land, houses, and trees.89 Other states had similar

88

See generally PHILLIPS, LIFE, supra note 35; LESLIE HOWARD OWENS, THIS SPECIES OF

PROPERTY: SLAVE LIFE AND CULTURE IN THE OLD SOUTH (1976). See also, THADIOUS M. DAVIS,
GAMES OF PROPERTY, LAW, RACE, GENDER, AND FAULKNER’S GO DOWN, MOSES (2003)
[hereinafter T. DAVIS] (analyzing the interrelationship between race, property, agency, game
theory, critical legal studies, feminist critique, and literature is very thorough and thoughtprovoking).
89

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 74 (“This law was meant to insure uniform rules of

inheritance, and liability for debt, would govern the law of an estate–the land and its slaves.”)
Friedman notes that in 1792, Virginia repealed this law, and, in 1794, passed a law prohibiting
the sale of enslaved blacks to satisfy a master’s debts, unless all other personal property had been
exhausted. (Id. at 197-98). See also, LOUISIANA’S BLACK CODE (1806) (“Slaves shall always be
reputed and considered real estates (sic).”); LOUISIANA DIGEST OF 1808, Chap. 2, Art. 19
[hereinafter “DIGEST”] (“Slaves in this territory are considered as immovables by the operation
of law, on account of their value and utility for the cultivation of the lands.”); CIVIL CODE OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA (1825), Art. 461 [hereinafter CIVIL CODE] (“Slaves, though movables by
their nature, are considered as immovables, by the operation of the law.”) See generally A. Leon
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laws, including Kentucky in 1789 and the Louisiana Territory in 1806.90
Eventually, enslaved blacks were mainly classified as “chattel or movables,”
although for some purposes they remained classified as “real estate or
immovables.”91 As “property,” blacks were bought and sold, passed by will, stood

Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity Second: the Recognition of
the Slave’s Human Nature in Virginia’s Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (1989).
90

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 197 n.54, citing HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN

THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES TO 1860,
91

183 (1938).

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 91, Chapter 3, “Slaves as Property– Chattel Personal or

Realty, and Did It Matter? Compare SHAW, supra note 58, at 161-62:

...whether slaves were to be regarded as chattels or as real estate.... In several of the
colonies slaves were designated, at a very period, as real estate.... In Louisiana Chapter
XXXIII of the Black Code of 1806 declared slaves to be real estate.... Eventually, slaves
came to be almost universally treated as chattels, or movable property, although certain
characteristics of real estate were still applied to them. In particular, it was commonplace
to mortgage them to creditors.

See also Judith Kelleher Schafer, Open and Notorious Concubinage: The Emancipation of Slave
Mistresses by Will and the Supreme Court in Antebellum Louisiana, 28 LA. HIST. 165 (1987)
[hereinafter SCHAFER, OPEN]. Whether enslaved blacks were legally real estate or chattel was
critical in determining certain concubinage cases in Louisiana, wherein it was illegal to gift
“immovables” to concubines. Hence, when a white master sought to free his black concubine
and their children, in his will, he could not do so if enslaved blacks were legally classified as
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attachable for debts, were insurable, and subject to taxation.92
American enslavement of blacks, although clearly contrary to natural law,
was equally a product of law.93 “Enslavement law” has perhaps three features.
The first is the obvious: the state enacted “slave codes.”94 The second is what one

“immovables.” LA. CIV. CODE, art. 1468 (1825). See generally QUIGLEY, supra note 51.
92

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 74.

93

See MORRIS, supra note 52, at 1 (e.g., enslavement and its relation to law was provided

in the Code of Alabama (1852): “the state or condition of negro or African slavery is established
by law in this State; conferring on the master property in and the right to the time, labor, and
services of the slave, and to enforce obedience on the part of the slave to all his lawful
command.” (Emphasis added.))
94

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 514:

The statutes, copious and easily available, describe a hypothetical regime, not an actual
one. The court records are on the one hand plentiful only for the higher tribunals, whither
questions of human adjustments rarely penetrated, and on the other hand the decisions
were themselves largely controlled by the statutes, perverse for ordinary practical
purposes as these often were. It is therefore to the letters, journals and miscellaneous
records of private persons dwelling in the regime and by their practices molding it more
powerfully than legislatures and courts combined, that the main recourse for intimate
knowledge must be had. Regrettably fugitive and fragmentary as these are, enough it
may be hoped have been found and used herein to show the true nature of the living
order.
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writer has referred to as “plantation law.”95 And the third is the judicial
pronouncements or enslavement case law.96 The following section will focus on
the “black or slave codes.” “Plantation law” is a study that needs to be developed.

95

See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 12, at 128-29:

Within fairly wide limits the state, in effect, turned the definitions of the codes of
legal behavior of slaves, and of the punishment for infractions of these codes,
over to planters. Such duality of the legal structure was not unique to the
antebellum South. It existed in medieval Europe...; and in lesser degree, it exists
with respect to certain large institutions today (for example, with respect to
university regulations).
The importance of the dual legal structure of the antebellum South is that
the latitude which the state yielded to the planter was quite wide. For most slaves
it was the law of the plantation, not of the state, that was relevant. Only a small
proportion of the slaves ever had to deal with the law-reforcement mechanisms of
the state. Their daily lives were governed by plantation law.

See also GENOVESE, ROLL, supra note 14, at 47 (referred to the master’s control in
enslavement law, as a “system of complementary plantation law” in which the State empowered
enslavement jurisdiction to the master.”)
96

Non-statutory or judicial case law is often referred to as the common law and composes

a body of principles or precedents derived mainly by judges. See generally JUDICIAL CASES
CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO, VOLS. 1-V (Helen Tunnicliff Catterall, ed.,
Octagon Books, Inc. 1968) (1926) [hereinafter CATTERALL] (composing a definitive
enslavement, most annotated compilation of enslavement cases).
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And the judicial pronouncements, as they relate to miscegenation and black
women’s property rights, are discussed later in this article.
While contemporary American property textbooks avoid the subject,97 “the
fact remains that the slave as property is central to any consideration of the
relationship between slavery and the law.”98 There are a number of legal topics
relative to the relationship between wealthy white men and enslaved black women
that are useful to our understanding of the general relationship of sex, race, status,
and the law of private property. The first is the legal status of the enslaved as
“property.” The second is the criminality of white men raping enslaved black

97

See, e.g., DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, a leading Property Law textbook devotes three

entries to the topic of “slavery:” “Chief Justice Holt was one of the greatest English judges....
He laid down the rule that the status of slavery could not exist in England; as soon as a slave
breathed the air of England he was free. Smith v. Brown & Cooper, 2 Salk. 666, 90 Eng. Rep.
1172 (1703).” Id. at 30-31, n.12. “(Citing Justice Mosk’s dissent in Moore v. Regents of the
University of California) Another is our prohibition against indirect abuse of the body by its
economic exploitation for the sole benefit of another person. The most abhorrent form of such
exploitation, of course, was the institution of slavery. Lesser forms, such as indentured servitude
or even debtor’s prison, have also disappeared.” Id. at 77. “History shows that it is possible to
maintain appropriate normative boundaries regarding market activities. Indeed, in many
instances we have narrowed the role of markets and commodification, as with slavery and child
labor.” Id. at 84.
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women. The third is the prohibition against interracial marriage. The fourth is the
legal status of issue of white men and enslaved black women. The fifth is the
prohibition against the enslaved owning property. And the sixth is the law’s
failure to recognize the marriage of enslaved persons.
Generally, the legal rules to these legal issues in the antebellum enslavement
economy were as follows: First, enslaved blacks were, in every sense of the word,
“property:” either real estate (land) or chattel (moveables).99 Second, white men
could freely rape enslaved black women, without adverse legal consequence.100
Third, interracial marriage was strictly prohibited,101 although “concubinage” was

98

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 2.

99

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 499 (“Property in slaves, though by some of the statutes

assimilated to real estate for certain technical purposes, was usually considered as of chattel
character.”) See also, supra note 89.
100

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 305 (“Race, age, and status were all elements in the law

of rape in the South. Every state that adopted statutes to deal expressly with rapes committed by
slaves (and in some cases (by) free persons of color) added that the victim was to be a white
female.... On the other side, no white could ever rape a slave woman.” Emphasis added.) See
also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 500 (“...although the wilful killing of slaves was generally held
to be murder, the violation of their women was without criminal penalty.”)
101

See SHAW, supra note 58, at 44 (“One such crime was an illegal marriage; a Maryland
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legally recognized, with restrictions as to the ability to transfer property.102 Fourth,
the legal status of the issue or children of white men and enslaved black women
followed that of their mother, e.g., enslavement.103 Fifth, enslaved blacks could
law of 1715 prohibited any white person from marrying any negro or a mulatto slave (the
marriage of a white person and a free mulatto was not proscribed by this act).”)
102

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 350, 355, 356:

Everywhere in the ante-bellum (sic) South marriages between whites and Negroes or
‘mulattoes,’ whether free or unfree, were prohibited. The prohibition against marriages,
however, did not prevent other forms of interracial sexual contacts.... The lower-class
whites, however, were by no means the only Southerners who had sexual relations with
slave women and fathered the mulatto population. Unmarried slaveholders and the
young males who grew up in slaveholding families, some bearing the South’s most
distinguished names, played a major role.... Though the cases of concubinage involving
young Louisiana Creoles and quadroon women are familiar, these alliances were
confined neither to persons of French or Spanish descent nor to Louisiana.... These
sexual relationships with slaves did not always end when the master married; and others
actually began after, rather than before, his marriage.

See also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 193-94 (“Concubinage itself was fairly frequent, particularly
in southern Louisiana; but no frequency of purchase for it as a predominant purpose can be
demonstrated from authentic records.”)
103

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 77:

Then in 1662 it was enacted that ‘whereas some doubts have arrisen (sic) whether
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not legally own property; any property that they acquired was considered to belong
to their master.104 And sixth, enslaved blacks were not allowed to legally marry.105
One of the most important tenets of the enslavement system was an enslaved
black’s total reliance on the master for support. As a result, the black codes
generally forbade enslaved blacks from owning property.106 Their ownership of
property would be a direct contradiction of the enslavement economy. How would

children got by any Englishman upon a negro woman shall be bond or free,... all children
born in this colony shall be bond or free only according to the condition of the mother.’
(Hening, II, 26)
104

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 197 (“Legally a bondman was unable to acquire title to

property by purchase, gift, or devise; he could not be a party to a contract.”) See also PHILLIPS,
supra note 14, at 500 (“...any property they might acquire was considered as belonging to the
master....”)
105

See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 122 (“Legally, slave families were nonexistent: no

Southern state recognized marriage between slave men and women, and legal authority over
slave children rested not with their parents but with their masters.”) See also PHILLIPS, supra
note 14, at 494 (“Slave marriages, furthermore, were declared void of all civil effect....”)
106

See supra note 104. See also SHAW, supra note 58, at 167 (“As an almost invariable

rule, the slave had no right to contract with any party or, at least, no means of enforcing such a
contract.”) It is fair to say that enslaved blacks had no property rights that the law needed to
respect. In some instances, white masters allowed their enslaved blacks to “hire out their time”
or attempted to gift property to them.
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they obtain property? All the fruits of their labor belonged to the master. They
were not allowed to receive gifts inter vivos or causa mortis.107
It appears that the enslavement paradigm was a perfect corollary to the
principles of private property ownership. First, enslaved blacks were private
property, and were a commodity, like “chattel.” Second, they could be easily
alienated and subjects of inheritance. Third, they could be used to maximize
profits, including being leased and bred. Hence, the enslavement paradigm greatly
complemented the private property ownership paradigm, and, as it related to
enslaved black women, gave white men an added bonus.

C.

CHEAP SEX: THE AMERICAN SEXUAL PARADIGM

In order to understand the context of the relationships between wealthy
white men and black women, it is necessary to discuss the control white men had
over the sexuality of black women. As masters got cheap land and cheap labor,
there was only one thing they apparently needed or wanted to complete the
“American Dream”: sexual prowess. Put in crude terms, white masters exploited

107

See supra note 104.
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enslaved black women to satisfy their desire for cheap sex.
The most unfortunate feature of the property-enslavement nexus was the
reality that a white master not only owned and controlled his enslaved blacks’
labor, but he also controlled their sexuality. From a property perspective, every
white master who invested in enslaved blacks recognized the “dividend” of their
investment in the form of enslaved offspring.108 Not unlike cattle, enslaved blacks
were expected to “breed” enslaved children, adding to their master’s wealth.
White masters often oversaw the breeding process, very much invested in the
outcome–healthy enslaved black children to provide cheap labor, or to be sold or
collateralized for capital. Unfortunately, some white masters also took liberty to

108

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 245 (“The magnitude of the interstate slave trade caused

some critics to charge that many of those who supplied the speculators with merchandise were
engaged in ‘slave breeding’–in raising slaves for the specific purpose of marketing them. In
Virginia, Olmsted (a noted and respected Northern traveler throughout the South) remarked... ‘It
appears to me evident, however, from the manner in which I hear the traffic spoken of
incidentally, that the cash value that of a slave for sale, above the cost of raising it from infancy
to the age at which it commends the highest price, is generally considered among the surest
elements of a planter’s wealth.... That a slave woman is commonly esteemed least for her
laboring qualities, most for those qualities which give value to a brood-mare is, also, constantly
made apparent.’”(Emphasis added.))
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control enslaved black women sexually by rape or seduction.109 And, consistent
with the tenets of the legal support given to the property-enslavement nexus, the
law added a third tenet: that of a white master to legally “rape” his enslaved black
women. Adding one tragedy to another, one white master both sexually abused his
enslaved black woman, and later sold her and their son to another white master.110

109

See supra note 100.

110

See “Ex-Slave Story 11-A,” interview with Mary Harris and her son, by POSEY, WPA

WRITERS PROJECT (10-28-1940), xerox from Louisiana Department, Louisiana State Library,
Baton Rouge:

I never got a whippin’ either, because I was good an’ did my work
an’ never talked back. My ma tol’ me she was brutally beaten an’
she was bitter all her life. The plantation was owned by Mr.
Gaudet [Adam Gaudet, sugar planter, St. James Parish]-and I’ve
learn tell that Frenchmen were the hardest people an’ almos’
sqes’d blood outen their slaves... so jes’ set it down when you hear
of brutal treatment that it was foreigners. [and her mulatto son
recounts:]
Bitter? Yes, I’m bitter- I have a right to be. My mother tells me about the
brutality of those days, how they whipped unmercifully their slaves. Yes, I’m
bitter and the more I think about it the madder I got. Look at me they say I
could pass for white. My mother is bright too. And why? Because the man
who owned and sold my mother was her father. But that’s not all. That man I
hate with every fibre of my body and why? A brute like that who could sell his
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Such was the world the white masters made, their “American Dream,” one
that gave them cheap land, cheap labor, and cheap sex. It was a world of white
male control and domination. For the enslaved black women, it was the
“American Nightmare:” no land, no right to their labor, and their sexuality
exploited. Ultimately, the white man’s American Dream and the legal system that
supported it would have an interesting challenge: How should the legal system
respond to white men, who exercised their private property ownership rights, by
bestowing on their enslaved black women sex partners (and their children) private
property bequests, the issue of “wealth miscegenation?”

III.

RESTRICTING BLACK INHERITANCE RIGHTS: REGULATING
MISCEGENATION

A marriage between a person of free condition and a slave, or
between a white person and a negro, or between a white person
and a mulatto, shall be null.
– 1786 Virginia bill, drafted by Thomas Jefferson
own child into unprincipled hands is a beast- The power, just because he had
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(Jefferson 557, bill 86)111
A.

VARIOUS MISCEGENATION MODELS

the power, and thirst for money.
111

See INTERRACIALISM, BLACK-WHITE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY,

LITERATURE, AND THE LAW 3 (Werner Sollors ed. 2000) [hereinafter SOLLORS] (presenting a
quintessential reader on the history and laws of miscegenation, and quoting Jefferson’s antimiscegenation bill.) See also, id. at 5 (wherein Sollors points out that “Even the word used to
describe interracial sexual and marital relations, miscegenation, in an Americanism. Sidney
Kaplan’s essay in this volume (“The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864,” at 219-65)
reveals how the word was coined by two New York journalists in an 1863 pamphlet, a political
hoax designed to hurt abolitionists and Republicans who were invited to endorse it. Derived
from Latin miscere and genus, the made-up word that faintly echoes the term for the European
class mismatch, misalliance, and replaced amalgamation. It became a catchall term, used in
phases like “miscegenation law” that are hard to translate into some other languages.”
(Emphasis added in parts.)) See also GARY B. NASH, FORBIDDEN LOVE, THE SECRET HISTORY OF
MIXED-RACE AMERICA 92-93 (1999) [hereinafter NASH] (“As the election of 1864 approached,
the Democrats played the race card to the hilt. Appealing to widespread white racism, they
accused Lincoln’s Republican Party of turning the Civil War into a ‘nigger crusade.’ In
campaign literature labeled ‘Miscegenation, or the Millennium of Abolitionism,’ they portrayed
white women sitting on the laps of black men, white men with black wives strolling through the
park, and intermarried blacks, in fractured English, exulting that they had reached the heaven of
social and political equality. Democratic Party newspapers spread the word of a Republican
leader who wanted to ‘add to emancipation, to confiscation, and to miscegenation, a policy of
polygamy’ so that ‘a man could have a yellow wife from China, a brown wife from India, a black
wife from Africa, and a white wife from his own country, and so have a variegated family and
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1. America’s Varying Views on Miscegenation

Analyzing the legal history of miscegenation in the American South makes
for an obvious conclusion: the law was generally pitted against interracial
relationships.112 Even in recent contemporary times, southern state legislatures
put a sign over the door: ‘United Matrimonial Paint Shop.’”)
112

SOLLORS, supra note 111, at 3 (“One theme that has been pervasive in U.S. history and

literature and that has been accompanied by a 300-year-long tradition of legislation,
jurisprudence, protest, and defiance is the deep concern about, and the attempt to prohibit,
contain, or deny, the presence of black-white interracial sexual relations, interracial marriage,
interracial descent, and other family relations across the powerful black-white divide.”) See
generally KENNEDY, supra note 12; PETER BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD:
FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SOUTH (1995); IN JOY AND IN
SORROW: WOMEN, FAMILY, AND MARRIAGE IN THE VICTORIAN SOUTH, 1830-1900 (Carol Bleser
ed. 1991); THE DEVIL’S LINE: SEX AND RACE IN THE EARLY SOUTH (Catherine Clinton &
Michele Gillespie eds., 1997); ROBERT B. MCNAMARA, et al., CROSSING THE RACE LINE:
INTERRACIAL COUPLES IN THE SOUTH (1999); RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE
REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE (2001) [hereinafter MORAN]; NELL IRVIN PAINTER,
SOUTHERN HISTORY ACROSS THE COLOR LINE (2002); JOSHUA D. ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD: SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA, 1787-1861 (2003);
WE ARE YOUR SISTERS: BLACK WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Dorothy Sterling, ed.,
1997); A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in
the Law of Colonial And Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L. J. 1967 (1988-89) [hereinafter
HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF]; CARTER G. WOODSON, FREE NEGRO HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 1830, TOGETHER WITH A BRIEF TREATMENT OF THE FREE NEGRO x-xiv (1925)
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attempted to control the sexual lives of Americans along racial lines.113 These
legal attempts to prohibit interracial sexual relationships had at least one intended
effect– that of limiting the transference of wealth from whites to blacks, in other
words, “wealth miscegenation.”114
America’s miscegenational legal history is rooted in its American Dream,
that which gave white men, as a right of ownership, control of enslaved black
women’s sexuality, as white property.115 Throughout the antebellum South, white
[hereinafter WOODSON, HEADS] and Carter G. Woodson, The Beginning of Miscegenation of the
Whites and Blacks, 3 J. OF NEGRO HISTORY 335 (1918) [hereinafter WOODSON,
MISCEGENATION].
113

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down, as unconstitutional,

theretofore criminal bans on interracial marriage in Virginia, fifteen other states, and the District
of Columbia).
114

See SOLLORS, supra note 111, at 69, excerpt from Eva Saks, “Representing

Miscegenation Law” [hereinafter SAKS] (“Interracial sex and marriage had the potential to
threaten the distribution of property, and their legal prohibition was an important step in
consolidating social and economic boundaries.”) It is “Saks’s view of miscegenation’s rationale
that this article refers to as “wealth miscegenation.”
115

See THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1, 235-39 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1999) (1858) [hereinafter COBB]
(described by Paul Finkelman as “the most comprehensive antebellum restatement of the law of
slavery and the only treatise on slavery written by a southerner.”) (Cobbs, on an enslaved black’s
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men sexually exploited their enslaved black women, even in front of their white
wives with immunity.116 These sexual intimacies between white men and black
women also led to miscegenational relationships that were more “involved” than
right of private property stated: “Of the other great right of a freeman, viz., the right of private
property, the slave is entirely deprived. His person and his time being entirely of his master,
whatever he may accumulate by his own labor, or is otherwise acquired by him, becomes
immediately the property of his master.... Though our law allows no peculium to the slave, yet
as a matter of fact, such peculium is permitted, ex gratia, by the master.... of which the master
might at any time deprive him... (I)f a chattel is given and delivered to a slave, the title thereto
would vest in the master; and it seems if land were conveyed to a slave, and possession given, by
parity of reasoning, the master would be seized of the land. A slave cannot take by descent,
there being in him no inheritable blood.... The slave not being capable of acquiring property, if
follows, that he cannot convey or give it away.... As a consequence, a slave cannot make a
testament, and this was true even in those nations where the slave was allowed his peculium; on
his death, it belonged to his master.” (Footnotes omitted.)) See also, JUDITH KELLEHER
SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 6 (1994)
[hereinafter SCHAFER, SLAVERY] (noting, “The Black Code and the 1807 act together destroyed
two of the great freedoms of Spanish slave law.... First, the right of self-purchase ceased because
slaves could no longer own property....”)
116

See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 124 (“Still those who dealt at all frankly with the

subject noted–albeit from different perspectives–the prevalence of interracial sex. South
Carolina ideologue William Harper turned it into a virtue, insisting that it helped account for the
absence of Southern prostitution and the purity of white women. Patrician diarist Mary Boykins
Chesnut, by contrast, countered that in fact, ‘we live surrounded by prostitutes... Like the
patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with their wives and concubines, and the
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casual.117
Historically, the miscegenational law’s options reflected white society’s
changing views on blacks as property. In the Colonial Period, when white
America was still unclear about blacks’ role and place, there was ambivalence
about whether the races should interrelate sexually.118 There is strong evidence

mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children.’”)
117

See, e.g., GARY B. MILLS, THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE, CANE RIVER’S CREOLES OF

COLOR, Chapter 2 (1977) [hereinafter MILLS] (documenting the romantic relationship (17681784) between a white master, Pierre Metoyer, and his enslaved black woman, Marie Thereze
Coincoin, and how their children went on to become the wealthiest black family in antebellum
Louisiana, owning about two hundred enslaved blacks, and building Melrose Plantation, which
still stands today, in Natchitoches, Louisiana). See also, PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 434
(documenting that a free black master, “Martin Donato of St. Landry (Parish, Louisiana) dying in
1848, bequeathed liberty to his slave wife and her seven children and left them eighty-nine slaves
and 4,500 arpents of land as well as notes and mortgages to a value of $46,000.”) There were
numerous instances in which white masters sought to provide for their black mistresses and
mixed-race offspring, infra.
118

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 74-76 (“Thus for two generations the negroes were

few, they were employed alongside the white servants, and in many cases were members of their
masters’ households.... Until after the middle of the (17th) century the laws did not discriminate
in any way between the races.”(Emphasis added.))
Page 89 of 302

Blackness as Property
showing that whites accepted blacks as equals, and as human beings.119 At the
same time, there is strong evidence showing that whites denied blacks as equals,
and relegated them to property.120
Unfortunately, at least in the enslavement states, the proponents of blacks as
(white) property won out.121 Certainly, by 1830 (the start of the antebellum
period), in the enslavement states, it was legally accepted that enslaved blacks
were property.122 By then, it was also clear that interracial marriage was illegal
and miscegenation would not be promoted.123 What is interesting is that, during
the antebellum period, miscegenation would not be totally outlawed.124 In fact, it
was tolerated and legally recognized, at least when it came to white-men-and-

119

See generally HIGGINBOTHAM AND KOPYTOFF, supra note 112.

120

See generally WOODSON, MISCEGENATION, supra note 112.

121

See supra note 91. See generally MORAN, supra note 112.

122

Id.

123

See generally Karen Getman, Sexual Control in the Slaveholding South: The

Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 115 (1984).
124

See KOLCHIN, supra note 116.
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black-women relationships.125
During Reconstruction, when legal enslavement of blacks was abolished,
southern black-influenced, if not controlled, legislatures changed the antebellum
rules on miscegenation, allowing whites and blacks to legally marry.126 But this

125

See SLAVERY AND THE LAW 45 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) [hereinafterF INKELMAN]

excerpt from William W. Fisher III, “Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery” (“Lawmakers
ostensibly sought to maintain a rigid separation of blacks and whites. Accordingly, they banned
racial intermarriage, established severe penalties for interracial fornication and adultery, and
frequently in related contexts expressed repugnance for ‘commingling’ of the races. In practice,
however, they typically strongly condemned and harshly punished only sexual relations between
black men and white women, while they commonly tolerated both consensual and forcible sex
between white men and black women.” (Footnotes omitted.))
126

See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 254:

During Reconstruction, the color bar at the altar was breached in several places. For a
brief period, Alabama’s supreme court invalidated that state’s antimiscegenation law, and
when reformers friendly to Reconstruction overhauled the laws of Arkansas, Mississippi,
and South Carolina, they dropped existing antimiscegenation provisions from the statute
books. Reconstructionists likewise repealed Louisiana’s bar on mixed marriages.
(Footnotes omitted.)

See, e.g., supra note 568, Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss & Elder, Administrators, 1874 WL 3865
(La. 1874) (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court validated a “marriage” between E.C. Hart, a
white man, and Cornelia Hart, a colored woman).
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change was short-lived, for along with post-Reconstruction restoration of white
control of southern legislatures, pro-miscegenation rules were repealed.127 Oddly,
in their place, the law did not return to the ante-bellum laws that merely prohibited
interracial marriage, yet tolerated miscegenational relationships, at least between
white men and black women.128 What the post-Reconstruction white legislatures
decided was more stringent than before the Civil War: to criminalize interracial

127

See MORAN, supra note 112, at 5-6.

During Reconstruction, the state high court in Alabama declared a ban of interracial
marriage unconstitutional but reversed itself shortly thereafter. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld an antimiscegenation statute in Pace v. Alabama (106 U.S. 583 (1883)) in 1883,
thereby cementing the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ marriages and families. Only one
state court declared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional after the Pace decision. In
1948, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp (32 Cal. 2d 711, 948 P.2d 17
(1948)) concluded that prohibition of interracial marriage violated the principle of racial
equality and interfered with liberty to choose a spouse. (Footnotes omitted, case citations
added.)

See also KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 22 (“During the reaction against Reconstruction, white
supremacists exploited fears of interracial intimacy as perhaps the major justification for
subverting the civil and political rights that had been granted to blacks, and the major reason for
confining blacks to their degraded ‘place’ at the bottom of the social hierarchy.”)
128

See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64.
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marriage.129
This brief legal history of miscegenation raises an intriguing question: Why,
in the antebellum South, was miscegenation not altogether prohibited, as it was in

129

See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 76, 77:

Reconstruction’s egalitarian spirit had posed challenges to antimiscegenation laws, but these
challenges were typically short-lived. South Carolina’s history is instructive in this regard. Prior
to the Civil War, the state had declined to prohibit interracial marriage, but immediately
following the abolition of slavery, white authorities enacted an antimiscegenation statute.
Reformers removed the barrier in 1868, only to see it be reenacted in 1879. In 1895 white
supremacists embedded the prohibition in the state constitution, where it remained for 103 years.

Id. at 76, footnote *, Kennedy points out,

The same dynamic led to revisions of existing antimiscegenation laws in Alabama
and Mississippi. Alabama changed its laws to render all interracial marriages null
and void, while Mississippi increased the punishment for the violation of its
prohibition on interracial marriage: persons engaged in such unions, the state
declared, could be confined to the penitentiary for life. See Alabama Constitution
of 1865, art. 4, sec. 31; Miss. Session Laws ch. 4, sec. 3 (1865). See also Peter
W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the
Nineteenth-Century South (1995), 179.

See also, Lee et al. v. New Orleans Great Northern R. Co., 127 La. 236, 51 So.182, at
183 (“By Act No. 87 of 1908 concubinage between a person of the Caucasian or white race and a
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the post-Reconstruction South and throughout much of the 20th Century South?
This question requires an analysis of the various options the miscegenational law
had available to it, and an analysis of antebellum southern legislatures’ reasons for
their miscegenational regulations.

2. The Miscegenational Law’s Options

Before answering the question as to why the antebellum South chose the
miscegenational regulations it did, it would be insightful to look at the law’s
options. Hypothetically, the antebellum South had many options, when it came to
miscegenation, particularly between white men and black women. Each option has
two analytical aspects: The first aspect was a white man and a black woman’s legal
authority to have an interracial sexual relationship. The second aspect was a
miscegenational black woman’s resulting property interest in her white partner’s
estate.
The first of these miscegenational options, at one end of the rights’
spectrum, is the “optimal rights” theory. With “optimal rights,” a white man and a

person of the negro or black race was made a felony.”)
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black woman (enslaved, subject to emancipation, or free) could legally marry.
Under “optimal rights,” a black woman would receive all benefits of freedom and
of marriage, including all inheritance rights for the offspring of herself and her
white husband. The “optimal rights” option would have treated interracial
relationships as white-men-white-women relationships, allowing for legal
marriage, and resulting property rights in the marital estate.
The second option or theory, at the other end of the rights’ spectrum, is
“total prohibition.” Under “total prohibition,” a white man and a black woman
(enslaved or free) would be absolutely prohibited from any and all sexual contact
of any kind. With “total prohibition,” interracial marriage, cohabitation, casual
sexual relations, and a white man’s rape of a black woman would run afoul of both
the criminal and the civil laws. Under “total prohibition,” a black woman would
receive no property interests of any kind, resulting from any type of sexual activity
with her white sex partner. The “total prohibition” option would treat
miscegenational relationships between white men and black women just the same
as the antebellum South treated similar miscegenational relationships between
white women and black men.
There are several permutations between these two extremes, but two of them
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are particularly worth noting. One is the “marriage/no property” option, wherein a
white man and black woman (enslaved or free) could legally marry, but the black
woman (enslaved or free) would not be entitled to any property interest in her
husband’s estate. This option would legitimize the sexual relationship, while not
allowing for white-to-black wealth transference. The immediate beneficiary of the
“marriage/no property” option would be the miscegenational offspring of the
marriage who would be legally presumed legitimate, and thereby subject to
inheritance rights from both parents’ estates.
The other is the “no marriage/property” option or theory, wherein a white
man and a black woman (enslaved or free) could not legally marry, but the black
woman would have some property interest in her white sexual partner’s estate.
This option would not permit interracial marriage, but would reward a black
woman with some property interest in her white sexual partner’s interest. Under
the “no marriage/property” option, the miscegenational black woman would
receive some property rights, but in exchange, it would not be presumed that the
offspring of the relationship were legitimate.
There are a few other legal considerations that should be mentioned in
analyzing these hypothetical miscegenational options. The first is what effect
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existing relationships should have on these options? For example, what if the
interracial relationship is “extramarital,” as if the white man is already married to a
white woman and has a white family? The second is what effect should the black
woman’s legal status have? For example, what if the black woman is enslaved and
another white man, who is not her sexual partner, owns her? The third is what
effect should each option have, if any, on the property rights of the offspring or
issue of those relationships? And the fourth, and most common in antebellum
jurisprudence, is what effect should emancipation laws, and the white family’s
interests, have on property rights?130 For example, what should the law do with the
property of a white man who died leaving white family members, but who directed
in his will that his enslaved black female sexual partner and their children be gifted
their freedom? If his enslaved black woman and their children were largely the
testator’s only property, what property interest should the law provide on behalf of
the white family members?

130

See, e.g., Article 193 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1825) which stated, “The slave who

has acquired the right of being free at some future time, is from that time, capable of receiving by
testament or donation. Property given or devised to him must be preserved for him, in order to
be delivered to him in kind, when his emancipation shall take place. In the mean time it must be
administered by a curator.”
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Now that we have reviewed the many options from which antebellum
southern legislatures had to choose, there is still the question, why didn’t they
choose to totally prohibit miscegenation; as they, in fact, permitted interracial
affairs between white men and black women? Before we can answer the why, let
us review the how: How did antebellum southern legislatures regulate
miscegenation between white men and black women?

B.

LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN
THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH131

In the antebellum South, when it came to sexual relationships between the

131

As to some sources on enslavement law, see COBB, supra note 115;F INKELMAN, supra

125; THE REVISED STATUTES OF LOUISIANA (U. B. Phillips, compiler, 1856); JOHN CODMAN
HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLS. I

AND II

(Negro

Universities Press 1968) (1858); J.D. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SLAVERY (1837); JOHN CURTIS BALLAGH, A HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA (Johnson Reprint
Corp. 1968) (1902), THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA (John Belton O’Neall, collector and
digest, 1848); THE CENTURY EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DIGEST: A COMPLETE DIGEST OF ALL
REPORTED AMERICAN CASES FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 1896, VOL. XLIV, SHIPPING–
SUBSCRIBING WITNESS (1903); CATTERALL, supra note 96. See also, for excellent summaries on
miscegenation legislation, MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 136-40 (1985).
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races, the law of miscegenation was somewhat peculiar: it was race, gender, and
status driven.132 This can be illustrated through an analysis of legislation

132

The law appeared, on the surface, less concerned with regulating sexual relationship

between free white women and enslaved black men, that is, except for the presumption that such
an arrangement was prima facie evidence of the black man’s rape of the white woman. See, e.g.,
MORRIS, supra note 51, at 304-05 (quoting Pleasant, (a slave), v. State (Arkansas, 1855), “The
presumption that a white woman yielded... to the embraces of a negro, without force... would not
be great.” And citing Bertram Wyatt-Brown who argued, “it goes without saying that the
penalty for a slave who dared lust after white women’s flesh was castration, first by the law of
the slave code, later by community justice alone.” (Footnote omitted.))
Despite these legal and community-based restrictions, there is evidence that these types
of miscegenational relationships existed. See, e.g., STAMPP, supra note 12, at 352: “Though
white women were less involved in interracial sexual contacts than men, their role, especially in
the colonial period when slaves and indentured servants worked on the same estates, was never
entirely negligible. A Maryland statute of 1663 noted that ‘divers freeborn English (sic) women,
forgetful of their free condition, and to the disgrace of our nation, do intermarry with negro
slaves’; but the penalties provided in this and other southern statutes did not put an end to the
practice.... [t]hese women were not all paupers or prostitutes. In New Orleans a ‘seemingly
respectable’ white female was arrested on charges of having been in an ‘indecent
companionship’ with a slave.... Occasionally a white female who loved her colored paramour
lived with him as a common-law wife.” See also, BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at 156 (“The
evidence from a Virginia divorce petition is conclusive... a Norfolk white man asserted in 1835
that his wife had ‘lived for the last six or seven years and continues to live in open adultery with
a negro man....’”)
Relative to miscegenational relationships between free black men and free white women,
the law forbade marriage, but allowed intimate liaisons between them to exist. See BERLIN,
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regulating sexual relationships between white men and black women.133 There
supra note 7, at 269 (“When a Richmond white woman claimed she had been raped by a free
Negro, the police simply ignored the charge. Since she associated with ‘none other than the
lowest and debased free Negroes in the Valley....’”) But see BERLIN, supra note 7, at 268 (“Yet
Southern leaders despised these illicit combinations of whites and free Negroes.”)
133

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 206 (“Fundamentally the slave codes were much alike.

Those of the Deep South were somewhat more severe than those of the Upper South, but most of
the variations were in minor detail.”) Hence, this article will focus on one state’s code, the State
of Louisiana, as representative of southern states’ enslavement codes, including laws relative to
free blacks. See also BERLIN, supra note 7, at 317 (noting that “as the nineteenth century wore
on, Southern legislators reviewed each other’s statute books and gradually made their laws
uniform. New states generally adopted the legal codes of the older states, thereby adding still
greater uniformity to the system. By 1860, despite regional variations in racial ideology, the free
Negro’s legal status was strikingly similar in every Southern state.”) Compare PHILLIPS, supra
note 14, at 493-94:

Louisiana alone in all the Union, because of her origin and formative experience as a
Latin colony, had a scheme of law largely peculiar to herself. The foundation of this lay
in the Code Noir decreed by Louis XV for that colony in 1724.... Nearly all the
provisions of this relatively liberal code were adopted afresh when Louisiana became a
territory and then a state of the Union. In assimilation to Anglo-American practice,
however, such recognition as had been given to slave peculium was now withdrawn,
though on the other hand slaves were granted by implication a legal power to enter
contracts for self-purchase.
Hence, despite some disclosed reservations, the following discussion of American
enslavement law focuses on the law of the State of Louisiana, although not limited to that State’s
laws. There are several reasons for this. First, while Louisiana law has a different history, being
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based on the Code Noir decreed by Louis XV for the French colony of Louisiana in 1724, its
nineteenth century legislative pronouncements reflect the pressing enslavement legal issues
experienced by all the enslavement states. Second, the United States’ acquisition of the
Louisiana Territory via the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 fueled the “private property” paradigm
through the newly-available expanse of land. And third, the City of New Orleans was a major
southern commercial hub that made the State of Louisiana important to nineteenth century
economic development. The author acknowledged that there are some unique features of
Louisiana’s antebellum law, such as “forced heirship,” its approach to “bastards” inheritance
rights, and its attitude about concubinage that reflect its civil law roots. See generally LORIO,
supra note 83; SCHAFER, OPEN, supra note 91.
Yet Louisiana may have been a more “permissible” state (along with South Carolina),
for, as this article details, its legislature legally recognized concubinage between white men and
black women (enslaved and free), formally allowed black women concubines limited property
inheritance rights, and allowed white men to formally acknowledge their mixed-race children
with black women (along with inheritance rights). See supra note 147. But see SCHAFER,
SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 184-85:

Freeing a slave mistress meant not only overcoming legislative restrictions, but also
surmounting two additional legal obstacles firmly embedded in the Louisiana Civil Code.
The first of these was forced heirship. Forced heirship required that legitimate children,
which the court call “descending heirs,” at a minimum receive a specified portion of the
property of the deceased parent or grandparent. Forced heirs could be disinherited for
committing serious offenses against a parent.... If an individual died childless but one or
both parents survived, they were forced heirs–‘ascending heirs’–and entitled to a
specified portion of the estate. With either ascending or descending heirs, the forced
portion varied according to the number of forced heirs, and the Code clearly spelled out
every possible configuration of heirship. Under Louisiana law, freeing a slave was
considered a monetary donation to that person, and the state’s forced heirship doctrine
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were different types of sexual relationships between white men and black women
in the antebellum South, from rape to marriage.134 We shall begin with the type
that was unfortunately, the most prevalent of them, a white man’s rape of his
enslaved black woman.135

came into play. Article 190 of the Civil Code held that ‘any enfranchisement made in
fraud of... the portion reserved by law to forced heirs, is null and void... [if] (sic) it shall
appear that at the moment of executing the enfranchisement, the person granting it had
not sufficient property... to leave to his heirs the portion to them reserved by law.
134

See generally KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 41, n. 2, 529-30 (providing a splendid

overview of the subject and, inter alia, an exhaustive list of scholarship on interracial sex during
the enslavement era).
135

See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 124-25:

Far more often, however, slaves who had sex with whites did so against their will,
whether the victims of outright rape or of the powerlessness that made resistance to
advances futile and the use of force in such advances unnecessary.... Sex between white
men and black women was a routine feature of life on many, perhaps most,
slaveholdings, as masters, their teenage sons, and on large holdings their overseers took
advantage of the situation to engage in the kind of casual, emotionless sex on demand
unavailable from white women.

See also, supra note 56.
See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 163 (“The sexual abuse of enslaved women was a
constant refrain, for example, in Frederick Douglass’s indictment of bondage:
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1. White Men Could Legally Rape Their Enslaved Black Women.

The most significant miscegenational rule, in the antebellum South, was that
a white man/master could legally rape his enslaved black woman, and the black
woman had no legal recourse.136 From the white master’s perspective,

More than a million women, in the Southern States... are, by the laws of the land,
and through no fault of their own, assigned to a life of revolting prostitution....
Youth and elegance, beauty and innocence are exposed for sale upon the auction
block; while villainous monsters stand around, with pockets lines with gold,
gazing with lustful eyes upon their prospective victims.... Every slaveholder is a
party, a guilty party, of this awful wickedness.” (Footnote omitted.))
136

See HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, supra note 112, at 2008 (“In cases of interracial

rape, in contrast, only black men were called to task. White men were not punished at all for the
rape of black women, and black men were punished more severely than were white men who
raped white women.”). See also FINKELMAN, supra note 125, at 50 (citing from William W.
Fisher III, “Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery,”
In situations implicating the sexuality of female slaves, the Jezebel image
predominated. For example, the supposed licentiousness and poorly developed
parental instincts of Negro women were commonly invoked to justify denying
them the right to marry or to retain custody of their children. Similar
characterizations were used to justify the failure of almost all jurisdictions to
criminalize rape of a slave woman. (Footnotes omitted.))
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miscegenation between himself and his enslaved black women was entirely
unregulated.137 Where it related to white masters and enslaved black women,

See also, SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 85 (“No Louisiana law made rape of a black
woman, slave or free, a crime. Rape was specifically limited to white women under the state’s
law.”) Compare PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 260-1
(1986) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, CASEBOOK]) (citing George (a Slave) v. The State, 37
Mississippi 316 (1859) (in the case of an enslaved black man’s indictment for the rape of
enslaved female child under ten years old, the Court held that no indictment could be sustained
either at common law or by statutory law. The Court stated the terrible legal position that
enslaved black women (of any age) faced, when raped, “From a careful examination of our
legislation, on this subject, we are satisfied that there is no act which embraces either the
attempted or actual commission of a rape by a slave on a female slave.” One can be sure that if
the law did not hold an enslaved man liable for raping an enslaved ten-year-old child, it would
not have a white master liable for the same horrid act!)
137

See JOE GRAY TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN LOUISIANA 20 (1963) [hereinafter

TAYLOR]

The existence of extramarital relation between whites and Negroes can be accepted
without doubt. To some extent this had occurred on the slave coast, and it continued
amidst the stench of the slave ships. When the slave woman reached the New World she
was in no position to resist white insistence.... Citations are after all unnecessary,
because the increasing number of references to mulattoes as time went on and a realistic
appreciation of the conditions which exist when women are the property of men make the
conclusion inevitable that there were many children born of mixed parentage. Nor do the
sources available indicate any strong disapproval. Men in court frequently accounted for
their whereabouts at a certain time by asserting that they had been ‘sleeping with a
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plantation law (e.g., the master’s desires) ruled.138 An enslaved black woman
legally had no will that her white master needed to respect, and she owed total
obedience to him.139
negress.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
138

See COBB, supra note 115, at 99-100:

Another consequence of slavery is, that the violation of the person of a female slave,
carries with it no other punishment than the damages which the master may recover for
the trespass upon his property.... It is a matter worthy of consideration of legislators,
whether the offence of rape, committed upon a female slave, should not be indictable;
and whether, when committed by the master, there should not be superadded (sic) the sale
of the slave to some other master. The occurrence of such an offence is almost unheard
of; and the known lasciviousness of the negro, renders the possibility of its occurrence
very remote. Yet, for the honor of the statute-book, if it does occur, there should be an
adequate punishment. (Footnotes omitted.)

See also, supra note 56.
139

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 198:

Slaves themselves had little claim on the law for protection. A South Carolina judge, in
1847, put the case bluntly. A slave, he said ‘can invoke neither magna charta nor
common law.... In the very nature of things, he is subject to despotism. Law as to him is
only a compact between his rulers.’ The Louisiana Black Code of 1806 (sec.18) declared
that a slave ‘owes to his master, and to all his family, a respect without bounds, and an
absolute obedience, and... is... to execute all... orders.’
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2. White Men and Black Women Could Not Legally Marry.

The next most significant miscegenational rule was that a white man could
not legally marry a black woman of any status, whether he owned her, whether
another person owned her, or whether she was free.140

See also ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987) (presenting the feminist view that under
conditions of patriarchy, most, if not all, heterosexual sex amounts to coerced sex). See
generally DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR’N’T (SIC) I

A WOMAN:

FEMALE SLAVES IN THE

ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1985).
140

See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 219:

The race bar at the altar has a long history in America. In 1664, Maryland severely
punished white women who married Negroes or slaves, calling such unions ‘shameful
matches.’ To prevent ‘abominable mixture and spurious issue’–meaning mixed-race
offspring–the Virginia Assembly decreed that whites who married blacks, mulattoes, or
Indians would be banished from the dominion forever. By 1800 ten of the sixteen states
then constituting the United States proscribed interracial marriage. By 1913, when
Wyoming became the last state to impose a statutory impediment to marital
miscegenation, forty-one others had already enacted similar laws, and in doing so armed
public authorities and private persons with the means to create and police racial divisions
in matters of sex and matrimony.
See, e.g., La. BLACK CODE, art. VI (1724) (provided that marriage of whites to enslaved blacks
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was forbidden, and that concubinage of whites with manumitted or freeborn blacks was also
forbidden.) Article 95 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 prohibited marriage between a white
person and a colored person. Compare KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 76 (noting that South
Carolina did not prohibit interracial marriage during the antebellum period). See also MICHAEL
P. JOHNSON & JAMES L. ROAKE, BLACK MASTERS, A FREE FAMILY OF COLOR IN THE OLD
SOUTH 128-29 (1984) [hereinafter JOHNSON] (“In South Carolina, unlike many other Southern
states, a marriage between a free person of color and a white person was perfectly legal.”)
As to marriage between free blacks and whites, see COBB, supra note 115, at 313:

Free persons of color, unless restricted by statute, may contract marriage with those of
their own condition, or any free person capable of contracting. Intermarriage with the
whites is prohibited in a large majority of the States of the Union. Public policy has
made it necessary for the slaveholding States, by statute, to impose other restrictions
upon free persons of color... to place them on the same footing with slaves as to their
intercourse with white citizens....” (Footnotes omitted.)

See also STAMPP, supra note 12.
Compare A LAW UNTO ITSELF? ESSAYS IN THE NEW LOUISIANA LEGAL HISTORY 196-98
(Warren M. Billings & Mark F. Fernandez eds., 2001) [hereinafter BILLINGS], Ellen Holmes
Pearson, “Imperfect Equality, The Legal Status of Free People of Color in New Orleans, 18031860:”

The Code Noir’s interdiction against interracial marriage was reiterated in the
Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of 1825, but it was not tested in the Supreme
Court of Louisiana until 1855, in Dupre v. Boulard. That case arose out of a
disputed succession, and the issue turned on the validity of a French marriage
between a white man and a free woman of color. The children of Marie Elizabeth
Boulard attempted to block Jean Pierre Michel Dupre from claiming any of their
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3. White Men Could Legally Buy and Sell Enslaved Black Women
for Sexual Exploitation.

The next most significant miscegenational rule was that a white man could
legally buy, and, if disobedient, sell, an enslaved black woman for any lawful
purpose, including sexual exploitation.141 In fact, there is evidence that law
mother’s estate because Dupre and Boulard’s marriage was illegal in Louisiana.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Henry Spofford expressed his disapproval,
calling the marriage an “unnatural alliance” and refusing to sanction an evasion of
Louisiana law by legitimating the union. The fact that the first challenge to this
law came so close to the Civil War is somewhat surprising. Because New
Orleanians tended to overlook cohabitation between white men and women of
color, perhaps the marital status of Marie Elizabeth and Jean Pierre Michel Dupre
would have gone unnoticed had it not been for the dispute over an estate worth
almost $23,000. (Footnotes omitted.))

See also, H.E. STERKX, THE FREE NEGRO IN ANTE-BELLUM LOUISIANA 243-44 (1972)
[hereinafter STERKX].
141

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 196:

Some slaveholders preferred to use ‘bright mulattoes’ as domestics; a few paid premium
prices for light-skinned females to be used as concubines or prostitutes.” Id. at 259
(“Lewis C. Robards, Lexington’s best-known trader in the 1850's, had special quarters on
the second floor of his ‘Negro jail’ for his ‘choice stock’ of quadroon and octoroon girls.
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allowed white men to buy enslaved women merely for their sexual and physical
attraction and pleasure, as there was quite a demand in the enslavement market for
certain black women.142

4. White Men Could Legally Cohabit with a Black Women, as

‘In several rooms,’ reported a visitor, ‘I found very handsome mulatto women, of fine
persons and easy genteel manners, sitting at their needlework awaiting a purchaser. The
proprietor made them get up and turn around to show to advantage their finely developed
and graceful forms–and slaves as they were, this I confess, rather shocked my gallantry.
New Orleans was known to be a good market for ‘fancy girls,’ but traders found
purchasers elsewhere too.” (Footnotes omitted.)

See also, supra notes 14 and 52.
142

The author has reviewed the enslavement sales found in the 1829-1831 Slaves Sales of

Notary William Christy in the Orleans Parish Courthouse, New Orleans, Louisiana and found
that the average price, between 1829 and 1831, for an 18-year-old black woman was $400
(average of 100 such sales). And yet, in 1830, an agent of a Virginia white master bought an 18year-old “mulatto” woman for $1200! See SIR EDWARD ROBERT SULLIVAN, RAMBLES AND
SCRAMBLES IN NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA 210 (1853) (making observations about the
desirability of attractive black women on the enslavement sale block: “Their movements are the
most easy and graceful that I have ever seen.... A handsome quadroon could not, though the
market is well supplied, be bought for less than one thousand or fifteen hundred dollars!”).
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Concubines.143
The next most significant miscegenational rule was that a white man could

143

A “concubine” is defined as “a woman who cohabits with a man without being his

wife; a kept mistress. A male paramour.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. III, supra note 5, at 674.
This article defines a concubine as either a man or a woman (primarily) who live together,
without being married. They were parties cohabiting out of wedlock. Often, the term was used
to describe the woman (usually black) in such a relationship, while the more positive term
“paramour” was used to describe the man (usually white). There were some other types of
miscegenational relationships between white men and black women. These included a white
man/master legally prostituting an enslaved black woman he owned for profit; a white man
legally having casual sexual activities with an enslaved black woman he owned; a white man
legally cohabiting secretly with an enslaved black woman he owned; and a white man having the
same types of the aforementioned relationships with an enslaved woman that he did not own, or
with a free black woman.
See JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 52-53:

Others among the women without co-residing spouses were concubines of white men.
Some of the white men who fathered these women’s children were their former masters.
Others were white men who chose not to reside with the women who bore their children.
In the racial climate of antebellum South Carolina, most white men would not want to
acknowledge their mulatto children or their Negro concubine. Although the exact
proportion of concubines among the free Afro-American women without co-residing
spouses cannot be known, a rough estimate is that they numbered about a third of these
women, or about one free colored household in ten. In South Carolina, unlike many other
Southern states, a marriage between a free person of color and a white person was
perfectly legal. (Footnotes omitted.)
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legally cohabit “open and notoriously” with an enslaved black woman that he
owned, or with a free black woman, a “concubine.”144 In addition, the law in some
instances provided that an enslaved black woman was capable of receiving
property by will or inter vivos, if she had acquired the right to be set free in the
future.145

144

See LA. CIV. CODE, art. 1468, infra note 147. Compare HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF,

supra note 112, at 2003:

Cases in which white men were prosecuted for interracial sex rarely reached the highest
courts of Virginia. We have found only two, despite the frequency with which mulatto
children were born of black mothers. One reason lay in the rules of evidence: no black or
mulatto could testify against a white at trial. Therefore, another white would have had to
bring the complaint. Another reason was that society tended to wink at the casual
liaisons of white men and black women.
145

See supra note 130, LA. CIV. CODE, art 193 (1825), stating “A slave who has acquired

the right of being free at a future time, is from that time capable of receiving by testament or
donation. Property given or devised to him must be preserved for him, in order to be delivered to
him in kind, when his emancipation shall take place. In the meantime it must be administered by
a curator.” Unfortunately, in 1855, the State of Louisiana followed other enslavement states and
tightened the legal restrictions on blacks, enslaved and free. Some of its provisions included a
prohibition against free blacks marrying both whites and enslaved blacks, essentially permitting
free blacks to marry only other free blacks or to live illegally with whites or enslaved blacks.
See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 183-84 (“On March 6, 1857, the Louisiana
legislature eliminated all loopholes and totally prohibited emancipations: ‘From and after the
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5. White Men Could Transfer Limited Personal Wealth to
Their Black Concubines.

Even though white men could and often did “cross the color line” to
have sexual relations with enslaved black women, the law made it very difficult,
but not impossible, for white wealth to cross over as well.146 A statute did, in fact,
formally allow for some property transfer in such “illicit” relationships.147 It would
appear from this study that white men wanted the right to reward their black
women with property favors.148
passage of this act, no slave shall be emancipated in this state.’”)
146

See generally DAVIS, supra note 9.

147

See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE, art. 1468 (1825), which provided:

Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively incapable of
making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of
immovables; and if they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth
part of the whole value of their estate. Those who afterwards marry are excepted
from this rule.
148

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 268:

The strength and persistence of these liaisons were demonstrated whenever
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6. White Men Could Legally Transfer Personal Wealth to Their
“Colored” Children, Their Offspring with Black Concubines.

One obvious concern over miscegenation between white men and black
women was the procreation of mixed-race or “colored” children.149 Consequently,
officials challenged them. An attempt to prevent black women from inheriting a
portion of their white lovers’ estate brought howls of protest in the Louisiana
legislature (in 1840). One representative assured the assembly that ‘a black
woman who lived with a white man might be as virtuous as if she were his wife,’
and doubtless more virtuous than a white woman who lived in similar
circumstances since she (the black woman) was (legally) prohibited from
marrying her paramour.... (In 1860) the South Carolina General Assembly quietly
buried a petition lamenting that whites were ‘frequently found living in open
connection with negro and mulatto women’ by simply declaring ‘the evil
complained of cannot be prevented by legislation. (Emphasis added, footnotes
omitted.))

149

See HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, supra note 112, at 1994-95:

Significantly, the new and harsher legal attitude toward interracial sex appeared in
the 1662 statute designed to solve the ‘problem’ of fitting the mulatto children of
such unions into the social order. This suggests that what prompted the harsher
punishment was not simply the act of interracial sex itself, but its likely outcome:
Page 113 of 302

Blackness as Property
early in the Colonial period and throughout the antebellum period, the law treated
the offspring of miscegenational relationships between white men and black
women as their white father’s “bastards,” or illegitimate, without the father’s
inheritable blood.150 Their inheritance was that of their enslaved black mother, the
legal status of “enslaved.”151
The law clearly justified this rule to punish miscegenational relations. The
alternative–the presumption of legitimacy–would reward miscegenational
behavior, and would transfer wealth to mulatto children. (Imagine the
psychological effect on the enslaved child, to be your father’s legal property, to be
bought, sold, or abused as he willed!152) Oddly, the antebellum legislatures did
not completely close the door to the inheritance rights of “colored” or “mulatto”

mulatto children.... A 1691 statute... stated... ‘[I]t is hereby enacted, that for the
time to come, whatsoever English or other white man or women being free shall
intermarry with a negroe (sic), mulatto, or Indian man or woman bond or free
shall within three months after such marriage be banished and removed from this
dominion forever.’ (Footnotes omitted.))
150

See COBB, supra note 115.

151

See RUSSELL, supra note 14.

152

See supra note 110.
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children of miscegenational relationships between white men and black women,
allowing a more stringent but available means of legitimatization.153
And what should the law do if a white master decided to exercise his private
property rights so as to emancipate his enslaved black female lover and their
enslaved children?154 Unfortunately, later in the antebellum period (1840-60),
southern state legislatures made manumission of enslaved persons a more difficult
legal exercise, often requiring that the freed enslaved be sent out of the state.155

153

See LA. CIV. CODE, art. 221 (1825), providing strict requirements for a white father to

legally acknowledge a colored child as his offspring. This Article required that if a white father
desired to legally acknowledge a colored child, he must provide evidence in a notarial act, in
front of and signed by two witnesses.
154

See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF

SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 103 (1988) [hereinafter D’EMILIO] (“When white men emancipated their
mistresses and mulatto children in their wills they implied that more than mere physical
exploitation characterized these relationships.”)
155

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 138-139:

The master’s right to free his slaves shrank as slavery expanded.... By the 1850s, when
many states prohibited manumission altogether, only the border states of Delaware and
Missouri and newly settled Arkansas allowed masters to liberate their slaves and
permitted manumitted blacks to remain in the state.” (Footnote omitted, lists various
states’ manumission laws and source references.)
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The strength of the law’s abhorrence of “colored” children receiving
property from their white fathers is observed in the case of Robinett v. Verdun’s
Vendees.156 In that case, the deceased, Alexander Verdun had sold certain tracts of
land to Jean Baptiste Gregoire and six or seven other colored persons whom
Verdun’s white heirs alleged were Verdun’s illegitimate children.157 The court
annulled the sale, finding that the deceased, Verdun, had not properly
acknowledged his illegitimate colored children.158 Justice Simon recognized the
obstacles that white men faced in attempting to pass on property to their “colored”
children:

‘A part of the population of that (sic) state has been
placed by law under certain disabilities and incapacities,
from which it is not the province of the courts of justice
to relieve them; and there are very important
considerations which impose on our courts a stricter

156

Robinett et al. v. Verdun’s Vendees, 14 La. 542, 1840 WL 1092 (La. 1840).

157

Id.

Page 116 of 302

Blackness as Property
ob
servance of the laws relative to illegitimate children,
especially to those of color.’159

In summary, when it came to miscegenation between white men and black
women, antebellum southern legislatures imposed a double standard, allowing
white men to enjoy a black woman’s sexual favors, while granting her and their
offspring little or no property rights. Rather than completely prohibit any
meaningful sexual contact between them, the law condoned them, and, at least in
Louisiana, legislatively provided black women who participated in these
relationships and their offspring an opportunity to enjoy limited property rights.
Why the apparent inconsistency? Why not prohibit all interracial sexual
relationships? And, even if some were recognized, why not cut off all property
rights to black women in miscegenational relationships? The answers to these
questions and whether those answers support or oppose Professor Bell’s “interestconvergence” principle is analyzed next.

158

Id. at *4.

159

Id. at 3, citing Jung et al. v. Doriocourt et al, 4 La. 175, 1832 WL 820 (La. 1832).
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C.

WHY MISCEGENATION LAW PERMITTED WHITE MEN AND
BLACK WOMEN TO COHABIT, AND GAVE BLACK WOMEN
LIMITED PROPERTY RIGHTS?

As there is little legislative history explaining antebellum Southern
legislatures’ reasons for their approach to white man and black woman
miscegenation, one is left to speculation. First, there is the Jeffersonian theory of
enslavement status: once an enslaved black, always enslaved, even descendants of
free white men and enslaved black women.160 But Jeffersonian theory fails to
explain the law’s similar treatment of miscegenational relationships between white
men and free black women, and its treatment of free, albeit presumptively
illegitimate, children.
Another explanation is racism, or the boundary of color, that despite “free,”
non-enslaved status, white society aspired to remain “white” and racially
segregated.161 This “racism” theory is embodied in the Higginbotham theory of

160

See RUSSELL, supra note 14.

161

See FINKELMAN, supra note 125, at 395, excerpt from Jonathan A. Bush, “The British

Constitution and the Creation of American Slavery” (“The colonial boundaries of skin color and
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racial purity and segregation, that to allow interracial sexual intercourse would lead
to mulatto children.162 But the legislatures’ failure to make criminal a white
master’s rape of his enslaved black refutes this theory.
Analyzing the law’s handling of blood issue of white men and black women
is illuminating.163 Without racism, a white man would have been legally capable
white racism did not always succeed in separating the races, particularly before the eighteenth
century.... For masters the general answer to these boundary challenges was the same: keep
slaves as slaves and not free by keeping blacks separate. This explains the prominence of
colonial penal statutes, miscegenation laws, restrictions on manumission, and similar acts.”)
162

See generally HIGGINBOTHAM & KOPYTOFF, supra note 112.

163

See P. Keith Daigle, All in the Family: Equal Protection and the Illegitimate Child in

Louisiana Succession Law, 38 LA. L. REV. 189 (1977-1978) (discussing the various
classifications of children and their inheritance rights). Historically, Louisiana has classified
children as legitimates, natural (acknowledged by either parent but born out of wedlock), and
illegitimates (unacknowledged and out of wedlock). Illegitimates had no inheritance rights
except for nourishment, lodging and “alimony” (support), if the father or mother had legitimate
children or descendants. An acknowledged natural child was ranked higher in the mother’s
succession, inheriting ahead of ascendants, collaterals, and the surviving spouse, if there were no
surviving legitimate descendants. In the father’s succession, an acknowledged natural child
inherited only ahead of the state, and after any lawful relations and a surviving spouse. Id. at
189-91. See also, In the Matter of the Succession of Joseph L. Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La.
1977) (holding that Civil Code Article 1488 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution, by treated “adulterous bastards” different from other “illegitimates”). Id.
at 198-200.
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of marrying a black woman. Then, their children would have all the property and
inheritance rights of legitimate children. Without racism, a white male could
easily bestow, by inter vivos gift or by will, property upon his “concubine” and
their children. On the other hand, with racism, a white father could not easily
acknowledge his children with a black woman, as was the case under Louisiana
law, which required greater formality164 than when acknowledging a white child,
and still faced legal limitations on the portion of his estate he could give by will.
These legal restrictions and impediments were greater if the black woman was
enslaved, not free, and if the children were enslaved.
Then there is the D’Emilio “romance theory,” that a white master who
attempted to free his enslaved mistress and their mulatto children by will showed
more than physical exploitation, and was likely in love.165 But, as we shall see, in
the case law, these attempts at emancipation by will often failed. One also has to
wonder how romantic it was to the enslaved black mistress, to wait until her white
master-lover died, to be emancipated (along with their children), when he could

164

La. CIV. CODE, art 221 (1845) (providing that acknowledgment of an illegitimate child

should be made by a declaration before a notary public in the presence of two witnesses and no
other proof of acknowledgment shall be admitted in favor of children of color).
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have done so while alive!
The usual justification for these statutes regulating interracial relationships
was, according to the Schafer “family theory,” protection of the “institution of the
family.”166 That is, at least, the white family. But as the Schafer “family theory”
points out, it is unfair to judge miscegenational relationships between white men
and black women by “legitimate” marital standards, as the law prohibited them
from marrying. At the end of the day, despite the law, white men and their black
women often carried on relationships with them that mirrored, for better or worse,
marriage.167 Many defied the law and sought legal loopholes to reward their black

165

See D’EMILIO, supra note 152.

166

See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 200 (“Louisiana’s continental legal

heritage is evident in these rulings. Illicit and illegal liaisons were a threat to the institution of
the family. The Civil Code ensured that the legitimate family of the free partners in an illegal
relationship would not be deprived of their inheritance. Of course, slaves had no legitimate
families under the law, could own no property, and were in fact property themselves. These
factors operated in most court decisions to make these laws more burdensome on them than on
whites.”)
167

See KOLCHIN, supra note 116.
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mistresses with wealth and property.168
Can Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle provide the answer? Should
antebellum Southern legislatures have allowed black women and their
miscegenational offspring with white men, to share in the American Dream?
Reflecting on Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle is the Saks “wealth
miscegenation” theory, that whatever property rights antebellum Southern
legislatures provided black women in relationships with white men coincided with
the interests of privileged, wealthy, powerful white men.169 The Saks “wealth
miscegenation” theory is also consistent with the creation of the American Dream,
based upon cheap land, cheap labor, and cheap sex.170 To allow black women to
enjoy property rights would arguably reduce what would be available for deserving
white Americans: wealth, power, and privilege.
More critically, for antebellum Southern legislatures (and the contemporary
U.S. Supreme Court) to provide black women property rights would undermine the
very basis of the American Dream and of whites’ important rationale for

168

See generally DAVIS, supra note 9.

169

See SAKS, supra note 114.
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enslavement: the inferiority of blacks. How could blacks be both inferior and
treated as equal? The answer, in the eyes of antebellum Southern legislatures, was
that black women were not equal.171 As enslavement was a human institution
where white men ruled, the law bent to accommodate their sexual desires and guilt,
so as to allow white men-black women miscegenation and to apparently reward
black women some limited property rights.
While antebellum Southern legislatures provided some insights into the
answers to these questions,172 one must look to case a law and judicial
pronouncement to get a full picture of how these laws were actually implemented
and the judicial rationales for their decisions. Even though the legislature granted
miscegenational black women some limited property rights, did antebellum
Southern judges reinforce or impede such rules? And most important, why did the
judges do what they did?

170

See supra, Section II.

171

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 268 (“Whites maintained their dominance by

differentiating themselves from blacks and monopolizing the symbols of superiority.”)
172

See supra, Section III, B.
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IV.

COURT DECISIONS RESTRICTING WHITE WEALTH
TRANSFERENCE TO BLACKS173

In a market economy, property is freely bought and sold,
and freely transferred by way of gift. Most gift
transactions take place within the family. Few property
owners make major gifts during their lifetime; but, when
they die, all must be given away. Almost the entire stock
of private wealth turns over each generation, by last will
and testament, or through the intestacy laws, or by a gift
in the light of death. Only public, corporate, and dynastic
property is immune from this law of mortality.174
– Lawrence M. Friedman

173

There are many cases from enslavement states providing examples of white men who

attempted to transfer wealth to their enslaved black women and their children. See generally
DAVIS, supra note 9. Louisiana, a state that Davis expressly does not cover, provides an
abundant variety of these cases. See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 184.
174

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 218 (introducing the American law changes to the

English rules concerning succession).
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A.

LOUISIANA “PERMISSIVE” LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF
CONCUBINAGE.

This next section will focus on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s reaction to
the legislative concubinage wealth transfer statute, to determine whether Louisiana
did, in fact, provide a greater wealth opportunity for enslaved black women (and
their miscegenational children), as its legislative scheme implied. This will be
followed by an analysis of cases wherein white men transferred wealth to free
black women or “black mistresses.”
One scholarly study of nineteenth century case analyzed inheritance rights of
enslaved women against postmortem transfers of wealth.175 It concluded, “The
distributive rules of succession reinforced the exploitative roles of enslaved women
in the sexual economy.”176 That study chose not to focus on two important areas:

175

See DAVIS, supra note 9.

176

Id. at 285 (continuing, Davis explains, “The reproduction of the enslaved could never

produce property rights, only property. Sexual relationships never yielded economic rights,
regardless of the degree of affect, length of commitment, or adherence to monogamy. Southern
succession doctrine blocked the intimate sphere, as well as the commercial, as a source of
economic personality for the enslaved.”)
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interracial transfers in the State of Louisiana and interracial transfers to free black
mistresses.177
The first important inquiry is that of postmortem, interracial transfers in the

177

Id. At first glance, the miscegenational relationships described in the following case

study might appear somewhat romantic. Perhaps some of them were, but one should not assume
that all such relationships were other than brutality. For an example of the extend of brutality in
an antebellum concubinage relationship, see SCARBOROUGH, supra note 12, at 113-16:

Of all the great slaveholders included in this study, however, no others were more
callous or more brutal in the treatment of their human property than Judge Samuel
S. Boyd of Natchez and his partner, the former slavetrader Rice C. Ballard.... The
records indicate that throughout the term of their joint planting venture Ballard
and Boyd were constantly buying and selling slaves, apparently in utter disregard
of family ties.... But trafficking in slaves was not the most egregious of Judge
Boyd’s sins. His treatment of a female house servant named Maria bordered on
sadism.... The attorney described Maria’s treatment in graphic detail. She was,
he charged, ‘lashed... like an ox, until the blood gushes from her.’.... Outrageous
as was Judge Boyd’s abuse of Maria, it was exceeded by his subsequent treatment
of another female slave, his long-term mistress Virginia. The relationship had
evidently been one of extended duration, for by 1853 she had already borne him
two children and was pregnant with a third. Apparently fearful that the
relationship was about to be revealed to his wife, Boyd, in March of that year,
directed Ballard, acting through the agency of the slave dealer C.M. Rutherford,
to send Virginia and her children–his own children–to Texas to be sold.... In early
August, Rutherford informed Ballard that he had just received word from Texas
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State of Louisiana. And the second important inquiry is that of cases, involving
white men’s postmortem wealth transfers to free black women. The next section
of this article will analyze cases in these two important areas: First, we analyze the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state’s “permissive” concubinage
statute, allowing white men to transfer limited wealth to their black female sexual
partners.

B.

ENSLAVED BLACK WOMEN’S SEXUAL SERVICES
LEGISLATIVELY PAID, JUDICIALLY DENIED

There are many ways by which wealth could be acquired in the antebellum
South, including purchase, gift, or inheritance.178 By way of summary, each of
these wealth acquisition tools were denied to enslaved black women.179 They were
not legally allowed to own property,180 acquire by gift,181 labor for money to
that Virginia and her youngest child had been sold.
178

See supra note 79.

179

Id.

180

See supra note 104.
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purchase,182 contract for purchase,183 or inherit.184 Their inability to acquire wealth
or property was controlled by their legal status as property.185
An enslaved black woman would have to be manumitted or freed in order to
enjoy the full rights of private property ownership.186 In the early days of
enslavement, the laws of manumission made it easier for enslaved blacks to obtain
their freedom.187 Some legal avenues for manumission included allowing blacks to
“hire out their own labor” and purchase their freedom,188 successfully bring a
lawsuit for their freedom,189 travel with their master to a free state and be freed

181

Id.

182

See supra note 115.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

See supra note 51.

186

See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.
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there,190 or receive an inter vivos or causa mortis gifts of emancipation.191
Particularly, for the enslaved black woman, enslavement law and plantation
practices greatly diminished her ability to use her sexuality as socio-economic
bargaining chip, as her master had legal control over her sexuality and could rape
her without legal repercussions.192 That being said, some enslaved black women
were still able to negotiate their sexual relationships with white men, in exchange
for their freedom and that of their miscegenational children.193 Many of them were
manumitted during their white masters’ lifetimes.194 Unfortunately, many white
masters, for varying reasons from negligence to intent (and some because their

190

See STAMPP, supra note 12, at 2234-35 (“The truth was... that living masters in all the

southern states–even in those which prohibited manumission by last will and testament–always
had the right to remove their slave to a free state and there release them from bondage. Though
no slave state could deprive them of this right, few made use of it.”) But see, infra note 213,
Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847) (wherein a white master, Samuel
Miller, did just that, sending his enslaved black woman, Patsy, to Indiana, where she was
emancipated).
191

See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.

192

See supra note 136.

193

See supra note 117.
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miscegenational relationships were extramarital), chose to manumit their enslaved
black female sexual partners when they died, by their wills.195
It has already been established that the State of Louisiana, during the
antebellum period, had legislatively established a “permissive” scheme for white
men, living in “open and notorious” concubinage relationships with black women,
to give them limited property interests in their estate.196 Louisiana’s statutes were
“permissive” in that they 1) legally recognized concubinage between white men
and enslaved black women,197 2) expressly provided limited property rights to
enslaved black women (and their miscegenational children) in concubinage
relationships,198 and 3) treated manumission and free blacks favorably.199

194

Id.

195

See DAVIS, supra note 9.

196

See supra note 147.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

See SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45, at 2-3:

Slaves in Louisiana had two unique rights. State law allowed them to contract for
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The following analyzes antebellum Louisiana Supreme Court cases in which
that “permissive” legislative scheme was challenged by white family members of
miscegenational white men, seeking to frustrate the stated wills, to transfer
property (usually freedom) to their enslaved black women and their
miscegenational offspring.

1. Enslaved Women as Whore-ish White Property.

In the following cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled on critical issues,
involving a deceased white man’s will, providing that his enslaved women (and
usually, their children) receive some property interest in his estate. In doing so, the
Court was called upon to weigh the property claims of two competing groups: the
testator’s mixed-race, enslaved family against his white, legitimate one. Should
the testator’s desire to grant his enslaved black woman property be respected? Or

their freedom and to initiate a law suit for their liberty. Article 174 of the Civil
Code of the State of Louisiana (1825) allowed slaves to enter into only one form
of contract–for their freedom.... Slaves’ right to sue for their freedom constituted
an exceptional legal act in antebellum Louisiana. Article 177 of the Civil Code
held that slaves could not be parties in any civil action, either as plaintiffs or
defendants, except to claim their freedom.
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should the testator’s white relatives’ interests supersede his miscegenational
bequests?
But there was more at stake here than the mere disposition of probate
property: usually at stake in these cases was the very freedom of the enslaved black
woman and her miscegenational offspring. Typically, in these cases, they were the
property in controversy.200 This reality raised and often turned on a legal fiction of
great significance: that enslaved blacks were legally immovable property.
Louisiana’s concubinage statute expressly forbade gifts of immovables to
concubines.201 Could a white master will freedom as property to his enslaved
black woman when the Louisiana law considered (for most purposes) enslaved

200

The concubinage cases that the Louisiana Supreme Court heard clearly represent a

limited universe of concubinage cases. There were many concubinage cases, that were likely
properly disposed of at the lower court level, requiring no high Court review. For example, the
high Court did likely not review cases, where the testator clearly complied with the 10% total
value limitation, where the testator clearly failed to comply with the 10% rule, or where no one
challenged the miscegenational bequest. Hence, the cases that the Louisiana Supreme Court
reviewed usually involved fundamental issues, requiring their involvement. And then there were
likely some concubinage matters that the Probate Court was able to hear.
201

See supra note 147, at 185-200 (Professor Schafer anticipated some of the case

analysis in this section. The author is grateful for much of her foundational work in this area.).
Page 132 of 302

Blackness as Property
black people to be “immovables?”202

a. Maria v. Destrehan203

In an early case, in 1831, the Louisiana courts established a doctrine that
would resonate throughout their handling of concubinage cases: that enslaved
black women were not merely the immediate property of their white master, they
were “indefeasible” property, a continuing legacy of the white master’s white
heirs. In Maria v. Destrehan,204 the Court sought to balance a white daughter’s
forced heirship claim to her white father’s estate, against his bequest of freedom
for his enslaved black woman and her daughter.205 That estate consisted mainly of

202

See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 185 (“The second barrier, ignored by the

Louisiana Supreme Court until the 1850s, was more formidable: people living in open
concubinage could not donate immovable property of any value to each other while they were
alive or by will–and slaves were immovables under Louisiana law.”)
203

Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831). See SCHAFER,

SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 186-87.
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Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831).

205

Id.
Page 133 of 302

Blackness as Property
her father’s enslaved black woman, Maria, and her ten-year-old daughter.206
In Maria v. Destrehan,207 Jacob Philips died and willed that his enslaved
woman, Maria, and her ten-year-old daughter, Angel, be freed.208 He instructed his
white daughter to see to the emancipation “as a particular favor to her father.”209
Additionally, he left Maria and Angel all of his movable property.210 The entire
estate was valued at $1,497.25, of which Maria and Angel accounted for $850.211
The lower court held that the daughter must be given her required portion of the
Philips’s estate, under Louisiana’s forced heirship laws.212 (The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower court on a procedural issue.)
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Maria et al. v. Destrehan et al., 3 La. 434, 1832 WL 701 (La. 1831).
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b. Cole v. Lucas213

In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Patsy, a formerly enslaved,
then free, black woman, an inter vivos bequest of promissory notes for
approximately $24,000, secured by a plantation and enslaved blacks.214 The case
was determined on a technical issue of the date of delivery of the notes.215 More
important, the Court reiterated its doctrine of blackness as white property, in
stating that a slave cannot inherit, nor receive inter vivos gifts of property.216 The
Court found that despite evidence that the white testator, Samuel Miller, had gone
to great lengths to transfer title to Patsy, that at the time of the transfer, she was
still a slave, even though she was shortly thereafter freed.
In Lucas v. Cole,217 on May 11, 1843, Samuel Miller, a white man, sold his

213

Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847). See SCHAFER SLAVERY,

supra note 115, at 277, n.35.
214

Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 at *2 (La. 1847).
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Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847).
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plantation and enslaved blacks in Louisiana, taking the property as collateral for
promissory notes of approximately $24,000.218 Patsy, his enslaved black woman,
was Miller’s concubine.219 Miller desired to free Patsy, and made arrangements for
her to travel to Indiana, and there she was emancipated on the 13th or 14th of May
1844.220 The miscegenational couple decided to move to St. Louis, Missouri, and
did so in April of 1844.221
Prior to Patsy’s emancipation, Miller endorsed the notes and handed them to
Miller’s associate named Kirk to hold for Patsy’s benefit.222 The notes were
redelivered from Kirk to Miller in St. Louis, and given to Patsy after her
emancipation.223 The issue the Court faced was how Patsy’s legal (enslavement)
status at the time of the gift, and the concubinage, should affect Miller’s
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Id. at *2.
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Id.
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Id.
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Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 at *3 (La. 1847).
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bequests.224
The tone of the Court’s decision was most important: “She was the slave of
Miller and his concubine, and we think the evidence establishes that their
concubinage was open and notorious. Under the cumulated incapacity of slave and
concubine, she could not receive these notes from Miller as a valid gift, under our
laws. The concubines can only receive, in movables, one-tenth part of the whole
estate of her paramour, and the slave can receive nothing by donation (gift).”225
(Emphasis added.) As to the validity of the gift, and its position on the importance
of protecting versus punishing miscegenational relationship, the Court stated, “We
have already stated our opinions of the relations subsisting between the parties to
this donation. The disabilities under which the law places persons who have lived

224

Id. at *2:

But it is said she was emancipated on the 13th or 14th of May, 1844, at Madison
city, in the State of Indiana, and that her incapacity to receive as a slave was
removed by the act of emancipation. To render the gift valid under that
hypothesis, it would be incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the notes were
transferred, or give, to her subsequent to the act of emancipation. The mere
possession of the notes by her is no evidence of the time when they were
delivered to her.
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in this condition, are created for the maintenance of good morals, or public order,
and for the preservation of the best interests of society.”226 Therefore, the Court
found that Miller’s gift to Patsy failed, as it was delivered when she was an
enslaved concubine, and belonged to Miller’s white heirs.227

c. Vail v. Bird228

In 1851, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly articulated its quintessential
bias against white men’s bequests to free their enslaved black women and their
miscegenational children in its dicta in Vail v. Bird.229 The Court found that the
miscegenational bequest in that case, freedom for an enslaved black woman,

225

Id. at *2, and see supra, Article 1468, note 147.
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Id. at *5.

227

Id. at *5-6.

228

Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583

(La. 1851). See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 187-88.
229

Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583
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violated the expressly statutory prohibition of gifts of immovables.230 The Court
grounded its decision on the well-founded Louisiana law that enslaved blacks were
not only property, but were immovables.231 Vail v. Bird established that an
enslaved black is not merely the property of her present owner, but is a permanent
fixture of the family’s estate, and hence, indefeasible by will. It also established
the Court’s racist-sexist bias against the unfortunate position that enslaved black
women often found themselves.
In Vail v. Bird,232 Henry Clay Vail died, and his will provided freedom for
his enslaved black woman, Jane, and left her two promissory notes of $100 each.233
Vail’s white heirs sought to annul the will, arguing that as enslaved blacks were
legally classified as immovable property, Jane could not be the subject of Vail’s
gift.234 Following the “enslaved as indefeasible immovables” argument, the Court

230

Id. at *2.

231

Id.
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Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583
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accepted the challenge of Vail’s white heirs.235
In a very lucid moment, Justice Isaac Preston, for the majority, presented his
“blackness as permanent white property” view of the operation of the statute on
concubinage:
Slaves are made by our law immovable property. A donation which
deprives the heir of the donor of a slave (sic) is a disposition of
immovable property. The donation of freedom to a slave deprives the
(master’s white) heirs (ownership) of the slave, and is therefore the
donation of an immovable.236 (Emphasis added.)
Vail’s executor attempted to save the bequest to free Jane, arguing Jane
could not have consented to be a concubine. Arguably, the statute should not have
applied to enslaved black women, because, being “enslaved,” legally meant one
was without will and, therefore, could not have consented to be a concubine.237 On
this, the Court recognized that an enslaved black woman was vulnerable to her

235

Id. at *2.

236

Id.
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Abraham B. Vail et al. v. Abraham Bird, Executor, 6 La. Ann. 223, 1851 WL 3583 at
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white master’s power.238 But they stated that generally an enslaved mistress
willingly participated in sexual relations with her master:
It is true, the female slave is particularly exposed ... to the seductions
of an unprincipled master. That is a misfortune; but it is so rare in the
case of concubinage that the seduction and temptation are not mutual,
that exceptions to the general rule cannot be founded upon it.239
In 1854, in Bird v. Vail et al.,240 Vail’s executor continued to sue for Jane’s
and her child’s freedom, claiming that Vail’s heirs were not entitled to Louisiana’s
forced heirship rights, as they were neither ascendants nor descendants.241 A
newly-composed Court, Justice Campbell presiding, ignored the idea of an
enslaved person as immovable issue, and acknowledged Jane’s right to freedom.242
But the Court again sided with Vail’s white heirs, by providing that Jane
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Id.
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Id.
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A. Bird, Executor v. A. B. Vail, et al., 9 La. Ann. 176, 1854 WL 4038 (La. 1854). See

SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 188.
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A. Bird, Executor v. A. B. Vail, et al., 9 La. Ann. 176, 1854 WL 4038 (La. 1854).
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must remain in their enslaved service until she reached thirty (then the statutory
age of manumission of an enslaved black, she was then twenty-five).243 Judge
Campbell reasoned: That bequest to free enslaved black women did not free them
at the time of probate, those enslaved black women are only “entitled to their
freedom, upon compliance with the formalities prescribed by law for the
emancipation of slaves; until [then]... the heirs had a right... [to] enjoy their
services and labor.” 244 The Court also found that her daughter, Louisa, was
permanently enslaved to the heirs, as Vail’s will was silent about her fate.245

d. Adams v. Routh and Dorsey246

In 1853, in Adams v. Routh and Dorsey,247 the Court further assaulted
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Id.
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Id., citing Nimmo et. al v. Bonney et al., Executors, 4 R. 179.
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Id.
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William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 (La. 1853). See

SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 189.
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William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 (La. 1853).
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enslaved black women’s property rights. The Court was asked to balance a white
father’s forced heirship claim against his son Adams’s will, providing that his
enslaved black woman, Nancy, be freed, and that their children receive $1,000
each.248 The Court denied the miscegenational bequest, finding that it exceeded
the statutory gift limitation.249 It decided that Adams’s father continued to own
Nancy and her children with Adams, despite Adams’ specific bequest.250 And the
Court authorized their new owner to partition or separate the interracial family to
satisfy his property rights to one-fourth of the estate.251
In Adams v. Routh and Dorsey,252 William Adams, Jr., a white master,
lived in “open concubinage” with an enslaved black woman, Nancy.253 He died in
1851 and, in his will, he ordered his executor to free Nancy, give her his watch,

248

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *1-2.
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furniture, and $1,000 for each of their children.254 Adams’s legitimate white father
(who, under Louisiana law had “forced heirship” rights to one fourth of the estate,
as the Court found that Adams had no legitimate children) sued to invalidate the
will.255 Adams’s father claimed that as the entire estate was worth only $4,750, the
donation to Nancy of her freedom could cost the estate her value, $1,000, and that
amount exceeded the one-tenth concubinage statutory limitation.256 The Louisiana
Supreme Court agreed with Adams’s father, ruling that Nancy could not be
freed.257 It further held that Adams’s father was “entitled to receive one-fourth of
the entire succession of the testator, and to enforce a partition of it in kind or
licitation (sic), as the case may be.”258 This likely meant that Adams’s interracial
family would be divided by sale, to satisfy his father’s inheritance rights. The
Court also found in favor of Adams’s bequests of $1,000 to each of his colored
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William Adams v. Routh and Dorsey, 8 La. Ann. 121, 1853 WL 4080 at *1-2 (La.
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children, as Adams’s father “had no interest or standing in Court to contest those
legacies; and as the residuary legatees have not prosecuted their appeal from the
judgment, it must remain undisturbed.”259

2. “Adulterous and Incestuous Bastards:”
Miscegenational Offspring of White Men and Enslaved Black
Women?

a. Compton v. Prescott260–the Case of the Black Princess

As seen in the following analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly
disapproved of illegitimate children of white men and enslaved black women.261

259

Id. at *2.

260

John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677 (La. 1845).
261

See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 197:

Although white New Orleans tacitly accepted interracial cohabitation, the Civil
Code made it difficult for a concubine or natural children of mixed race to make
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One reason was that they generally perceived white men-black women
concubinage, as “immoral,” as many, if not most, of them were extramarital.
Hence, the Court often felt morally obligated to punish the participants. But, at the
same time, the Courts seemed to ignore the morality of the outcome of their
position, which was to victimize the innocent offspring of these extramarital,
miscegenational relationships. In the next case, the Court explained the various
levels of illegitimacy in the enslavement society.
In Compton v. Prescott,262 Leonard B. Compton, a white man, died without
leaving any ascendants or legitimate descendants,263 but leaving an estate worth

substantial claims on a white man’s estate. The law allowed bastards of color to
prove descent only from a father of color. Unless a white father formally
acknowledged his natural child of mixed race either at birth or at a later date, the
child had no claim to inherit any portion from his natural father. (Citing Civil
Code, art. 221, 226; Jung et al., v. Doriocourt et al., 4 La. 175 (1832); Robinett et
al. v. Verdun’s Vendees, 14 La. 592 (1840) (sic).

See supra, note 156.
262

John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677 (La. 1845).
263

Id. at *2.
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approximately $184,640.264 In this will, he made several bequests. The most
significant one at issue provided that his plantation (545 acres), enslaved blacks,
and $10,000 each, go to his mulatto daughter, Loretta, and her mulatto brother,
Scipio: “it being my intention to give them, and that they shall have one-fourth in
value of my estate.”265 Compton had previously “acknowledged them, as his
natural children, by regular notarial acts executed on the 14th of May, 1830, and
27th of December, 1837.”266 In doing so, the Court found that Compton complied
with the statutory requirements for acknowledgment of illegitimate “colored”
children, under Article 221, and for bequeathing one-quarter of his estate to his
“natural” children, pursuant to Article 1474 of the Louisiana Civil Code, then in
effect.267

264

Id. at *7.

265

Id. at *3.

266

John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *7 (La. 1845).
267

Id. at *9, the Court stated,

Now, art. 221, says, in positive terms, that ‘the acknowledgment of an illegitimate
child, shall be made by a declaration before a notary public, in the presence of
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In addition, Compton willed Fanchon, a “free woman of color” (and Loretta
and Scipio’s mother), “all my household and kitchen furniture of all descriptions
whatsoever; also one saddle horse, and my carriage, pair of horses, two patent gold
watches, stock of cattle, &c. (sic)”268 The Court noted the special nature of the
miscegenational relationship that Compton and Fanchon enjoyed:
The testimony established that the deceased was living in open and
notorious concubinage with a mulatress (sic) named Fanchon, who,
being formerly a slave, was emancipated in April, 1825; since then,
she was always considered a free woman of color. Fanchon had
several children, two of whom, Scipio and Loretta, are named in the
will as being the testator’s children; he always treated them as such,
and acknowledged them as his natural children, by regular notarial

two witnesses,’ and provides that ‘No other proof of acknowledgment shall be
admitted in favor of children of color.’” See also, id. at *10, where the Court also
stated, “It is perfectly clear that, under art. 1473, to wit: ‘when the natural father
has not left legitimate children or descendants, the natural children, acknowledged
by him, may receive by donation, inter vivos or mortis causa, to the amount of the
following proportions, to wit: one-fourth of his property, if he leaves legitimate
ascendants, or legitimate brothers and sisters; &c’. (sic)
268

Id. at *3.
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acts executed on the 14th of May, 1830, and 27th of December, 1837.
The deceased caused one of them to be educated in Ohio at his own
expense, and always showed them the affection of a father. It appears
that Loretta is dead.269
In his will, Compton made two specific bequests and left the remainder of
his estate to his four legitimate (white) nieces.270 During his lifetime, Compton
had allegedly made, directly and indirectly, certain inter vivos gifts to his free
black concubine and their children, Loretta and Scipio, including immovables.271
In the lawsuit, the legitimate, white nieces sought to have the entire estate divided
amongst themselves, voiding the provisional bequests to Fanchon, Loretta, and
Scipio, recapturing the inter vivos gifts to themselves, and questioning the specific

269

Id. at *7. A close reading of the decision shows that Loretta and Scipio were likely

born after their mother, Fanchon, was emancipated. This would mean that they were free blacks
and not enslaved (as there is no mention of the will’s providing that they be freed).
270

John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *4 (La. 1845).
271

Id. at *7-8.
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bequests to others.272
This case is as interesting for its dicta, as for its surprising disposition. The
disposition is easier to explain, so we will start there. In the end, the Court
honored Compton’s bequest that one-quarter of his estate go to his miscegenational
children, Loretta and Scipio, “crediting” the alleged inter vivos gifts they had
received previously.273 This was a major victory for miscegenational children. As
to the gifts to the free black woman and concubine, Fanchon, she received nothing,
but not because of her status as a concubine (although, but for the statutory
prohibition of interracial marriage, she and Compton could have legally married,
which would have resulted in the entire miscegenational family becoming
legitimate, and likely entitled to most of Compton’s estate).274 The remaining
three-fourths of the estate went to Compton’s four white legitimate nieces.275

272

Id. at *1.

273

Id. at *10-11.
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John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *11 (La.
1845).
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Now for the important dicta, the Court explained the nature of the Civil
Code’s definition of “adulterous and incestuous bastards.”276 Overall, the
Louisiana Code made it more difficult for a black child to inherit from a white
father, mainly, because of its prohibition of interracial marriage. First, under
Article 200, it provided for two classes of “natural” or illegitimate children: “those
born from two persons who, at the moment when such children were conceived,
might have legally contracted marriage with each other (white couples); and those
who are born from persons to whose marriage (sic) there existed, at the time, some
legal impediment (a miscegenational couple).”277 (Of course, the most common,
intended legal impediment was the legal prohibition of interracial marriage.)278
Second, it established more stringent rules for a white father to acknowledge a
black or mulatto child, by providing that the sole means to acknowledge a
“colored” child was for the acknowledging father to make a declaration before a

276

Id. at *9.

277

Id.

278

See supra note 140.
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notary public, in the presence of two witnesses.279 This more formal procedure
differed from provisions for a white father acknowledging paternity of a white
child or that of a black father acknowledging paternity of a child of either race.280
That brings us to the ultimate issue that the Court in Compton had to face:
based upon the two classes of illegitimate children stated in Article 200, the Civil

279

John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *9, citing Art.
221 (La. 1845).
280

Id. See Succession of Melasie Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099, 1103-07, 1881 WL 8776 (La.

1881), for a different twist, involving the “illegitimate” children of a free black man and a free
white woman. In this post-antebellum case, the plaintiff, Emelia Hebert, represented herself as
the natural daughter and sole issue of the deceased and sought to be put in possession of the
entire estate. At the lower court, a judgment was rendered against her. On appeal, the court held
that at the time of Emelia’s birth, her mother (white) and father (black) were unable to marry.
But the court further held that as there was no legal impediment to interracial marriage at the
time of the succession, Emelia’s right to inherit must be enforced. The court used as precedent
Compton v. Prescott, holding that the legal prohibition against interracial marriage does not
extend to the children of those relationships, such that they may prove maternal/paternal descent.
The statutory requirement of written recognition of acknowledgment applied exclusive to
children of color descending from a white father. The statute did not address the issue of a white
mother and a black father. Hence, Emelia received her white mother’s estate through a loophole,
not addressed by a legislature mainly concerned by protecting white men’s estates and not those
of white women. Succession of Melasie Hebert, 33 La. Ann. 1099, 1103-07, 1881 WL 8776 (La.
1881).
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Code in Articles 202 and 203, defines two classes of “adulterous and incestuous
bastards.”281 Those of the latter class, whose marriage was subject to legal
impediment, “can never be acknowledged.”282 But here is where the Court
departed from its generally racist doctrine of blackness as white property:
and although there is a legal impediment to the marriage of a white
person, with a free person of color, (art 95,) (sic) the exception (that
they as “adulterous and incestuous bastards,” can never be
acknowledged) does not appear to extend to their illegitimate or
natural children; for art. 222, says only: that ‘such acknowledgment,
shall not be made in favor of the children produced by an incestuous
or adulterous connection.’ Now, art. 221, says, in positive term, that
‘the acknowledgment of an illegitimate child, shall be made by a
declaration before a notary public, in the presence of two witnesses,’
and provides that ‘No other proof of acknowledgment shall be
admitted in favor of children of color.’ (Court’s own emphasis.)

281

John Compton et al, Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of said Leonard B. Compton, et al., 12 Rob. (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677, at *9 (La. 1845).
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Id., citing Article 222.
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This last proviso, which contains a negative pregnant with an
affirmative, undoubtedly means, that, as we said in the case of
Robinett et al. v. Verdun’s Vendees, (14 La. 545,) any other proof of
acknowledgment should be excluded, when offered by children of
color. It cannot mean any thing (sic) else; for art. 226, by which
illegitimate children who have not been legally acknowledged, are
allowed to prove their paternal descent, provided also, that free
illegitimate children of color may also be allowed to prove their
descent, from a father of color only, and it is obvious, that this last
restriction, was inserted in the law, because, with regard to his white
father, an illegitimate child of color, is not allowed to prove that he
has been acknowledged, but in the manner pointed out in art. 221, to
wit: by authentic evidence, and that, therefore, he cannot resort to any
other kind of proof, but when his father is a man of color. This
interpretation... does not seem to us, to conflict in the least with art.
259, relative to the alimony which natural children may claim from
natural parents. It is true, that article fixes the limit, to which such
alimony should be extended, as to natural children of color; but it
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clearly corroborates our opinion, that illegitimate colored children are
not on the same footing with adulterous or incestuous bastards, since
by art. 262, the latter are not entitled to any alimony from their father,
but can only claim it from their mother or her ascendants. We think
therefore, that Scipio and Loretta could be acknowledged, and art.
1473 makes no distinction, they should be entitled to the rights
allowed by law as such. (Emphasis added.)283
These dicta, although rather verbose, established that a white man could
acknowledge, as his natural child (and thereby pass on limited inheritance rights in
his will) a free colored child of a miscegenational relationship, between a white
man and a free black woman (presuming that the child did not, in fact, result from
an incestuous or adulterous relationship, such that the legal impediment was that
the white man was already married). It also indirectly meant that the white man
who acknowledged as his natural child an enslaved colored child from a
miscegenational relationship with a free or enslaved black woman, did not receive
inheritance rights, because an enslaved black, albeit acknowledged, could not

283

Id. at *9-10.
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receive gifts and had no right to inherit.284 As we shall see in the next case, the
miscegenational children were not as lucky.

b. Turner v. Smith285

In this next case, the miscegenational children were not so fortunate, as
those in Compton. As a result of their black mother being enslaved and a
legislative change prohibiting emancipation, they were denied their freedom, their
inheritance, and their family unity. As this case will show, by 1857, the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s “blackness as permanent white property” doctrine seemed

284

See COBB, supra note 115.

285

L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878 (La. 1857).

See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 189-90. See also, MORRIS, supra note 51, at 379-80:

After a decade of bitter controversy among the members of the Georgia court, the
state legislature, in 1859, adopted a law prohibiting all postmortem manumissions
whether ‘within or without the State.’... In some Southern states, in other words,
public policy, especially after 1840, overroad (sic) the right of an owner of
property to “discontinue” the claim to that property when the property was a
slave. Public policy had cut deeply into possessive individualism. (Footnotes
omitted.)
Page 156 of 302

Blackness as Property
complete. It coincided with a southern legislative movement prohibiting
emancipating enslaved blacks.286 One enslaved black woman and her children
were caught in the sea-change, and denied the freedom provided in her white
lover’s (or perhaps “rapist’s”?) miscegenational bequests. As a result, the winning
white heirs were allowed to divide the miscegenational family among them,

286

See STAMPP, supra note 125, at 232-54:

In the Deep South the trend was toward increasingly severe legislative
restrictions. In Louisiana (for many years the most liberal of these states) an act
of 1807 limited the privilege of manumission to slaves who were at least thirty
years old and who had not been guilty of bad conduct during the previous four
years. In 1830, Louisiana required emancipated slaves to leave the state within
thirty days; after 1852, they had to leave the United States within twelve months.
Five years later, Louisiana entirely prohibited private emancipations within the
state. The remaining states of the lower South had outlawed private
emancipations early in the nineteenth century.... Several states in the Deep
South... prohibited emancipation by last will and testament. South Carolina acted
as early as 1841, when it voided all deeds and wills designated to free slaves
before or after removal from the state. Mississippi, Georgia, Arkansas, and
Alabama adopted similar laws during the next two decades.... [I]n 1859, only
three thousand slaves were emancipated throughout the entire South. At that time
both Virginia and Kentucky permitted manumissions by deed or will. Yet
Virginia, with a slave population of a half million, freed only two hundred and
seventy-seven; Kentucky, with a slave population of nearly a quarter million,
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destroying the black family, for the sake of blackness as white property.
In Turner v. Smith,287 the Court weighed white heirs’ property rights against
a black family’s right to freedom.288 The facts of that case show that on December
19, 1855, John Turnbull formally acknowledged, before a notary and two
witnesses, his five mulatto children, born of his twenty-three-year-old enslaved
woman, Rachel.289 On the same day, Turnbull made a will, instructing his
executor to free his children and their mother upon his death; and, if that were not
possible, then the executor was to take them to their chosen country or state, where
enslavement was prohibited.290 His will further provided that one-third of his
estate should be divided equally between Rachel and the children.291

freed only one hundred and seventy-six.
287

L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878 (La. 1857).

288

Id.

289

Id.

290

Id. at *1-2. See also B. Price, Guardian v. John Ray, Executor,14 La. Ann. 697, 1859

WL 5929 (La. 1859); SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 191-92 (similar facts and outcome).
291

L.E. Turner, Curator, v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878, at *2

(La.1857).
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In 1856, Turnbull died.292 The executor refused to free Rachel and the
children; Turnbull’s white heirs joined in, claiming that Turnbull’s
acknowledgment of the children, as his own, was “contrary to law and good
morals.”293 The lower court found for Rachel and her children, making a rare
statement that Rachel could not be blamed for “her yielding obedience to his
wicked desires,” so as to “punish the weak and helpless for the sins of the strong
and powerful.”294 (Clearly, the court “did the math,” recognizing that Turnbull
sexually assaulted Rachel when she was still a minor.)
Unfortunately for Rachel and her children, in 1857, the Louisiana
Legislature passed an act expressly prohibiting all emancipation of enslaved
blacks.295 Following the Legislature’s lead, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed

292

Id.

293

Id.

294

See SCHAFER, SLAVERY, supra note 115, at 190.

295

L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878, at *2 (La.

1857), quoting “the Act of the Legislature of the 6th March, 1857,” which entitled “an Act to
prohibit the emancipation of slaves”: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the State of Louisiana in General Assembly convened. That from and after the passage of
this Act, no slave shall be emancipated in this State.”
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the lower court, and ruled against Rachel and her children, holding that they could
not be freed, nor could they inherit or own property.296 Adding insult to injury, the
Court authorized Turnbull’s white heirs to destroy the miscegenational family, by
allowing them to divide Rachel and her children amongst themselves!297
Comparing Turner to Compton,298 notwithstanding the legislative
prohibition, it appears that the Court in Turner considered as significant the fact
that “Turnbull took no steps towards emancipating the children of Rachel during
his lifetime, although he lived for six months after the so-called act of
acknowledgment. His declaration, in his will, of an intention to enfranchise them,
was only intended to be operative after his death; and could not produce any effect
until after his death, because it was always in his power, up to the moment of his
death, to revoke his will.”299 This meant that Turnbull’s miscegenational children
fit the Compton court’s definition of “adulterous bastards,” in that they were

296

Id. at *3.

297

Id. at *3.

298

See supra note 257.

299

L.E. Turner, Curator v. C.D. Smith et al., 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878, at *2 (La.

1857).
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offspring of a miscegenational relationship between a white man and an enslaved,
versus a free, black woman. (In both case reports, it appears that the white man, in
the relationship, was unmarried, and died without white or legitimate children.)
This point raises an issue of status, did “free” status produce a different result in
miscegenational, postmortem bequest cases? This is the subject of the next
section.

C.

WHITE MEN AND THE “BLACK MISTRESS”– A DIFFERENT
STORY?

Did the Louisiana Supreme Court serve up the same bittersweet cup of
justice to enslaved black female concubines, denying their bequests, as it did when
the white master’s bequest benefitted a free black woman,300 a “black mistress?”

300

See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 193-94, n.5:

Among the earliest infringements on that (free blacks’ legal) status was one
designed to set free blacks apart from whites in all acts of legal record.
Formalizing a custom practiced by the French and Spanish, a territorial statute of
1808 required all officials to apply the designation ‘free man’ or ‘free woman of
color’ in legal documents or public notices. To segregate the vital records of
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Free black women were, like their enslaved black sisters, handicapped by
racially-based miscegenation laws.301 Louisiana law, similar to laws throughout
the country, forbade marriage between whites and blacks, enslaved or free.302 But
whites and free blacks, the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans also
decreed that separate books be kept for the birth and deaths of free persons of
color. (Citing “An Act to Prescribe Certain Formalities Respecting Free Persons
of Color,” Orleans Territorial Acts 92 (1808), “An Act to Provide for the
Recording of Births and Deaths,” 1811 La Acts 74.) (Emphasis added.)

See generally CHAINED TO THE ROCK OF ADVERSITY, TO BE FREE, BLACK & FEMALE IN THE OLD
SOUTH 36 (Virginia Meacham Gould ed., 1998) (using personal letters of free women of color
before, during, and after the Civil War, to provide valuable insight into their lives and
experiences):

Mary E. Williams Bingaman was a free woman of color who had grown up
outside of Natchez. As an adult, she was involved in a liaison with the white
colonial Adam Lewis Bingaman.... Before moving to New Orleans with Mary
Williams, Adam Bingaman had been one of Natchez’s most distinguished
citizens.... By 1819 Bingaman had become a planter, and between 1819 and
1841, he inherited much of the property that had previously belonged to his
family. At one point he owned several plantations around Natchez and 235
slaves.... By 1850, Adam Bingaman had moved to New Orleans with Mary and
their children, Charlotte, Elenore.
301

See supra notes 36-40.

302

See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 208:
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free black women had at least one legal weapon that enslaved black women lacked:
the right to contract.303 In order to “self-regulate” illicit miscegenational
relationships and to protect their offspring, some enterprising free black women
turned to contract and property law for answers to their miscegenational
troubles.304 They were able to use contract law to negotiate a “marital-like”

Free persons of color also maintained their right to own property. In most states
with large free black populations, landowning percentages were low, indicative of
the blacks’ general economic standing. In New Orleans, by comparison, property
held by free persons of color in the late 1850s was estimated at around $2.5
million. The unrestricted ability to acquire land and slaves helped free blacks
maintain the status and influence they needed to starve off wholesale diminution
of their personal and civil liberties. As long as they had economic standing, they
had a voice. (Footnotes omitted.)
303

See COBB, supra note 115, at 313-14 (“Free persons of color... may make contracts,

and dispose of their estates by will. In the absence of a will, administration will be granted on
their estate, and unless otherwise directed by statute, they will be subject to the ordinary and
general law of distribution.”)
304

This case is a precursor to a contemporary property case–that of Marvin v. Marvin, 18

Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 184 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1976) (on the enforceability of a
contractual arrangement for the disposition of property of unmarried cohabitation; although in
Marvin, there were no legal implements to the couple marrying). This leads to a discussion of
the concept of “common law marriage,” wherein a state recognized as legally married (granting
the same rights as if married with a ceremony and a license) cohabiting parties that manifest their
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property arrangement, called the “placage.”305

1. Thomas Durnford and Rosaline Mercier: The Extra-Marital
Contract or Placee or Placage

One very successful use of the placage, between a white man and a free
black mistress, involved that of a wealthy white Englishman living in New
Orleans, Thomas Durnford, and Rosaline Mercier, a “free woman of color.”306

intent to be husband and wife and hold themselves out to the public as husband and wife. The
arrangement was abolished in most states for several reasons including that “common law
marriage dignified immorality among persons in the lower socio-economic class who were more
likely than the well-off to enter into such an arrangement.” DUKEMINIER, supra note 59, at 405,
406. See also, REPPY, supra note 48. Compare similar issues involving same-sex cohabitation,
see, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. J. 1965 (1997).
305

See STERKX, supra note 140, at 250 (“Besides the legal family, there existed a

distinctive concubinage or placage–(fn. 24, Taken from the term une placee. It was usually
applied to those women who make arrangements for sexual connections with White men. See
Olmstead, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States in the Years 1853-54, II, 245) a liaison
between a White man and Mulatto or Quadroon women.... As a matter of fact placage (literally a
situation) developed into an institution because of the legal restrictions against intermarriage.”)
306

See DAVID O. WHITTEN, ANDREW DURNFORD: A BLACK PLANTER IN ANTEBELLUM
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Thomas Durnford died on May 3, 1826, unmarried and without a will.307 The
financial partnership between the white Thomas and the black Rosaline is
evidenced in Durnford’s succession papers.308 John McDonogh,309 a very

LOUISIANA 6-7, 9 n.25 (1982) [hereinafter WHITTEN] (Andrew Durnford was the offspring of a
placee arrangement, wherein a representant or matchmaker would negotiate a contract
“marriage” between the white male “husband” and a free black female “wife.” Rosaline
Mercier, his mother, was an affluent free mistress, who owned a small plantation in Orleans
Parish.) See also, ANNE RICE, THE FEAST OF ALL SAINTS (Simon and Schuster 1979) (presenting
an historically accurate, fictionalized portrayal of the human working of a placage “marriage,”
and its impact on the self image of young black women, as prostitutes).
307

See WHITTEN, supra note 306, at 7.

308

Id. (“February 28, 1827–the estate paid Rosaline Mercier $1,095 for services rendered

Thomas Durnford. This was the first installment of $1,716 ordered by the probate court to be
paid to her. July 2, 1837–‘To expenses, paid Andrew Durnford, the son and heir of Rosaline
Mercier, on the $1,716 ordered paid per by decree of the court of probate of the parish and city
of New Orleans, on the 3rd day of January 1827 for services rendered by her to the deceased,
during his last illness, as per receipt. $621.00.’” (Footnotes omitted.))
309

Perhaps the richest Louisianian of his time, John McDonogh willed, inter alia,

substantial wealth to the City of New Orleans and the City of Baltimore for public utility
purposes and the establishment of free schools, “wherein the poor, and the poor only, of both
sexes, of all classes and castes of color, shall be admittance, free of expense....” Executors of
John McDonogh v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. 367 (1853). The United States Supreme Court upheld
McDonogh’s will, which was the foundation for the establishment of the New Orleans public
school system. Id. at 415.
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prominent white businessman in New Orleans, was the curator of the Durnford
estate.310
The miscegenational couple produced one son, Andrew Durnford,
who became a large and prosperous plantation owner.311 By 1850, the
mixed-race Andrew Durnford owned 1,200 acres of improved and
1,460 acres of unimproved land, farm machinery valued at $10,000,
livestock valued at $2,800, and 70 enslaved blacks. His total assets
were valued at $80,000!312 This successful placage relationship was

310

See WHITTEN, supra note 306, at 9.

311

See STERKX, supra note 140, at 202-03.

312

Id. at 203. See also, JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 128-9 (well documenting the story of

another antebellum black man, William Ellison, from South Carolina who

possessed princely wealth.... In the entire state, only 5 percent of the population
owned as much real estate as Ellison.... However, Ellison was neither the richest
free person of color in the South nor the largest slaveholder. Louisiana contained
six free Negro planters who were wealthier and owned more slaves. The richest
was Auguste Dubuclet, a sugar planter whose estate was valued at $264,000. The
largest slaveholders were the widow C. Richard (sic) and her son P.C. Richard
(sic), also sugar planters, who together owned 152. Outside Louisiana, only one
free Negro in 1860 is known to have reported greater wealth than Ellison.
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non litigated, but is very similar to the next, celebrated miscegenation
case.

2. Eugene Macarty and Eulalie Mandeville: “Marital”
Property of Unmarried Concubines313

The most notable antebellum miscegenation case involving a white man and
a free black mistress, was that involving the interracial relationship between the
white Eugene Macarty and the black Eulalie Mandeville, in 1848. In that case, the
Court went to great lengths to protect the property rights of a free black mistress.

London Berry, a thirty-eight-year-old mulatto steward in St. Louis, owned real
estate worth $67,000, a sum larger than the wealth Ellison reported in the census
but not above the actual value of his property. No free person of color outside
Louisiana is known to have owned more slaves than Ellison in 1860. Since the
Louisiana planters tended to be second- and third-generation free people, it is
likely that Ellison was the richest Afro-American in the South who began life as a
slave. (Emphasis added.)

See generally SCHWENINGER, supra note 29.
313

Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848).
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The matter of Macarty v. Mandeville314 involved the scope of prohibitions
on gifts (donations) of immovables and movables, whether inter vivos or causa
mortis, between couples living in “open concubinage.”315 In this case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the scope and applicability
of the state’s statute on concubinage, that was clearly designed to prohibit or limit
the amount of property a white male could transfer to his black female sexual
partner.316
Macarty was a white man who, from 1796 until his death in 1845, “lived in

314

Id.

315

The issue of what is “marital” property, even in “extra-marital” relationships,

resembles one found in the contemporary property law case In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d
75 (Sup. Ct. of Colorado, 1978), determining whether a spouse is required to share, as marital
property, a master’s degree in business administration with a divorcing spouse.
316

Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *1 (La. 1848). (The

Court noted, “This case arises under article 1468 of the Code (of 1808, book 3, title 2, art.10, p.
210) which provides that those who live together in open concubinage are respectively incapable
of making to each other, whether inter vivos or causa mortis (sic) any donations of immovables,
and if they make a donation of movables it cannot exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of
their estate. Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.” (Emphasis added.))
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concubinage” with Mandeville, “who is a person of color.”317 Macarty’s white
“collateral heirs” challenged Mandeville’s possession of $111,200, in the Bank of
Louisiana; $11,000 that Macarty paid to a Lamothe; several other enslaved people;
and lots and houses in the City of New Orleans, claiming that the property was a
part of Macarty’s estate.318
What is surprising about this case is the unconventional, relative wealth
relationship between the parties. That is, the black woman, not the white man, was
the wealthier of the two, and from her own business enterprises! The Court noted,
“She is in possession of a fortune which, taking the estimate of her counsel,
exceeds the sum of $155,000.... She received, in 1799, a tract of land of three
acres front and forty in depth on each side of the bayou of Terre aux Boeufs, and
we think it is clear that her family gave her money.... There is no difficulty
whatever in accounting for the capital requisite to commence her business of a
retailer, which she afterwards followed.... She purchased from the importers, and
retailed her goods by her slaves and persons who sold for her. She was intelligent,
industrious and skilfull. (sic) Her business was extensive and lucrative, and her

317

Id.

318

Id.
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trade extended as far as Donaldsville and even to Attakapas.”319
Apparently modifying its “blackness as white property” doctrine that the
Court had previously used to dispose of postmortem bequests to enslaved black
women, the Court took an “affirmative” approach to protect a free black woman’s
property interests.320 The Court concluded, “At the same time that we are bound to
give effect to our laws made in the interests of (white) families,321 it would be an
abuse to bring them in conflict with the right of property, under which the
defendant claims the subject of the present suit. She bases her defence (sic) on that
right, and we find no warrant in the law or in evidence for disturbing her in the
enjoyment of the fruits of the (sic) labor and thrift of a long life.”322 (Emphasis
added.)

319

Id. at *1-2.

320

Id. at *4. The Court specifically noted their decision in Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946,

supra note 213, in which “we have, on a recent occasion, reversed the verdict of the jury,
vindicated the rights of heirs and restored to them a large estate, which a party had attempted to
deprive them of by an indirect donation to a concubine.”
321

Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *1 (La. 1848).

322

Id. at *4.
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Read literally, the statute323 the Court cited would have applied a ten percent
limitation on the movable gifts, and would have totally prohibited Macarty’s gifts
of immovables, to his concubine Mandeville.324 Instead, the Court narrowly read
the “open and notorious” statute, and held that it provided for no other restrictions
on the transfer of property, beyond the ten percent rule, stating, “The prohibition of
donations of a particular character implies the right to make those not within the
prohibition.”325
The Court also noted that whatever Macarty contributed to the relationship
was not covered by the statute.326 “It is contended, on behalf of the defendant, and
we think with justice, that there was nothing in the relation of those parties that
prevented the deceased from giving the defendant the benefit of his aptitude and
judgment in the loaning of money and the discounting of notes.... The mortgage

323

See supra note 147.

324

Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *3 (La. 1848).

325

Id.

326

Id. at *3-4.
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transactions we think were of the same character.”327
This “pro-inheritance rights of a free black woman” case may have resulted
from a number of factors. First, there was the literal reading of the statute in
question. Second, there was the fact that the white man had been the primary
beneficiary of the relationship.328 Third, the parties challenging the disposition of

327

Id.

328

Id. at *1:

It appears that she had, in all respects, rendered her condition as reputable and as
useful as it could be made. Five children have been the fruits of her connexion
(sic) with the deceased. They were all well educated. Two of her sons are in
business in this city, and one is living on his income. The daughters were married
and established in Cuba; one of them is since deceased, leaving two children.

See also, SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 117-18:

[D]ry goods broker Drausin McCarty, the son of Eulalie Macarty, was listed in
Dun’s credit ledgers in 1848 as being worth $30,000; twelve years later he had
real estate valued at $25,000 and personal possessions at $10,000. Between 1850
and 1860, McCarty’s brother-in-law, merchant and exchange broker Bernard
Soulie, doubled the estimated value of his real estate possessions, from $50,000 to
$100,000. Soulie’s brother, Albin Soulie, a partner in the business was very
prosperous. Together they were described in 1854 as ‘very wealthy, est. w[orth]
from 250-300m.’ An R.G. Dun investigator exclaimed in 1857, they ‘are rich, w
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Macarty’s estate were “collateral heirs,” not descendants. Fourth, the relationship
was in the eyes and words of Chief Justice Eustis, “the nearest approach to
marriage which the law recognized, and in the days in which their union
commenced the couple entered into serious moral obligations. The union received
the blessings of her family, which was one of the most distinguished in Louisiana,
and nothing appears to have occurred to forfeit or diminish their approbation and
good will.”329 And fifth, the black woman was a black mistress, a free, propertyowning woman, not enslaved: in other words, a black woman with status and her
own wealth.

3. Sandoz v. Gary330

$500m.’
329

Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762, at *1 (La. 1848). See

also, Olivier, f.w.c. v. Blancq. 2 La. Ann. 517 (La. 1848). Cf. J. P. M. Dupre, Administrator v. F.
Uzee, Widow, 6 La. Ann. 280, 1851 WL 3797 (1851) (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court
found that Joseph Uzee, a white man, had lived in “open concubinage” with an enslaved black
woman, Anna Sinnet, and violated the statute on concubinage, when (even though he later freed
Anna) gave her title to a lot, a house, and her freedom, during his lifetime. The Court found that
his estate belonged to his white widow and their white child).
330

David Sandoz, Administrator of the Succession of Jean Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary,
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The next two cases are earlier examples of those involving white men and
free black mistresses. The first is the case of Sandoz v. Gary, decided in 1845.331
In 1809, Jean Pierre Decuir emancipated “a mulatto girl named Josephine, who
was his concubine, and who continued to live with him up to the time of his
death.”332 In 1818, Josephine purchased an enslaved black woman, Betcy, for
$1,100, and Decuir acted as her surety.333 In 1823, Decuir sold Betcy and her
children for $1,500, but the buyer defaulted, and Decuir purchased Betcy and her
children at a sheriff’s sale.
In 1825, Decuir and Josephine moved to France, leaving Betcy and her
children on Decuir’s plantation.334 Decuir sold his plantation to another owner, it

was sold once again, and then finally to the defendant in this case, Louis Gary.335 In 1826, Dec
11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662 (La. 1845).
331

Id.

332

Id.

333

Id.

334

Id. at *2.

335

David Sandoz, Administrator of the Succession of Jean Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary,
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Louis Gary.337 The Court stated that the issue was “whether she (Josephine) has
lost it (title to Betcy and her children) by any of the kinds of prescription (statute of
limitations) known to our law.”338
Sandoz argued, inter alia, that Josephine’s purchase of Betcy and, therefore,
her title to Betcy and her children was Decuir’s “disguised” donation to his
concubine, Josephine. On that issue, the Court stated, “If it disguised a donation of
this slave by Decuir to his concubine,... such donation was not prohibited by the
law in force at the time it was made.”339 As to the effect that concubinage had on
the issue, the Court stated:
The circumstances disclosed by the record, in relation to Josephine’s
neglect of her rights, her silence when Decuir sold Betcy, the state of
concubinage in which she lived with him, and her discontinuance of
the suit brought in 1835, cannot, in our opinion, destroy or affect her
11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662, at *2 (La. 1845).
336

Id. at *1.

337

Id. at *2.

338

Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

339

Id. at *3, citing Civil Code of 1808, p. 210, art. 10.
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title in a contest with the heir of said Decuir.340
Hence, the Court upheld Josephine’s, and thereby Gary’s, title to Betcy and her
children.341

4. Valsain v. Cloutier342

The second early free black mistress case was Valsain v. Cloutier.343 In that
case, the right of a black concubine (and her children) to inherit from their white
master went before the Louisiana Supreme Court.344
In July 1810, Joseph Dupe willed $6,400 to his half brother Jean B.S.
Cloutier. Dupre also willed “the remainder, consisting of lands, slaves, &c after
paying for his debts... to some mulatto woman Adelaide, and his natural children

340

David Sandoz, Administrator of the Succession of Jean Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary,

11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662, at *3 (La. 1845).
341

Id.

342

Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717 (La. 1831).

343

Id.

344

Id.
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by her.”345 Dupre’s legal (white) heirs challenged the will.346 The Probate Court
set aside the legacies to Adelaide and her children.347 On appeal, Dupre’s white
heirs argued that Adelaide and her children should lose. They reasoned that Dupre
and Adelaide could not have been legally married, and as their children were not
properly acknowledged, they were incapable of inheriting. Further, Adelaide and
her children were enslaved, which meant they were not lawfully able to inherit.348
Adelaide and her children countered that, inter alia, if they were, as enslaved
people, incapable of inheriting, Dupre’s legacy to them belonged to their owner,
Marie Louise.349 Marie Louise Mariotte was “the mother of Adelaide, and was a
free woman of color before the death of Dupre the testator.350 Adelaide further
argued that she and her children were legally free, because her mother, Marie

345

Id.

346

Id.

347

Id.

348

Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717, at *1-2 (La. 1831).

349

Id. at *2.

350

Id.
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Louise, was free, and that her mother had provided that she would be free upon her
mother’s death.351 Adelaide concluded “that as Marie Louise is dead, she be
decreed to inherit her succession, and that the legacies and interest on them since
1815, be included.”352
In addressing the issues of concubinage in this case, the Court decided the
following: first, the Court found that Adelaide was a free woman.353 Her mother’s
act, dated December 28, 1797, manumitted Adelaide upon her mother’s death in
1815.354 Second, the Court found, “that a legacy given to a slave, shall belong to
the master of that slave in the same manner as if the gift was directly made to
him.”355 Third, the Court stated, “We think as the freedom of mother took place
the instant the (children’s) grandmother died, there was capacity to inherit.”356

351

Id.

352

Id.

353

Id. at *4.

354

Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717, at *2-3 (La. 1831).

355

Id. at *5.

356

Id.
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In concluding, the Court found in favor of Adelaide, in her own capacity,
rejecting any claims she made, on her children’s behalf.357 (The Court recognized
that while Adelaide and Dupre lived in concubinage, it was not necessary to
examine whether “natural” children (born out of wedlock) could be considered
persons, interposed to convey a donation to their mother, a concubine, whom the
law considered incapable of receiving.)358 Therefore, the Court allowed a free
black mistress “to recover of the defendant the sum of six thousand, six hundred,
and eighty-six dollars, with interest at the rate of five per cent. (sic) from the 28th
April, 1830, until paid.”359 In this case, free status or white lineage played a part in
the law’s allowing a free black mistress to inherit from her white male lover.
It appears from the case law involving free black mistresses, a black
woman’s status, enslaved or free, had some bearing on the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decisions concerning the validity of white men’s postmortem bequests to
black women. If a white man chose a free black concubine, the Court was more
likely to protect the property distributed to her, especially if, as in Macarty, the

357

Id.

358

Id. at *4.
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black mistress brought some wealth of her own to the table. If, on the other hand,
the white man chose an enslaved black concubine, as in Vail, the Court rejected the
property transfer arrangement. That is because the enslaved black woman’s
sexuality already belonged to her white master. Enslaved blacks were not merely
their white master’s property; enslaved blacks were “white property,” indefeasible,
and incapable of being released from white bondage, by will!360
Fortunately, antebellum legislatures and courts did not totally control black
people’s destiny. Otherwise, their real world would have perfectly reflected
racially and sexually-oppressive laws, requiring that all blacks be enslaved and
held incapable of owning or inheriting property. As noted earlier, enslavement had
many loopholes, and early on and throughout the antebellum period, many blacks
were free or freed. This next section discusses and analyzes the “black mistress,”
the free black woman, who was not enslaved, and who managed to acquire
property. As we shall see, as evidenced by Eulalie Mandeville,361 some black
mistresses came into their own, acquiring land, businesses, plantations, and,

359

Id. at *5.

360

See supra note 51.

Page 180 of 302

Blackness as Property
following the unfortunate example of their white counterparts, even owned
enslaved blacks.

V.

THE BLACK MISTRESS: A PARADOX CHALLENGING BELL’S
“INTEREST-CONVERGENCE” PRINCIPLE362

‘A WEALTHY NEGRO FAMILY.– An immense estate
in Louisiana, embracing over four hundred acres of land,
with two hundred and fifty negroes belonging to the
plantation was recently sold for a quarter of a million
dollars. The purchaser was a free negro, who is said to
be one of the wealthiest men in the South.’
The above is from a New York paper, and refers to the Harrison
property, which was purchased by Cypian (sic) Ricard, a free man of
color of our parish.... It lies in the rear of Madame Ricaud’s (sic)
plantation; and the two plantations, now owned by that family,

361

See supra note 313.

362

See supra notes 27, 30, for the definition of “black mistress.”
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probably do comprise the number of acres of land and slaves as above
stated, making them, doubtless, the richest black family in this or any
other country.363

363

As quoted in Calvin D. Wilson, Negroes Who Owned Slaves, POPULAR SCIENCE

MONTHLY 488, at 492 (Nov. 1912) [hereinafter WILSON]. Pierre Cyprian Ricard was the son of
Madame Cyprian Ricard, a black mistress. They both lived in Iberville Parish, Louisiana. The
1850 United States Population Census shows Madame Ricard and her son, owning 74 enslaved
blacks and a 1,050 acre plantation. The 1860 United States Population Census shows the
Ricards, owning 168 enslaved blacks and two plantations, with 1,300 total acres. Free black
ownership of enslaved blacks was not limited to black women or to Louisiana, as free men and
women owned enslaved blacks, and did so throughout the South. See supra note 29.
There is a view that all free blacks were all light-complexioned and “looked white.” See
supra note 57. Many free blacks were dark-complexioned and did not have “white” or European
facial features. See WILSON, infra, at 492, quoting the landscape architect Frederick Law
Olmstead, who spent fourteen months roaming the South, preparing articles for The New York
Times:

An intelligent man, whom I met in Washington, who had been travelling most of
the time for two years, in the planting districts of Louisiana, having business with
planters, told me of free negroes of the state in general, so far as had observed,
were just equal in all respects to the white creoles. There are many opulent,
intelligent and educated. The best houses and the most tasteful grounds that he
had visited in the state belonged to a nearly full-blooded negro–a very dark man.
He and his family are well educated, and though French is their habitual tongue
they speak English with freedom, and one of them with more elegance than most
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A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BLACK MISTRESS

When it came to enslaved black women’s property rights in the antebellum
South, Bell’s interest-convergence principle364 described how law was reflective of
powerful white men’s interests: that economic and sexual oppression required that
enslaved black women have no property rights including rights to their labor, their
sexuality, property, to receive gifts, or to inherit.365 The limited property rights that
black women concubines enjoyed, enslaved or free, were also reflective of
powerful white men’s interests: that concubines be encouraged to be loyal, faithful,

liberally educated whites in the south. They had a private tutor in their family.
(Emphasis added.)

This account likely described the household of Joseph A. Metoyer, whose household listed Oscar
Dubreuil as a tutor (United States 1850 Population Census Manuscript), and whose portrait (a
copy is in the author’s possession) shows a man with dark complexion, and “Negroid” features.
Compare KOLCHIN, supra note 11 (“Very large plantations were a rarity: a mere .01
percent of slave owners held estates of 200 or more slaves, and such estates contained only 2.4
percent of the slaves.” This data makes Madame Ricard’s holdings ever more remarkable!) See
generally WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112.
364

See supra note 4.

365

See Cole v. Lucas, 2 La. Ann. 946, 1847 WL 3490 (La. 1847), supra note 213.
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and true.366 What about the broad property rights that the law provided to the black
mistress? Were they consistent with Bell’s interest-convergence principle? To
answer that question, we turn to an analysis of the black mistress’s property rights.
For white masters, the American “property-enslavement-sexual” Dream367 of cheap
land and cheap labor worked to make many of them very wealthy.368 Along with
wealth came power, and often a greater desire for control.369 When it came to a
master’s control over his enslaved blacks, there was a nexus between the private
property ownership paradigm and the enslavement paradigm.370 The control nexus
was made stronger by the white master’s control over the sexuality of enslaved
black women.371
But there was an inherent contradiction in the property-enslavement-sexual

366

See Macarty v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848), supra note

367

See supra note 110.

368

See supra notes 12, 76.

369

See supra note 109.

370

See supra notes 99-105.

313.

Page 184 of 302

Blackness as Property
nexus. What if a master decided to exercise his property ownership rights, in a
manner inconsistent with the enslavement paradigm?372 In other words, what
should the law do when a white master wanted to free his enslaved black woman,
in exchange for, or with gratitude for, love, loyalty, or sexual favors?373
The paradox of the property-enslavement-sexual nexus, then, resulted
mainly from a white master’s desire to free or manumit his enslaved property.
Overall, there were four sources that could have contributed to the existence of the
free black population. The first and greatest source was the manumission, inter

371

See supra note 109.

372

See DAVIS, supra note 9.

373

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 151-52:

Limiting emancipation to a few favorites also shifted the balance of the
manumitted population toward women. Slave women not only made up a
disproportionate number of the domestic workers, but they were more apt to win
the sympathy and affection of their masters. Black men, on the other hand, were
more of a threat to white rule and also brought higher prices in the slave markets
of the South. If a master chose but one slave for emancipation, there were many
more reasons to pick a woman than a man.
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vivos or causa mortis, of enslaved blacks.374 The second source was through
children of a legitimate marriage between a black slave and a white person; this
source was not legally possible, due to prohibition of interracial marriage.375 The
third source was children of an enslaved black man and a white free woman, which
was extremely rare.376 And the fourth source was the relocation of free blacks into

374

White men most often freed enslaved black women, because they mothered their

children and took care of their personal needs. See supra note 203. White men manumitted
enslaved black men (who were not their children) for public service, successful military service,
and heroics. See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 428. (“Pierre Chastang of Mobile who, in
recognition of public service in the war of 1812 and the yellow fever epidemic of 1819 was
bought and freed by popular subscription.”) See generally ROLAND C. MCCONNELL, NEGRO
TROOPS OF ANTEBELLUM LOUISIANA, A HISTORY OF FREE MEN OF COLOR (1968) [hereinafter
MCCONNELL]; Donald E. Everett, Free Persons of Color in Colonial Louisiana, in 7 LA. HIST.
21-50 (1966) (when Spain, then an ally with France, declared war against the British in the
American Revolution, Governor Bernardo de Galvez had a force that included 169 free black
men.) See also, RODOLPHE LUCIEN DESDUNES, OUR PEOPLE AND OUR HISTORY 3-9 (Sister
Dorothea Olga McCants ed., trans., 1973) [hereinafter DESDUNES]. (At the Battle of New
Orleans in 1815, Commander (soon President) Andrew Jackson praised the black troops, who
successfully fought at his side against the British.)
375

See supra note 140.

376

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 6:

In the colonial South... [m]ost mulattoes were children of white indentured
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the South from a free country (such as Haiti, after the Revolution377) or a free state
(not a common occurrence).
From the primacy of the private property paradigm,378 a white master’s
desire to free an enslaved black person was a logical derivation, for if private
property comes under the owner’s sovereignty, then the owner is empowered to
dispose of it as he or she pleases, including setting it free. From the primacy of the
enslavement paradigm,379 a master’s desire to free an enslaved black person was
weighed against its impact on the entire enslavement system. Hence, the legal
status of the black mistress presented antebellum society with a peculiar challenge.
That challenge became more acute with the rise in the number of free blacks.
Another question that a study of the black mistress will answer is, why did
servant men and black women, and frequently, as William Gaston suggested, they
were the offspring of black men and white servant women. Indeed, despite the
antipathy toward such unions, masters often connived to push black men and
white women into bed together because the law gave them the services of the
children born of such interracial matches for thirty-one years, and it locked the
white mother into additional terms of servitude. (Footnote omitted.)
377

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 114-18.

378

See supra note 78.

379

See supra note 88.
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antebellum Southern law close the doors to emancipation prior to the Civil War,
and seek to drive out of the South blacks who were already free?380 Were these
pre-Civil War actions necessary to defend the very rationale of enslavement, that
is, black inferiority?381 Arguendo, if blacks were really not inferior to whites, how
could the enslavement political economy justify enslavement, other than for what it
really was: social, economic, and sexual oppression, based on race. As the black
mistress became a more significant feature of antebellum society, and as Southern,
white society increasingly questioned the status of free blacks in general, these
questions took on greater meaning.
Assuming that the white master’s private property ownership right to free his
enslaved black woman won out over the enslavement right (and sometimes it did),
what property rights did the enslavement social order want a black mistress to
have? Should they have the property rights of their enslaved black sisters? In
other words, should they have no rights? Or should they have the rights of their

380

See L. E. Turner, Curator v. C. D. Smith et al, 12 La. Ann. 417, 1857 WL 4878 (La.

1857), supra note 285.
381

See generally HIGGINBOTHAM & JACOBS, supra note 43 (analyzing the nexus between

white concepts of black inferiority as a precept function to enslavement, blacks as property, and
black powerlessness).
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white masters, full civil rights? Or should their property rights be somewhere
between that of the enslaved and the fully free?

B.

PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE BLACK MISTRESS

As we have seen, in the antebellum South, black women were generally
enslaved, and not legally allowed to acquire property, by purchase, not even by gift
or inheritance.382 Some black women were legally free, often by manumission.383
What property rights should Southern society provide the black mistress? Legally,
should the black mistress be treated as a first class citizen as was her white
counterpart? Or should she be treated as a non-citizen as were her enslaved
sisters? Or should she be treated somewhere in between? Were the property rights
that Southern society gave the black mistress reflective of Bell’s interestconvergence principle? The answers to their questions will be discussed in the
next section on the property rights of the black mistress.
The black mistress was the ultimate enigma to the American “property-

382

See supra note 106.

383

See, e.g., SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.
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enslavement-sexual” Dream.384 As private property ownership was such an
overarching paradigm in American law,385 what would prevent a black woman,
once freed, from acquiring property? If a black woman became a free person,
shouldn’t she enjoy all legal private property rights of a citizen, including the right
to purchase and sell property, to transfer title to property, to gift and receive gifts
inter vivos and causa mortis, inheritance and rights of succession, and all other
aspects of private property ownership?386
As previously discussed, the common law, along with a cluster of privileges

384

See supra note 111.

385

See supra note 88.

386

But see COBB, supra note 115, at 312-13:

Manumission once effected, removes forever the dominion of the master.... To
incorporate a new citizen into the body politic, is only within the power of the
State. The freed negro does not become a citizen by virtue of his manumission. It
requires another the act of another party, the State, to clothe him with civil and
political rights. Before such act he stands in the position of an alien friend, and in
the absence of legislation he would be entitled to all such privileges as are
allowed to such residents. (Footnotes omitted.))
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and rights, revolved around private land ownership.387 There are many indices of
private property ownership, from which one might evaluate the black mistress’s
private property rights in the antebellum South.388 The following section focuses
on eight indices of private property ownership rights by which to analyze the black
mistress’s legal status, in the antebellum South. These are 1) the right to earn
wages; 2) the right to contract; 3) the right to acquire, by purchase; 4) the right to

387

See supra note 79.

388

Id. (“A.M. Honore likewise distinguished between the rights of exclusion and of use

and enjoyment, listing the incidents of ownership as follows:
(1) the right to exclusive possession; (2) the right to personal use and
enjoyment; (3) the right to manage use by others; (4) the right to the
income from use by others; (5) the right to the capital value, including
alienation, consumption, waste, or destruction; (6) the right to security
(that is, immunity from expropriation); (7) the power of transmissibility by
gift, devise, or descent; (8) the lack of any term on these gifts; (9) the duty
to refrain from using the object in ways that harm others; and (10) the
liability to execution for repayment of debts; and (11) residual rights on
the reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets (sic),
111 Harv. L. R. (sic) 621, 663 n.187 (1998), citing Honore, A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence (sic) 107, 112-128 (A.G. Guest ed. 1961) (emphasis added) (sic).”
To that list, one might add (12) the right to encumber, by mortgage, liens, and covenants;
(13) the right to use as collateral; (14) the right of an insurable interest; (15) the right to shared
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acquire, by inter vivos gift; 5) the right to acquire, by will; 6) the right to acquire,
by marriage; 7) the right of disposition, by sale, inter vivos gift, will, and
inheritance (succession), and 8) the right to own enslaved blacks.
In addition to those property rights that the black mistress exercised, there
was another property right that caused the black mistress particular concern. That
was the black mistress’s ownership of enslaved blacks. Because of the unique
nature of and issues concerning the black mistress’s ownership of enslaved blacks,
there will be a separate discussion of that topic. But first, a caveat: the following
discussion of the black woman’s property right should not be misunderstood.
Their property rights are presented in the best light, during the best of times.389 In
ownership; and (16) the right of bailment.
389

See FINKELMAN, CASEBOOK, supra note 136, at 142-69 (presenting an antebellum case,

in which the court expressed its views about free blacks in general. In Bryan v. Walton, 14
Georgia 185 (1853), involved the right of a free black, James Nunez, to will property to his son,
Joseph Nunez. The case “underscores southern hostility to the existence of the free population.”
Justice Lumpkin found that free blacks had no rights in the state of Georgia, except those that the
state legislature expressly granted. The Court concluded that “under the Act of 1818, James
Nunez, the father of Joseph Nunez, should not be divested of the title to the slaves which he thus
held: but that the property should remain with him, during his lifetime, and at his death, go to his
descendants. It is by virtue of this section of the Act... and not under the will of his ancestor, that
Joseph Nunez held these slaves.” Id. at 146.) See generally WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112,
at xxi-xlv, “III. The Free Negro Before the Law” and “IV. Economic Achievement.”
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reality, there was constant and increasing legal and societal hostility to the black
mistress throughout the antebellum period.390 For many reasons, it can be said that
the following property rights are ones that the black mistress exercised, as a result
of consistent success over legal and economic adversities.

1. The Right to Earn Wages.

Perhaps the greatest legal distinction between the black mistress and an
enslaved black woman is that the black mistress had the right to the fruits of her

390

See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 3 (“This hostility toward the free Negro in Virginia

was expressed in law, in politics, in literature, and in actions by organized groups. The state
legislature and the local units of government heaped up laws to restrain him, and candidates for
office, governors, mayors, and other officials condemned him. Similarly, the proslavery writers
vilified free Negroes, and the American Colonization Society made every effort to get them out
of Virginia into Africa.”) Id. at 32 (“In this connection a sympathetic Northern writer of that day
compared the hardships of the free Negroes of the country to those suffered by the Jews of
medieval Europe.” (Footnote omitted.))
See also, BERLIN, supra note 7, at 381 (“‘The ex-slave was not a free man; he was only a
free Negro.’ George Washington Cable, The Negro Question (1888).”); WOODSON, HEADS,
supra note 112, at xxi (“The status of the free Negro did not materially change for the worst until
the ‘twenties and ‘thirties of the nineteenth century when practically all of the Southern and
Middle States and a few communities of the North began to restrict and, in some cases, to debase
Page 193 of 302

Blackness as Property
labor, unlike an enslaved woman, who was not allowed to benefit from her labor,
as both she and her labor belonged to her master.391 By comparison, the free
mistress was allowed to earn wages.392 Some chose to work independently of
the free Negro to a status next to that of a slave.”)
391

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 233 (“Ultimately, the right to collect wages, accumulate

property, and control their own family life distinguished them from slaves. Free Negroes, like
whites, needed meaningful work not merely to support themselves and their families but to
bolster their self-esteem. Its absence often drained free blacks of self-respect and robbed them of
a sense of purpose.”
Id. at 234-38:

The nature of the Southern work force and Southern attitudes towards blacks and
work often allowed many free Negroes to turn their status and their color to their
advantage in seeking employment.... In many places, free Negroes monopolized
work as caterers, stable owners, bathhouse keepers, and tailors as well as lesser
jobs as carters, butchers, coachmen, and delivery boys.... Many of the jobs
deemed ‘nigger work’ were drudgery deserving that epithet, but others provided
steady work and lucrative wages. Some were skilled trades that demanded
craftsmanship of the highest order.... Indeed, skill was an essential element in
many of the jobs deemed ‘nigger work’.... Skilled free Negro artisans and
tradesmen clustered in these stigmatized occupations... barbering, carpentering,
plastering, blacksmithing, bricklaying, and shoe-making.

Compare SHAW, supra 58 (on the status of enslaved blacks).
392

See generally BERLIN, supra note 7.
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employers, owning their own businesses, and often employing others.393 Many

393

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 433 (Often the success of the black mistress was envied

by whites, who thought wealth was too good for a black woman:

The keeper of one good tavern in the Louisiana village of Bayou Sara in 1831 was
a colored woman of whom Anne Royall wrote: ‘This nigger or mulatto was rich,
owned the tavern and several slaves, to whom she was a great tyrant. She owned
other valuable property and a great deal of money, as report (sic) said; and
doubtless it is true. She was very insolent, and, I think, drank. It seems one
Tague [an Irishman], (sic) was smitten with her charms and her property, made
love to her and it was returned, and they lived together as man and wife. She was
the ugliest wench I ever saw, and, if possible, he was uglier, so they were well
matched.’ (Footnote omitted.)

See also BERLIN, supra note 7, at 241-42:

[T]he increasing number of free Negro and slave hirelings, especially in the cities,
provided a small but growing market for black entrepreneurs. In every Southern
city, free Negroes ran boardinghouses for free Negroes and slaves whose owners
allowed them to live on their own. African churches and schools supported black
ministers and teachers, and a few Negro merchants profited from trade with
Liberia and Haiti. But the most common black enterprise were small cookshops
and groceries, which usually doubled as saloons and gambling houses where free
Negroes, slaves, and occasionally whites gathered.

See also, SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 85-86:
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free mistresses successfully did so,394 in spite of laws prohibiting free blacks from
competing in certain professions.395 Others chose to commercialize their physical
beauty and have control over their sexuality, with the hope of attracting a wealthy
white suitor, to enter into a placage arrangement.396

In most large cities, and in some small towns, free women of color were able to
establish themselves in service enterprises. They managed eating houses,
hairdressing shops, fruit and vegetable stands, confectioneries, bakeries, and
grocery stores.... In Savannah, Susan Jackson ran a pastry shop in Reynolds
Ward, the leading business section of the city, and eventually purchased her place
of business, a brick building appraised at $10,000. Her neighbor, free mulatto
Ann Gibbons, the descendant of a West African Ibo chieftain, lived comfortably
on the income from her various rental properties. (Footnotes omitted.))
394

Such as Eulalie Mandeville, supra note 313, and Madame Ricard, supra note 363.

395

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 230 (“Proscriptive laws, pressure on white employers, and

sporadic violence slowly drove free Negroes from many trades.... Free Negro mechanics had to
pay high licensing fees to work in Charleston and Savannah, free Negro butchers were barred
from the city market in Memphis, and free Negro masons in Georgia had to have their work
approved by whites.”) See also, WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxiii (“Most of the States
had restrictions having a direct bearing on earning a subsistence.”)
396

See RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDIES FOR THE NEW CENTURY at

67-92 (Judith Jackson Fossett and Jeffery A. Tucker eds., 1997), excerpt by Monique Guillory,
entitled “Under One Roof: The Sins and Sanctity of the New Orleans Quadroon Balls,”
(analyzing the commercialization and exploitation of creole women of color, in the New Orleans
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2. The Right to Contract.

The black mistress had the legal capacity to contract.397 This legal right
facilitated a black mistress’s right to acquire property.398 One notable Southern
judge recognized that the right to contract was essential for a black mistress to
acquire property.399

quadroon balls).
397

See COBBS, supra note 115, at 313 (“They may make contracts.”) Compare, COBB,

supra note 115, at 240 ([W]e may properly notice another disability of the slave, and that is, his
inability to contract, or to be contracted with.”)
398

See BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 88 (1969)

(concluding that as free blacks throughout the antebellum South were allowed to make contracts
and to own property, “some things operated in their favor.”).
399

See, e.g., CATTERALL, supra note 96, at Vol. I, at 392-93 (citing in 1856, Judge

Buchanan’s summary of free blacks’ legal rights:
[I]n the eye of the Louisiana law, there is, (with the exception of
political rights, of certain social privileges, and of the obligations
of jury and militia service) all the difference between a free man of
color and a slave, that there is between a white man and a slave.
The free man of color is capable of contracting. He can acquire by
inheritance and transmit property by will. He is a competent
witness in all civil suits. If he commits an offence against the
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3. The Right to Acquire, by Purchase.

The black mistress had the legal right to acquire property by purchase, the
most significant of which was land.400 Most black mistresses who owned land
laws, he is to be tried with the same formalities, and by the same
tribunal, as the white man. (Emphasis added.)

See also, id., at vol. II, 334-35 and vol. III, 176, as cited in BERLIN, supra note 7, at 196 (A
South Carolina judge saw nothing strange in the fact that many free blacks had “passed” for
whites, and “now enjoy all the rights of citizens; as well as lands, and even seats in the
legislature.”)
400

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 244:

Despite all whites could do, some free Negroes prospered. Their success was
reflected in the growth of free Negro property holding.... In Nansemond County
in tidewater Virginia, the number of free Negro farmers increased steadily
between 1830 and 1860, although the free Negro population remained relatively
constant.... The growth of a black landowning class in Nansemond County
mirrored that of the state generally.... The growth of free Negro property holding
followed a similar pattern throughout the South.

See also, WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxi:

On the whole, however, there was a striking difference between the status of the
free Negro and that of the slave. The free Negro gradually lost ground during the
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owned small farms.401 There were some, on the other hand, who owned large

reactionary period, but he did not become as helpless as the slave. The free
Negroes still retained their right to acquire property and dispose of property and
to do so could employ the general means effecting the transfer of property. The
courts early upheld the right of the Negro to devise property to another. Laws to
this effect were enacted as were also other measures to validate titles to real estate
and other property with the exception of dogs and guns mentioned above. Russell
points out that the inviolability of the property rights of the free Negro was an
effective argument against the frequent proposals to remove the entire free Negro
population from Virginia. It was considered a hardship to bring their property
into market all at once to sacrifice by one precipitated sale. (citing Russell, The
Free Negro in Virginia, 90).

Along with property ownership, came the burden of property taxes:

In fact, instead of being exempt from taxation, the free Negro was sometimes
required to pay higher poll taxes than the white man.... There were some
exceptions in this case, as it happened in Virginia in 1769, with the exemption of
free Negroes, mulatto and Indian women and all wives other than slaves of free
Negroes, mulattos and Indians.... The Negroes in Baltimore paid $50 in school
taxes in 1859, although their children could not attend the city schools.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Id. at xxxii.
401

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 244. See also, JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 58 (“[O]ne

free person of color in ten was a farmer who owned any real estate.”)
Page 199 of 302

Blackness as Property
plantations and built large plantation homes.402 The incredible history of the black
woman’s property transactions is told in the conveyance records throughout the
South.403
4. The Right to Acquire, by Inter Vivos Gift.

The black mistress had the legal right to acquire property by inter vivos gift,

402

See references to Madame Ricard contained in note 363, and see PHILLIPS, supra note

14, at 434 (“In Louisiana colored planters on a considerable scale became fairly numerous.
Among them... Marie Metoyer of Natchitoches Parish had fifty-eight slaves and more than two
thousand acres of land when she died in 1840.”) See also, KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 83 (“In
Louisiana’s Natchitoches Parish a colony of free Creoles, descended from an eighteenth-century
French settler and an African slave, grew and flourished until by 1860 it contained 411 persons
who owned 276 slaves....”) See also WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxiv-xxxv (“Using
what limited opportunities they had, moreover, some of the free Negroes accomplished what
might be considered exceptional. Many of them owned slaves who cultivated their large
estates.... Marie Metoyer, of Nachitoches Parish, possessed fifty slaves and an estate of more
than 2,000 acres.”)
403

See, e.g., CARL A. BRASSEAUX ET AL., CREOLES OF COLOR IN THE BAYOU COUNTRY

134-35 (1994) [hereinafter BRASSEAUX] (documenting the black mistresses’ property
transactions, in the Conveyance Books, Clerk of Court’s Office, St. Laundry Parish Courthouse,
such as “Auzenne, Carlostin, estate of, to Laurette Guidry, F.W.C. (free woman of color), wife of
Theodore Chenier, F.M.C., Public Auction, Book U-1, p. 237. On November 14, Laurette
Guidry entered the high bid of $1,200 for half lot #55 in town of Washington, Louisiana.”)
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although, as discussed, such gifts resulting from interracial concubinage
relationships were problematic.404

5. The Right to Acquire, by Will.

Gifts by will to the black mistress lacked many legal obstacles faced in gifts
to enslaved black women.405 The black mistress had the legal right to inherit

404

See, e.g., Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848),

supra note 313.
405

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 373-74:

In 1830, in Lenoir v. Sylvester, O’Neall wrote: ‘...a legacy cannot be given to a
slave, for he can have no right, whatever, which does not, the instant it is
transferred to him, pass to his master (sic). In other words, he is in law himself
chattels personal; and it would be absurd to say, that property can own
property....’ In North Carolina, Ruffin, in White v. Green (1840), ruled that
‘Slaves have not (sic) capacity to take by will, and a legacy to them is, like the
direction for their emancipation, void.’ Judge Alexander M. Clayton of
Mississippi, in Wade v. American Colonization Society (1846), adopted a different
position. The ‘right to freedom is inchoate, and becomes complete when the
subjects of it are removed. The bequest to the slaves is not void for want of
capacity in the legatees to take.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
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property by will, but again, when her father was white, she faced some legal
obstacles.406

6. The Right to Acquire, by Marriage.

As we have discussed, marriage is a major source of wealth transference,
that was unavailable to the black mistress in miscegenational relationships with
white men.407 The black mistress was legally prohibited from marrying an
enslaved black, as enslaved blacks were legally unable to marry even other
enslaved blacks.408 That left the black mistress only one legitimate marital option:

406

See John Compton et al. Heirs of Leonard B. Compton v. Aaron Prescott and Another,

Executors of Said Leonard B. Compton et al., 12 Rob (La.) 56, 1845 WL 1677 (La. 1845), supra
note 260.
407

See supra note 140.

408

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 29 (“...a North Carolina law of the 1830s. Free blacks

who married or lived as husband or wife with a slave would be punished. (fn. 64, Revised
Statutes... North Carolina, 1:590.) Insofar as the law included a marriage between a slave and a
free black, it was an absurdity. Slaves lacked the necessary ‘will’ to enter into a marriage
contract, and slave jurisdictions universally refused to recognize any slave marriage.”)
(Footnotes omitted.)
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to marry a free black man, but many chose not to marry at all.409
See also, COBB, supra note 115, at 242-43 (“The inability of the slave to contract extends
to the marriage contract, and hence there is no recognized marriage relation in law between
slaves.” (Footnote omitted.)) Compare SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 84-85:

Some black women chose to live with a partner without formalizing marital vows.
This could have the ironic effect of a woman losing all she had sought to preserve
by not marrying. In 1827, Nancy Munford, a Virginia slave, was purchased by
her husband and emancipated, but the couple never legalized their union. In
subsequent years, they built up a substantial estate, but in 1845, Nancy’s husband,
Thomas Walden, a carpenter, was murdered. To her surprise, Nancy discovered
that she was not entitled to any of their jointly acquired property–a house, three
lots, and 150 acres of farmland–all listed in her husband’s name. Although she
eventually petitioned the state legislature and was awarded the property others
were not so fortunate.” (Footnotes omitted.))
409

See COBB, supra note 115, at 313 (“Free persons of color, unless restricted by statute,

may contract with those of their own condition, or any free person capable of contracting.”) As
nearly all antebellum Southern states prohibited interracial, black-white marriage, a black
mistress could legally marry another free black, and perhaps other free persons of color, such as
native Americans. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 209 (“About four out of ten free Negro
women in Charleston in 1860 could not expect to find husbands among the city’s free Negro
men. A good many of them had to choose between remaining unmarried and accepting a slave
husband.”) Compare SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 128:

Among wealthy creoles of color in Louisiana, endogamous marriages were almost
universal. Antoine Decuir and Antoine Dubuclet, the richest blacks in Point
Coupee Parish, signed formal contracts concerning their children. In the case of
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7. The Right of Disposition, by Sale, Inter Vivos Gift, Will, or Inheritance.

The black mistress could transfer ownership of property by sale.410 She
engaged in extensive property transactions, as evidenced in the parish courthouse
records, throughout the South.411 In addition, the black mistress could apparently
dispose of property by inter vivos gift, by will, and by inheritance, through the

Decuir’s son, Antoine, Jr., and Dubuclet’s daughter, Josephine, they drew up a
four-page document (in French) specifying the date of the wedding, the size of the
dowry, and arrangements for the distribution of property. Decuir contracted for
his second son, Augustin, to marry the granddaughter of Iberville Parish planter
Cyprien Ricard, at the time the wealthiest free person of color in Louisiana.
410

See, e.g., Luther P. Jackson, The Virginia Free Negro Planter and Property Owner, 24

J. NEGRO HIST. 390, 392 (1939) (“Having employment, many free Negroes turned their earnings
to good account and bought property. The right to own and transfer property was one right
which an otherwise hostile society never took away from this minority group.”) He supports this
observation with the fact that in Virginia, there was a one hundred percent increase in free black
land ownership between 1830 and 1860, even though the Virginia free black population only
increased twenty percent in that time period.) But see WOODSON, HEADS, supra 112, at xxxivxxxv (“In 1805 Maryland prohibited Negroes from selling corn, wheat or tobacco.... North
Carolina... [i]n 1826, there followed an act which restricted the right of free Negroes to trade in
certain articles and to peddle beyond their county without a license.” (Footnotes omitted.))
411

See, e.g., BRASSEAUX, supra 403.
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laws of succession.412 At least one Southern state expressly forbade the black
mistress from the right to pass their wealth onto the next generation.413 Some were
able to will sizable estates to their black heirs.414 The black mistress faced the
same problem that white men faced when trying to will property to enslaved black
loved ones, that is, the law often refused such efforts at wealth transference.415

412

See COBB, supra note 115, at 313-14, n.1 (“They may... dispose of theirestates by will.

In the absence of a will, administration will be granted on their estates, unless otherwise directed
by statute, they will be subject to the ordinary and general law of distribution.” “In Georgia,
their estates go to their ‘descendants,’ which has been held not to include collaterals.” (Cases
omitted.)) Some wealthy black mistresses made substantial charitable donations to their
community. One such wealthy black mistress was a philanthropist who founded New Orleans’s
Couvent School, in 1847. SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 129. See also DESDUNES, supra note
374, especially the chapter on free women of color.
413

Compare JULIA SMITH, SLAVERY AND PLANTATION GROWTH IN ANTEBELLUM FLORIDA

112-13 (1973) (noting that in Florida free blacks were not allowed to will their property to their
heirs).
414

See supra note 403.

415

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 435:

[S]uch petition was that presented in 1832 by Marie Louise Bitaud, free woman of
color, which recited that in the preceding year she had bought her daughter and
grandchild at a cost of $700; that a lawyer had now told her that in view of her
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8. The Right to Own Enslaved Blacks

Another issue the law faced was, if the black mistress could acquire
property, should she have the right to acquire and own enslaved blacks?416 The

lack of free relatives to inherit her property, in the case of death intestate her
slaves would revert to the state; that she had become alarmed at this prospect; and
she accordingly begged permission to manumit then without having to leave
Louisiana. The magistrates gave her their consent on the condition that the
petitioner furnish a bond of $500 to insure support and education of the grandson
until his coming of age. This was duly done and the formalities completed.
(Footnote omitted.)

See also BERLIN, supra note 7, at 156:

Many more blacks depended on their friends and relatives to extricate them from
bondage. Hundreds of free Negroes used their small savings to purchase and free
loved ones, especially their immediate families. In New Orleans, better than a
third of the petitions for manumission between 1827 and 1851 came from Negro
freemen. Sometimes relatives in the free states helped to buy enslaved brethren
out of bondage.... Wealthy free Negroes occasionally used their privileged
position to aid bondsmen.... At times, the black community pitched in to help one
of their number. (Footnotes omitted.)
416

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 30 (“A touchier issue concerned the right of free blacks
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answer, in most states, was yes, and some states expressly confirmed the black
mistress’s right to own enslaved blacks.417 In some other states, the answer was
no, a black mistress’s property rights were expressly limited to prohibit ownership

to own slaves. In some jurisdictions the right was affirmed, and in others it was denied.”)
417

Id. at 30 (“In cases in the Carolinas in 1833, for instance, the right of free blacks to

own slaves was upheld. In State v. Edmund, (a slave), Judge Thomas Ruffin observed that in
North Carolina ‘a free man of colour may own... lands and personal property, including
slaves.’... In Cline v. Caldwell (1833), Judge O’Neall noted that as ‘free persons’ they could
own slaves without restrictions.” (Footnotes omitted.))
See also, WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxii:

This right to own property extended even to that of owning white indentured
servants and slaves. Early in the history of the colonies, as in the case of Virginia,
in 1670, Negroes and Indians were prohibited from owning white indentured
servants, but were still permitted to acquire property in persons of their own
color... free Negroes, for benevolent reasons, often purchased members of their
family that they might thereafter be manumitted for a nominal sum. An effort
was made to prohibit this by restricting manumission, but free Negroes thereafter
continued to purchase their wives, or husbands, or children and to hold them in
slavery since they could not manumit them if they were to remain with them. A
man, therefore, often purchased his wife, or the wife her husband, or the parents
their children. This led to unusual complications upon the death of the free owner
if he died intestate. If there were no relatives legally qualified to receive the
inheritance, such property escheated to the State, inasmuch as slaves were not
considered as persons before the law. (Footnotes omitted.)
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of enslaved blacks.418 Allowing the black mistress to own enslaved blacks would

418

See TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 149-52:

The issue of a free black’s right to own slaves arose in a representative form in
Georgia. (Fn. 96, Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185 (1853)).... Then he addressed to
‘main point,’ the ability of free blacks to own slaves. Judge Lumpkin stated his
‘strong inclination... to give [his] (sic) sentiments pretty fully upon this subject,’
and he did, in a virulently racist opinion. First, he presented his conclusion, that
free blacks were ‘in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship’ and had only those
rights expressly granted by the legislature.... To the extent that he supplied
reasons for the result, they were found in the manumission, being the private act
of the master, could convey no public rights on the free black. Nor had the
legislature acted to eliminate the ‘unconquerable prejudice, if it can be so called,
of race’; rather the free black was ‘associated still with the slave in this State, in
some of the most humiliating incidents of his degradation....’ ‘In no part of this
country, whether North or South, East or West, does the free negro stand erect
and on a platform of equality with the white man. He does, and must necessarily
feel this degradation.... Civil freedom among whites, he can never enjoy.... [T]he
Courts of this country should never lean to that construction, which puts the
thriftless African upon a footing or civil or political equality with a white
population which are characterized by a degree of energy and skill, unknown to
any other people or period.’ (Footnotes omitted).

See also MORRIS, supra note 51, at 30 (“By a statute of 1818 Georgia prohibited such
ownership.... How far this prohibition extended was debated in Bryan v. Walton (1856). Judge
Lumpkin... (clarifying that the restriction did not apply to all blacks), ‘that if a person has any
negro blood, he is disabled from conveying slaves... we should say that to put him under such a
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challenge the very basis of enslavement, black inferiority.419 Equally important,
the black mistress, who owned land and enslaved blacks, challenged the white
male-dominated hierarchy.420 Another court supported the black mistress’s right to
disability, he must have one-eighth of African blood in his veins.’” (Emphasis added; footnotes
omitted.)) See FINKELMAN, CASEBOOK, supra note 136, at 389.
Compare WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxviii (“Virginia... provided that no free
Negro or mulatto should be capable of purchasing or otherwise acquiring permanent ownership,
except by descent to any slaves, other than his or her husband or wife and their children.”)
419

See MORRIS, supra note 51, at 31:

One Arkansas judge in Ewell v. Tidwell (1859) provided the following logic for
not allowing free blacks to own enslaved blacks: ‘The ownership of slaves by free
negroes is opposed to the principles upon which slavery exists among us... its
foundation is an inferiority of race.... The bondage of one negro to another has
not this solid foundation to rest upon. The free negro finds in the slave his brother
in blood, in color, feelings, education and principle... civilly and morally
disqualified to extend protection, and exercise dominion over the slave.’”
(Footnotes omitted.))
420

See TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 149:

Racism and its associated notions of hierarchy overcame the impulse to draw lines
based solely on status when courts in Georgia, Mississippi, and Arkansas held,
during the 1850s, that free blacks, although entitled to own certain forms of
property, could not own slaves, even in the absence of a statutory bar such as
existed in other states. The opinions contain as feverish a rhetoric as can be found
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own land,421 but drew the line there, holding that the free black mistress could not
in any area of the law, which plainly resulted from the sensitivity of the issue at a
time of heightened sectional conflict. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion,
indeed, consisted in large measure of quotations from Chief Justice Taney’s
opinion in the Dred Scott case, followed by a peculiarly inappropriate essay on
the status of aliens in international law. (fn. 95, Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209
(1859).
421

Id. at 152-53:

A property dispute similar to that in Bryan v. Walton arose a few years later in
Arkansas. (fn. 97, Ewell v. Tidwell) The facts, drawn from a more complex
situation, that are relevant to this discussion are that Jonathon Koen bequeathed
land and a slave named Charles to a free black. The Arkansas Supreme Court
rejected the proposition, drawn from Bryan v. Walton, that manumission
conferred no rights to contract or hold land.

‘The negro, though morally and mentally inferior to the white man,
is, nevertheless, an intellectual being, without feelings, necessities
and habits common to humanity. By the act of emancipation... no
one is interested in the protection of the negro. If, under such
circumstances, he could not make and enforce contracts, it is
difficult to understand how he could, with any certainty, supply his
commonest necessities. Such a condition would be inconsistent
with civilization. And, besides this, the negro, having no power to
acquire property, or certain means of gathering the fruits of his
labor, every incentive to industry would be at once destroyed; and,
sinking into idleness and deprivation, he would become an
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own enslaved blacks.422 Another court had the opportunity to discuss the subject
intolerable nuisance.’

422

Id. at 153-54:

But the situation was different when a free black sought to own, not land, but a
slave.

‘Without attempting to discuss slavery in the abstract, it may be
said that it has its foundation in an inferiority of race. (sic) There is
a striking difference between the black and white man, in intellect,
feelings and principles. In the order of providence, the former was
made inferior to the latter; and hence the bondage of the one to the
other. For government and protection, the one race is dependent
on the other. It is upon this principle alone, that slavery can be
maintained as an institution. The bondage of one negro to another
has not (sic) this solid foundation to rest upon. The free negro
finds in the slave his brother in blood, in color, feelings, education
and principle. He has but few civil rights, nor can have, consistent
with the good order of society; and is almost dependent on the
white race as the slave himself. He is, therefore, civilly and
morally disqualified to extend protection, and exercise dominion
over the slave.’

In 1846, the same court had summarized the general view in upholding the
state’s requirement that free blacks post a $500 bond against becoming a public
charge or injuring any person. (fn. 98, Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509 (1846).)
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of the black mistress owning enslaved blacks, in a case in which a black mistress
owned her own child.423 Some whites recognized the importance of having free

The statute did not violate the privileges and immunities of citizens, because free
blacks could not be citizens: ‘The two races, differing as they do in complexion,
habits, conformation and intellectual endowments, could not nor ever will live
together upon terms of social or political equality. A higher than human power so
ordained it, and a greater than human agency must change the decree.’
423

Id. at 155-56:

This discussion can be summarized by examining a Delaware decision in which
the impossibility of using race as the categorizing device is evident to the
observer as it was concealed from the judges. Tindal v. Hudson was a suit for
freedom by Isaac Tindal. (fn. 99, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 441 (1838)) His father, a free
black, had been ‘legally married’ to a slave. When Isaac was born, his father held
him as a slave and in his will bequeathed him to serve until he reached twentyfive. The suit for freedom from one who bought Isaac from the estate was said to
pose two ‘novel and interesting’ questions: can a free black own slaves, and
‘whether a father can hold his own children in slavery.’ The court’s opinion dealt
with the questions separately. On the first, it argued that slavery as it existed
involved black slaves and white owners and that it would ‘not institute a new
species of slavery.’ Further, free blacks were ‘almost as helpless and dependent’
on whites as slaves; their limited civil capacity made it impossible for them to
provide the ‘support and protection’ that slaveowners had to give in a system of
‘mutual and reciprocal obligations and duties.’ On the second question, the court
said that ‘humanity revolts at the idea of a parent selling his own children into
slavery’; ‘the natural rights and obligations of a father are paramount to the
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blacks as allies in the enslavement enterprise.424 Despite white society’s and the
law’s views on the subject, there is clear evidence that the black mistresses owned
enslaved blacks.425
acquired rights of the master.’ But of course fathers owned their children
throughout the South. Although lawyers’s distinctions might be drawn between
children born of legal marriages and ‘illegitimate’ children, the Delaware court
could say what it did on the second question only by ignoring the reality of race
on which its answer to the first question rested.

See also, Valsain et al. v. Cloutier, 3 La. 170, 1831 WL 717 (La. 1831), supra note 342 (another
case in which a black mistress owned her daughter as an enslaved black).
424

See JOHNSON, supra note 140, at 169 (“The free Negro’s ‘right to hold slaves gives

him a stake in the institution of slavery, and makes it his interest as well as his duty to uphold it.
It identifies his interests and his feelings, in this particular, with those of the white
population...’”)
425

For empirical evidence that the southern black mistress did, in fact, own enslaved

blacks, see SCHWENINGER, WOODSON, supra note 29. See also PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 43336 (“...a negro planter in St. Paul’s Parish, South Carolina, was reported before the close of the
eighteenth century to have two hundred slaves as well as a white wife and son-in-law, and the
returns of the first federal census appear to corroborate it.... In Louisiana colored planters on a
considerable scale became fairly common.... In rural Virginia and Maryland also there were free
colored slaveholders in considerable numbers. Slaveholding by colored townsmen were likewise
fairly frequent. Among the 360 colored taxpayers in Charleston in 1860, for example, 130,
including nine persons described as of Indian descent, were listed as possessing 390 slaves.”)
See also JACKSON, supra note 29, at 217 (“Frankey Miles was one of the largest
Page 213 of 302

Blackness as Property
Some black mistresses owned noenslaved blacks, while some owned family
members who were still enslaved.426 On the other hand, as this study will show,
there were a few black mistresses, who like their white “aristocratic,” wealthy
slaveholders among the free Negroes in Virginia during the entire period under review. In 1860
this woman, as previously noted, owned a plantation of 1,100 acres; and doubtless she had need
for the nineteen slaves she owned.” (Footnote omitted.)); RUSSELL, supra note 14, at 77, 90-95
n.34 (citing, inter alia, Lower Norfolk County Antiquary, vol. iv, pp. 174-82, “for negro slaveowners enumerated in a list, prepared by the commissioners of the revenue,... of Princess Anne
County in 1840.”); FRANKLIN, supra note 29 at 159 (“At no time during the ante-bellum period
were Negroes in North Carolina without some slaves.”); JAMES M. WRIGHT, THE FREE NEGRO IN
MARYLAND, 1634-1860 (1921) [hereinafter WRIGHT]; Horace E. Fitchett, The Origins and
Growth of the Free Negro Population in Charleston, South Carolina, 25 J. NEGRO HIST. 430
(1941); LARRY KOGER, BLACK SLAVEOWNERS: FREE BLACK SLAVE MASTERS IN SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1790-1860 (1985); MARINA WIKRAMANAYAKE, A WORLD IN SHADOW: THE FREE
BLACK IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1973); and LITITIA WOODS BROWN, FREE NEGROES
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

1740-1846 (1972). See generally BERLIN, supra note 7, at xvii-

xx (providing a list of published and unpublished doctoral theses on free blacks in virtually every
enslavement state).
426

See FRANKLIN, supra note 29, at 160. (Not all black mistresses, of course, owned

slaves. Most of them, like the majority of antebellum southern whites, were poor, and owned no
property of any kind. The majority of black mistresses, who did own enslaved blacks, owned
only a few, leading to the observation “that by far the larger portion of free Negro owners of
slaves were the possessors of this human chattel for benevolent reasons. There are numerous
examples of free Negroes having purchased relatives or friends to ease their lot. Many of them
manumitted such slaves, while others held title to slaves who were virtually free.” (Footnote
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counterparts, were in the “planter” class.427

C.

ORIGIN, EXISTENCE, AND GROWTH OF THE BLACK
MISTRESS CLASS428

omitted.))
427

For these black mistresses, there were the greatest status differences with the enslaved

population. Black mistresses were also the greatest challenge to enslavement’s white supremacy
premise. See supra note 30.
428

See generally BERLIN, supra note 7 (presenting a definitive study of the origins,

demographics, and development of the free black class in the antebellum South). See also
WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at vi. (“The period in which it was possible for Negroes to
come as servants and later acquire freedom terminated near the end of the seventeenth century.
The free Negro population thereafter found recruits only from children born of free Negro
parents, mulatto children born of free Negro mothers, mulatto children born of white servants or
free white women, children of free Negro and Indian mixed parentage, and manumitted slaves.”)
See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 100:

Whatever the specific circumstances, and despite the different traditions in
various sections of the Lower South, prior to 1840, most free people of color who
reached the upper economic levels were of mixed ancestry and had received
assistance from whites. Often they were children of white planters or merchants.
In South Carolina, the father of a free mulatto owner Robert Collins was a white
landowner in St. Thomas Parish; the father of farmer Henry Glencamp was a
white planter in St. Stephens Parish; Charleston hotel owner Jehu Jones, described
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Why did some white men in the antebellum South choose black women as
sexual partners? Perhaps it was merely rape and exploitation in an enslavement
system that was sheerly barbaric.429 Perhaps it was exotic, some strange attraction

as ‘almost white,’ tinner William Penceel, and barber Thomas Inglis claimed
white ancestry; the father of Sumter County cotton gin maker William Ellison was
probably Fairfield District planter and slave owner Robert Ellison. Charleston
slaveholder Margaret Noisette and other members of the Noisette family were
children and grandchildren of French-born Philip Stanislas Noisette and his
Haitian-born slave wife. In Georgia, fisherman and farmer Anthony Odingsells,
one of the largest Negro property holders, received his land and nine slaves from
Charles Odingsells, an officer in the American Revolution, a state legislator, and
the owner of three plantations. The most prominent ‘colored creole family’ in
Florida, the Ponis family, who engaged in various business activities, claimed
descent from two Spanish officers. In Alabama, the two largest Negro
slaveholders, cattle ranchers Zeno and Basile Chastang, were the children of Dr.
John Chastang, a prominent Mobile surgeon who had served as a medical
consultant at the Spanish fort of San Esteban de Tombecbe. In Mississippi, the
plantation and slaveowning Baran brothers– Andrew, David, and John– and
probably the Natchez barber William Johnson, the wealthiest Negroes in the state,
were children of white slave owners and slave women. (Footnotes omitted.)

429

See supra note 136. See also WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xiv (“The masters

of the female slaves, however, were not always the only persons of loose morals. Many women
of color were also prostituted to the purposes of young white men, and overseers. Goodell
reports a well-authenticated account of a respectable ‘Christian lady’ at the South, who kept a
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to another race. Perhaps it was sheer physical attraction.430 Perhaps it resulted
from the seductive actions of black women. Or perhaps, it was romantic, the result
of true love.431 Whatever the reason, it appears that there was a lot of sexual
activity between white men and black women, and that miscegenation between
white men and black women was a reality.432
An analysis of key demographics explains why white men often chose black
handsome mulatto female for the use of her genteel son, as a method of deterring him, as she
said, ‘from indiscriminate and vulgar indulgences.’” (Footnotes omitted.))
430

For example, many white travelers in Louisiana remarked at the beauty of the black

women they saw. See THOMAS ASHE, TRAVELS IN AMERICA 315-16 (1809) (“... still there is an
assembly held every Sunday evening at the Bayou, about two miles out of town, where the
beauty of the country concentrates, without regard to birth, wealth, or colour.”); F. TROLLOPE,
DOMESTIC MANNERS OF THE AMERICANS 33 (1832) (“... the gentle Quadroon has the sweet but
dangerous vengeance of possessing that of attraction. The union formed with this unfortunate
race are said to be often lasting and happy, as far as any unions can be....”); and SAXE-WEIMER
EISENACH, TRAVEL THROUGH NORTH AMERICA DURING THE YEARS 1825 AND 1826, vol.2, 62
(1828) (“The quadroons both assume the names of their friends, and, as I was assured preserve
this engagement with as much fidelity as ladies espoused at the altar. Several of these girls have
inherited property from their fathers or friends, and possess handsome features.”)
431

See Macarty et al. v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 1848 WL 3762 (La. 1848), supra

note 113.
432

See, e.g., BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27 (presenting, inter alia, a statistical
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women as sexual partners in the antebellum South.433 First, white men
outnumbered white women in the antebellum South, and most enslaved blacks
lived on small farms, with resident white masters.434 Second, free black women
outnumbered free black men, making for an imbalance in the free black
community.435 Third, many free blacks were descendants of white men and black
women, and therefore, were more closely connected to whites.436
analysis on interracial relationships in Reconstruction New Orleans).
433

See generally BERLIN, supra note 7.

434

See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 101 (“Regional variations qualify but do not negate the

generalization that most Southern slaves lived on holdings of modest size... in the South as a
whole, the medium figure was 23. In rough terms, about one-quarter of Southern slaves lived on
very small holdings of 1 to 9, one half lived on middle-range holdings of 10 to 49, and onequarter lived on large estates of 50 or more.” (Tables omitted.))
435

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 177 (“In contrast to the white and slave populations, there

were many more free Negro women than men in the South.”)
436

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 178 (“In 1860 fully 40 percent of the Southern free Negro

population were classified as mulattoes... throughout the South a light skin was the freeman’s
distinguishing characteristic.”) Berlin noted that the census takers were not given any criterion
for distinguishing “black” from “mulatto,” so as noted we must view census figures on color
with “usual skepticism.” Id. at 178-79 n.62.
See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 101:
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A federal census-driven study of the free mistress in rural Louisiana shows
both the triumph of the unique group, their relationship to white masters, and their
contribution to the antebellum Southern political economy.437 In 1850, in “rural”

Even when there were no direct kinship ties prosperous free persons of color often
received some assistance from whites. Alabama bridge builder Horace King,
emancipated in 1829 by Georgia slaveholder John Godwin, was assisted by his
former master when he constructed a bridge across the Chattahoochee River, and
later the two became partners in a construction company. In New Orleans, Pierre
A.D. Casenave, who worked for many years as a clerk in the office of
philanthropist Judah P. Touro, was given a bequest of $10,000 by his employer to
start a mercantile firm. Later, Casenave established the first large-scale, blackowned undertaking business in the South. Between 1828 and 1832, Plaquemines
Parish sugar planter Andrew Durnford purchased St. Rosalie plantation from New
Orleans merchant-planter John McDonogh, a friend of Durnford’s white father,
who allowed Durnford to pay the $72,000 purchase price over a period of more
than twenty years, at a 6 percent interest, when mortgage notes for such amounts
usually called for lump sum payments over a period of three or four years at 8 or
10 percent. By 1840, with rare exceptions, affluent free persons of color in the
Lower South were directly related either to whites or mulattoes who had been
assisted by white benefactors. (Footnotes omitted.)

437

The author completed this analysis in fulfillment of his Scholar of the House thesis at

Yale University in 1974-75, under the direction of Professor John W. Blassingame. The full,
unpublished thesis and statistical analysis is available.
See also SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 101:
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Louisiana, there were 169 households headed by free black women and men; a
large majority of whom were the offspring of Spanish and French white masters

Similarly, affluent free persons of color in Louisiana were often directly related to
whites. In New Orleans, among the approximately 535 succession (estates)
probated for free blacks in the District Court between 1805 and 1846, nearly twothirds were for women. Their names–Marie Allemand, Charlotte Burle,
Marguerite Beaudouin, Charlotte Colbert, Catherine Lachiapella, Magdeleine
Jourdain, Marie Pierre, Madeleine Rillieux–bore witness to their relationships
with white Creoles. At the same time, a majority of the city’s property-holding
free men of color, including prosperous merchants Leon Sindoz and Erasme
Legoaster and speculator Francois Edmund Dupuy, were of mixed African and
Spanish or French heritage. Similar interracial family backgrounds existed
among affluent free persons of color in rural parishes, including those of
Plaquemines Parish sugar planters Andrew Durnford, Louise Oliver, and Adolphe
Reggio; St. John the Baptist Parish slave owners, George Deslonde, Cyprian
Ricard, and Antoine Dubuclet; St. Landry Parish planters Adolophe Donatto and
Jean Baptiste Meullion; and Natchitoches Parish slave masters Nicholas
Augustine Metoyer, Marie Suzanne Metoyer, and Dominique Metoyer. Meullion
was the one of white planter Luis Augustin Meullion, and his slave Maria Juana,
while the Metoyers were the children of French immigrant and planter Claude
Thomas Pierre Metoyer, and his slave mistress Marie Thereze Coincoin.
(Footnotes omitted.)
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and their African slaves.438 Three facts, abstracted from the 1850 manuscript
census, indicate the origin of the black mistress in antebellum rural Louisiana:
their average age, their place of nativity, and their skin color. As to age, the
average age of the black mistress in antebellum, rural Louisiana was 46 years old
in 1850. As to place of nativity, 96.6% of them had been born in Louisiana. And
as to skin color, 93.5% of them were described as “mulatto.”439 These three facts
provide evidence that the black mistress had her origin in “Latin” Louisiana, in the
late 18th and early 19th Centuries, from racially-mixed parentage. This conclusion
is further supported by the high incidence of black mistresses, who had French and
Spanish surnames.440

438

These facts were extracted from the 25 microfilmed reels of the free population, slave
population, and agricultural schedules returned by those who took the census of Louisiana in
1850. The term “rural” is used to define the State of Louisiana, except for Orleans Parish, which
comprises the City of New Orleans. As previously mentioned, see the English and colored
creole ancestry of Andrew Durnford, supra note 306, not all free blacks in Louisiana derived
from “Creoles” and Africans. Some of these black mistress households were held by free black
men. As common when referring to men so as to include women by inference, the following
discussion uses the term “black mistress” to include black masters, free black men who owned
enslaved blacks.
439

As compiled from the 1850 manuscript census, out of 169 households, the average age

for the black mistress was 45.7 years; 6 were born outside of Louisiana; and 11 were listed of
“black” skin color.
440

Although it is often difficult to say what nationality a name is, it is conservative to say
that 90% of the names of free mistresses, listed in the 1850 manuscript census, are Spanish or
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The number of mulattoes listed in the Census provides proof enough of the
mixing of the races.441 In 1850, there were 17,462 free blacks in the entire state of
Louisiana, of which 81% were listed as mulatto and 19% were listed as black
(14,083 mulattoes; 3,379 blacks).442 And in Louisiana’s enslaved community in

French. The majority of the white masters were also Catholic. There has been some literature on
the effect that religion played on enslavement. Some have argued that the laws of the Catholic
Church greatly affected enslavement. See FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE
NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS (1947), and STANLEY ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN
INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE (1976) (for a discussion of the humanizing effects of the
Catholic Church on enslavement). Others have argued that the behavior of the Church and its
authority did not significantly affect the life of enslaved blacks. Compare Carl N. Degler,
Slavery in Brazil and the United States: An Essay in Comparative History, 75 AM. HIST. REV.
1004-28 (1970).
See also KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 82 (“The great majority of free blacks in the
antebellum South were descendants of those who received their freedom between 1780 and
1810.”) This is evidence that the Louisiana free mistress phenomenon was not unique to location,
culture, or religious affiliation. It appears that as the economics of enslavement changed, whites’
and the law’s attitudes towards manumission and to free blacks became more “conservative.”
441

As per instructions, the census takers classified the “free” population in 1850, 1860,

and 1870 manuscript censuses, as “white,” “mulatto,” and “black,” in an effort to describe race
based on skin color. See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 178 n.62 (“In 1850 and 1860, the census
distinguished between ‘mulatto’ and ‘black’ members of the free Negro and slave populations.
However, census marshals were not given any criterion for distinguishing mulattoes from blacks
or even whites. Presumably, all those who were not full-blooded blacks yet were unable to pass
for whites were listed as ‘mulattoes.’ Naturally, census figures on the color of both the free
Negro and slave populations should be viewed with even more than usual skepticism. Negro
Population, 1790-1915 (Washington D.C., 1918), pp. 207, 220-1.”)
442

Calculations are based on the statistics found in STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED
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1850, there were 244,809 enslaved people, of which 8% were listed as mulatto and
92% were listed as black (19,835 mulattoes; 224,974 blacks).443
One might assume that being “mulatto” meant special treatment by whites
and automatic freedom, but this was not the case.444 The greater percentage of free
blacks was mulatto: 400 mulattoes to every 100 blacks.445 This percentage was far
greater than that for enslaved blacks: the ratio of mulattoes to blacks in the slave
community was about nine mulattoes for every 100 blacks.446 However, one
cannot conclude that if a black person were mulatto, that meant that they were free:
not all mulattoes were free and not all blacks were enslaved. There were, in fact,
more enslaved mulattoes than there were free mulattos, at least in antebellum, rural
Louisiana: out of the total mulatto population, 4,083 were free, compared to 19,835
STATES– COMPENDIUM OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS 83 (J.D.B. DeBow 1970) [hereinafter DEBOW,
SEVENTH], at 83.
443

Id.

444

“Mulatto” is defined as “[o]ne who is the offspring of a European and a Black; also

used loosely for anyone of mixed race resembling a mulatto.” OXFORD DICTIONARY, VOL. IX,
supra note 5, at 68.
445

See DEBOW, SEVENTH, supra note 442, at 83.

446

Id.
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who were enslaved!447 These figures support two important conclusions: first, that
despite the laws, miscegenation was practiced in antebellum, rural Louisiana, and
second, that white masters often abandoned their mulatto children to enslavement.
Some white masters in Louisiana had relationships with black women that
were “the nearest approach to marriage which the law recognized, and in the days
in which their union commenced it imposed serious moral obligations,” defying
the law and social disapproval.448 This was especially true of white masters of
Iberville, West Baton Rouge, and Pointe Coupee Parishes.449 A large number of
manumissions resulted from these miscegenational relationships.450 It has been
estimated that, prior to the Civil War, three-fourths of the free black population in
the Lower South had some white ancestry.451 In some Lower South port cities, like

447

Id.

448

See Macarty, supra note 329, per Chief Justice Eustis.

449

In the emancipation document of 1829, five mulatto women who might have been
sisters (all have the same maiden name of “Belly”) are listed as being married to wealthy
(presumably) white planters. See Emancipation document of “Henriette” by A. Dubuclet, et al.,
June 8, 1829, Iberville Parish Courthouse, Plaquemines, Louisiana, a copy of which is in the
author’s possession.
450

See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.

451

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 180.
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New Orleans, nearly 90 percent of free blacks had white ancestry.452 Many
emancipation documents describe a young, enslaved black woman with mulatto
children.453
One example of such a miscegenational relationship, in Latin Louisiana,
occurred in 1764, between a white master, Luis Augustin Meullion, and his
mulatto, enslaved woman, Maria Juana, which produced a son, Jean Baptiste
Meullion. In 1776, Jean Baptiste Meullion and his enslaved mother were
emancipated, on the condition that they serve their former owner until his death.454
After his father’s death, Jean Baptiste Meullion moved to St. Landry Parish and, in
1830, owned 52 enslaved blacks.455 The origins of many black mistresses can be
traced back to miscegenational relationships, between white masters and their

452

Id.

453

See generally SCHAFER, FREE, supra note 45.

454

MS. Deed of Emancipation, February 21, 1776, microfilmed on Meullion Papers

(Louisiana State University Archives).
455

Compiled from over 20 reels of microfilmed manuscript schedules of population

reported in Louisiana by the 1830 census takers.
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enslaved black women.456
During the antebellum period, there were increased pressures throughout the
South to send the black mistress out of the State, efforts to take away their
property, and even efforts to re-enslave them.457 As a result of these pressures,
including a decline in the number of newly-manumitted blacks, the free black
population in Louisiana declined from 25,502 in 1840 to 17,462 in 1850.458 Many
black mistresses migrated to the states in the North and the West, while others
immigrated to Mexico, the Caribbean islands, and to France.459
The black mistress, especially in miscegenational relationships with white
men, and those descendants of white masters and black mistresses, often relied on

456

See generally SCHWENINGER, supra note 29. See generally BRASSEAUX, supra note

457

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 316-40, Chapter 10, entitled “The Mechanics of White

403.

Dominance.” (“‘Humanity, self-interest and consistency all require that we should enslave the
free negro.’ George Fitzhugh, What Shall Be Done with the Free Negro (1851).”) Id. at 343.
458

See DEBOW, SEVENTH, supra note 442, at 63.

459

See, e.g., Josephine Decuir who moved to France, in David Sandoz, Administrator of

Pierre Decuir v. Louis Gary, 11 Rob. (La.) 529, 1845 WL 1662 (La. 1845), supra note 330.
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their “family ties” to support their legal rights.460 After all, the black mistress was
at best a quasi-citizen, despite her wealth and status, for in the South, there was
really no such thing as a half-black or a part white.461 The question that the
enslavement law faced was, when a white master exercised his property rights and
freed an enslaved black woman, or when he chose to have a sexual relationship
with a free black mistress, should he be allowed to transfer his wealth to them?
*

*

*

In summary, the black mistress was an enigma to the American “propertyenslavement-sexual” Dream. That is, she was allowed to exercise three prized
possessions of American life: freedom, right to contract, and the right to privately
own property, including enslaved blacks.
While the black mistress made significant progress in exercising her
property rights in the antebellum South, her legal status was under constant

460

See CATTERALL, supra note 96, vol. 3 (1932) (citing examples of how white relatives

of free blacks testified on their behalf in court).
461

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 182 (“‘You may manumit a slave but you cannot make

him into a white man.’ Robert G. Harper, Letter to E.B. Caldwell (1818).”)
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scrutiny, and the subject of continuous debate.462 Other American civil rights of
full citizenship, such as the right to vote, were hardly forthcoming.463 Prior to the

462

See BERLIN, supra note 7, 182-216, at Chapter 6, “A White Man’s Country: Racial

Attitudes and Policies.”
463

See KOLCHIN, supra note 11, at 17:

As the status of white migrants gradually improved, that of blacks in America
became more clearly defined as well. Whereas the legal status of the few blacks
who resided in the colonies remained uncertain prior to the 1660s, a spate of
legislation passed during the subsequent century regulated the condition of the
growing population of black slaves and set them off from white settlers. These
acts established that slaves– and the children of slave women– would serve for
life; limited the rights of slaves and even of free blacks (they could not vote,
testify in court against whites, or marry whites)....

Limited civil rights, such as voting rights, that the black mistress exercised, must be
viewed in the context of the limited rights, that women and free blacks exercised generally, even
in the North.

Northern blacks, although free, were objects of both legal discrimination and
vicious hostility. Excluded from most public schools, denied the right to vote
(except Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and – if they could
meet a property requirement– New York), forbidden by (sporadically enforced)
law from entering many states, jeered at and at times physically attacked by
whites who refused to work with them or live near them, blacks quickly came to
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Civil War, even their property rights were eroding.464 Perhaps their eroded legal
status reflected a decline in their percentage of the general population, due to an
increase in the white population.465 Or perhaps it reflected the white population’s
increased fear of the black mistress’s role in enslavement revolts.466
White fear and resentment of the black mistress often resulted in legal and
extralegal restraints on their “freedom.”467 As clearly reflected in the postappreciate the difference between freedom and equality.

Id. at 82.
464

See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 91. (“While the state’s politicians undercut

incrementally such freedoms as public assembly, education, and travel, they barely touched other
rights. Thus, free blacks managed to cling to a quasi-citizenship down to 1860.”)
465

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 46, 136, 398-99 (showing that in 1810, free blacks

comprised of 18 percent (or 7,585 people) of the Louisiana population, but by 1860, they
comprised of only 5.3 percent (or 18,647) of the State’s population; while the white population
grew in Louisiana from 34,311 in 1810 to 357,456 in 1860).
466

Id. at 345-49. (This would help explain the focus on free assembly, education, and

travel of anti-free black legislation. And with some justification, there was sufficient evidence
that many free blacks were anti-slavery and promoted black liberation.)
467

See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, Rather Than Free: Free

Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 17 (1991). See
generally WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64.
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enslavement, “Jim Crow” era, many white Southerners “could not conceive of a
society in which whites and blacks were equal.”468
Overall, for whatever the reasons, Southern white society allowed the black
mistress to exercise many private property rights. This represents a triumph of the

468

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 182:

The desire to get rid of free Negroes, perhaps all Negroes, stood at the heart of
racial policies of the Upper South. Believing that blacks were a people yearning
for liberty but forever barred from enjoying it in America, Upper South whites
saw only three alternatives: amalgamation, race war, or physical separation.... ‘...
the only rational and Christian alternative is colonization.’

Id. at 200. Greed was a major factor in laws against free blacks, and led whites to propose a
fourth alternative for free blacks’ fate, that of re-enslavement:

It took but scant provocation for whites to chip off another piece of the freemen’s
ever-shrinking liberty. In 1822, for instance, when a Virginia legislator found the
state penitentiary crowded and the treasury low, they ordered free Negro felons to
be whipped and sold into slavery. Enthusiasm for the new penal system quickly
spread to nearby Maryland and Delaware, both of which barred free Negro
convicts from the state penitentiary and local jails and subjected them to the lash
or to sale for a term of years out of the state.... A minor fiscal crisis was enough
to encourage some whites to drive free Negroes into permanent bondage.

Id. at 182-83.
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private property ownership paradigm over the enslavement paradigm. As we shall
see, the black mistress class, and the free black population, grew in number and
prominence in the antebellum South, making them less marginal.469 The question
that Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle implores is, why did white
masters empower the black mistress with private property rights? And, in
particular, was it in the best interest of the white power structure to do so?

VI. “JIM CROW” SEGREGATION AND THE BLACK WOMAN’S
STRUGGLE FOR SEXUAL AND RACIAL EQUALITY

This next section discusses the black mistress’s fate in the years just prior to
the Civil War, her reaction and that of her racially-mixed offsprings, to the Civil
War, and their experiences during Reconstruction. It also examines the effect the
Reconstruction rules allowing interracial marriage had on pre-War legacies that

469

Id. at 46-47, 396-403. (In 1810, there were 108,265 free blacks in the South, out of a

southern white population of 2,208,785, and an enslaved black population of 1,163,854. By
1860, there were 261,918 free blacks in the South, compared to a southern white population of
8,097,463, and an enslaved black population of 3,953,696. More important than their numbers,
they provided a “legacy of freedom,” as important as the legacy of enslavement.) Id. at 395.
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white men provided their black concubines. And lastly it glimpses at the
challenges that “Jim Crow” segregation posed for the black mistress in her
struggles for sexual and racial equality.

A.

A “DYING GENERATION”

The black mistress was born near the end of the eighteenth century and, as a
result, most died or were old by 1860, the end of the antebellum period.470
Looking over its life span the black mistress class reached its height in the 1830s,
and their children benefitted from economic expansion over a thirty-year period.471
These black mistresses laid the foundation for the financial success of their mixedrace children, for example, Nicholas Metoyer of Natchitoches, the son of a
prominent black mistress, died in 1856, after he had been a wealthy planter for
most of his eighty-eight years of life.472 His two younger brothers died in 1864, at

470

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 176-77.

471

See WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at v.

472

See generally SISTER FRANCES JEROME WOODS, MARGINALITY AND IDENTITY (1972)

[hereinafter WOODS], and MILLS, supra note 117.
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the ages of sixty-seven and sixty-nine.473 Many of the black mistress class and
their children died by 1860, through natural causes as a result of the Civil War or
war-related causes.474
This generational phenomenon can be seen in the life of Rosaline Mercier, a
black mistress who, with her white paramour Thomas Durnford, produced Andrew
Durnford, a wealthy and influential black master.475 Andrew Durnford was
reaching thirty years old on June 27, 1829, when he was listed as the purchaser of a
large tract of land in Plaquemines Parish.476 In that land sale, he was listed as a
“f.m.c. [free man of color] residing in this City [New Orleans].”477 On July 22,
1829, Andrew Durnford purchased another tract of land in Plaquemines Parish,
and, by 1830, Andrew Durnford, with his black mother’s assistance, became

473

See MILLS note 117.

474

See supra note 428.

475

See supra note 306.

476

Land sale of John McDonogh to Andrew Durnford, New Orleans, June 27, 1829,

Orleans Parish Courthouse Archives.
477

Id.
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Andrew Durnford, the black sugar plantation owner.478
By 1840, Andrew Durnford had begun to make his mark in the planter class.
According to the 1840 Census (he was then about forty years old), Durnford
owned sixty enslaved blacks, and was listed as the head of a household of four
members.479 By 1850, he was listed in the manuscript census as being fifty years
of age, a sugar planter, heading a household of seven members, owning seventy
enslaved blacks, and having a sugar plantation valued at $80,000, showing the
growth of this estate.480 Just prior to the 1860 Census-taking, and prior to the Civil
War, Andrew Durnford died, as recorded in the July 13, 1859 obituary column of
the New Orleans Bee: “on his plantation in the Parish of Plaquemines 12th instant
at 4½ (sic) o’clock, a.m., Dr. (sic) A. Durnford, aged sixty years.”481 Andrew
Durnford’s death marked the end of the black mistress and their interracial

478

Land sale of John McDonogh to Andrew Durnford, New Orleans, July 22, 1829,

Orleans Parish Courthouse Archives.
479

See the 1840 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.

480

See the 1850 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.

481

See David O. Whitten, Slave Buying in 1935 Virginia as Revealed by Letters of a

Louisiana Negro Sugar Planter, 11 L A. HIST. 231-32 (1970) [hereinafter WHITTEN, BUYING].
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offspring.
Parenthetically, one wonders about the attitude black mistresses and their
racially-mixed children held toward ownership of enslaved blacks. Some of them
owned enslaved blacks in small numbers and probably for benevolent purposes.482
Some mistresses and their offspring, who owned large numbers of enslaved blacks,
did so for economic exploitation and profit.483 Such was the case of Andrew
Durnford, as evidenced through his extensive correspondences with a prominent
white businessman and personal friend, John McDonogh, on many issues of the
day.484
Andrew Durnford, a black man who enslaved black people, can be classified

482

See WOODSON, HEADS, supra note 112, at xxxv:

In some of these cases, as in that of Marie Louise Bitaud, a free woman of color
in New Orleans, in 1832, these slaves were purchased for personal or benevolent
purposes, often to make their lots much easier.... Samuel Martin, a benevolent
slaveholder of color residing at Port Gibson, Mississippi, purchased two mulatto
women with their four children, brought them to Cincinnati in 1844, and
emancipated them.

483

See generally WHITTEN, supra note 306.
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as a “progressive” enslaver (if such a classification makes any sense). He, along
with McDonogh, favored the re-colonization of blacks to Africa, particularly
Liberia.485 While traveling to Philadelphia in 1835, Durnford met with the
outspoken abolitionist of American enslavement, Elliott Cresson.486 From his St.
Rosalie Plantation on March 23, 1844, Andrew Durnford wrote to John
McDonogh, praising him for establishing a voyage to Africa for New Orleans
people:
I see by your letter of the 4 that a vessel is to leave here for Africa: I
have heard since with pleasure, from different sources, that you have
been engaging some of our New Orleans people to go to Africa; act.
This is the right way to do things my friend.487

484

Id. at 57-67.

485

Id. at 58.

486

See WHITTEN, BUYING, supra note 481, at 233-35.

487

Andrew Durnford to John McDonogh, St. Rosalie, March 23, 1844, McDonogh MSS,

Tulane University Library. See also, supra note 66: “Contrary to the norm, some enslaved
blacks were able to obtain money, often with the permission of their master, and allowed or
encouraged to ‘purchase’ their freedom.”
See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 427-28:
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Durnford himself had a burning interest in the American Colonization Program:
the article of the colonization Herald of March 20th, from the Biblical
repository and Princeton review for January 1844; is a clear
topographical and commercial &c. (sic) of the colonies of Africa. It
is worth reading. I have sent for it, if it can be had in New Orleans.488
Andrew Durnford apparently wished to send his enslaved blacks to Africa,
and obviously influenced his friend John McDonogh, who willed that eighty-five
of his enslaved blacks be liberated and sent to Liberia with transportation expenses,
tools, provisions, and money to get settled.489 Durnford wrote on January 6, 1844:
“ . . . (it will interfere with my future projects, if I am spared long enough, to send

John McDonogh... of New Orleans... made a unique bargain with his whole force
of slaves...by which they were collectively to earn their freedom and their passage
to Liberia by the overtime work of Saturday afternoons.... The plan was carried to
completion on schedule...they left America in 1842, some eighty in number....
McDonogh wrote: ‘... I can say with truth and heartfelt satisfaction that a more
virtuous people does not exist in any country.’ (Footnotes omitted.)

488

Id., June 13, 1844.

489

See WHITTEN, BUYING, supra note 481, at 234.
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my mite to the African shore) . . .”490 The Plaquemines Parish conveyance index
lists Durnford’s emancipation of enslaved blacks, indicating he did free some of
his people.491 Yet, the 1860 manuscript census lists the estate of Andrew Durnford
as owning seventy-five enslaved blacks and showing that Durnford freed few, if
any, of them.492 Unlike McDonogh, Durnford was greatly in debt (to McDonogh’s
estate) when he died; this might have affected his decision or bettered Durnford
ability to liberate his enslaved blacks. Durnford did not live to see the Civil War,
but some of his fellow black masters did, as discussed next.493

490

Andrew Durnford to John McDonogh, St. Rosalie, January 6, 1844, McDonogh MSS,

Tulane University Library.
491

Index to the Plaquemines Parish Civil Records, New Orleans Public Library Archives.

492

See the 1860 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.

493

See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 192:

Following the death of their mother in 1866, Andrew Durnford, Jr., and his sister
Rosema Durnford struggled desperately to regain the antebellum production of
sugar that made their father one of the richest free Negroes in the United States,
but in 1874, besieged by creditors, they were forced to sell St. Rosalie plantation
for a few thousand dollars.
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B.

FIGHTING FOR HER PROPERTY

The ten years between 1860 and 1870 brought the Civil War and the
Reconstruction to the South, along with social confusion and economic ruin to the
black mistress.494 In the late 1850s, the black mistress faced a change in white
attitudes toward her. New laws made it impossible to emancipate an enslaved
black in Louisiana and throughout the South, limited her free movement, and even

494

Id. at 190:

Despite such professions of ‘common sympathy,’ the war and its aftermath
spelled disaster for the great majority of affluent free persons of color in the
Lower South. This was especially true in rural areas that had experienced the
brunt of Union attacks, but even in towns and cities, despite the ability of some
wealthy families to maintain their real estate holdings, there was a marked decline
in the wealth holdings of the majority. Following three successive postwar crop
failures, South Carolina rice planter Robert Collins, who had once owned a 3,100acre plantation and seventeen bondsmen and women, was forced to borrow
money from the Freedmen’s Bureau to purchase supplies for his former slaves.
Collins’s sister, Margaret Mitchell Harris (both children of Elias Collins), owner
of 44 slaves and a 981-acre rice plantation in Georgetown District, had a
premonition of the coming disaster. In 1860, she sold her slaves, disposed of her
plantation, and invested $35,000 in stocks and bonds, only to lose everything as
the stock certificate became worthless during the war.
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encouraged her to select a white master and voluntarily become enslaved.495 One
politically astute free black taught his children to do menial tasks normally done
for them by their enslaved blacks: “And he made his children, mind you, every
week one of those daughters had to cook and another would take the house.
Learning housekeeping. Because he saw that things were going to change. He
told them its going to be different. You are going to have to do (sic)–to work.”496
Not all black mistresses and their privileged children resolved the possible
future changes in such an easy and committed manner. As reported in September
1861, two free blacks argued over their positions concerning the Civil War, and
one man was killed in the ensuing duel.497 While many opposed the Civil War,
others took up arms to defend their homeland, volunteering to fight for their
property rights, as expressed in a 1864 communication to the New Orleans Daily
Delta stating:
The free colored population (native) of Louisiana . . . own slaves, and

495

See TAYLOR, supra note 137, at 157.

496

See WOODS, supra note 472, at 36-37.

497

See BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27, at 33.
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they are dearly attached to their native land, . . . and they are ready to
shed their blood for their defense. They have no sympathy for
abolitionism; no love for the North, but they have plenty for
Louisiana. . . . They will fight for her in 1861 as they fought in 1814’15. . . . If they have made no demonstration it is because they have
no right to meddle with politics, but not because they are not disposed.
All they ask is to have a chance, and they will be worthy sons of
Louisiana.498
Free blacks who proposed to defend their homeland followed a wellestablished tradition of fighting foreign invaders.499 They had participated in the
Battle of New Orleans with success, as noted in President Andrew Jackson’s
recognition, that General Sir Edward Pakenham, the British commander, had been
shot by “a free man of color, who was a famous shot and came from the Attakapas
region of Louisiana,” perhaps a certain “Captain” Savary.500 It was not surprising

498

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 435-36.

499

See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 374.

500

See EDWIN ADAMS DAVIS, LOUISIANA, A NARRATIVE HISTORY 85 (1971) [hereinafter

E. A. DAVIS].
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that as the Civil War approached, a free black, Jordan Noble, who was the
drummer boy at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815, advertised and held meetings
in New Orleans, for those free blacks, who wanted to defend their homes.501
Accordingly, on April 23, 1861, the New Orleans Delta reported, “these men who
distinguished themselves at the Battle of New Orleans are determined to give new
evidence of their bravery.”502
Free blacks in Louisiana’s Pointe Coupee and Natchitoches Parishes formed
companies of Home Guards, soon after the Civil War began, and were reportedly
used to prevent uprisings of enslaved blacks.503 An affluent free black, Metoyer of
Natchitoches, was reported a Confederate captain in the cavalry, and another free
black from that area was a colonel.504 Free blacks in Plaquemines Parish organized
a militia company.505

501

See Mary F. Berry, Negro Troops in Blue and Gray: The Louisiana Native Guards,

1861-1863, 8 LA. HIST. 165, 167 (1967) [hereinafter BERRY].
502

See BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27, at 33.

503

See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 374.

504

See WOODS, supra note 472, at 38-39.

505

See generally MCCONNELL, supra note 374.
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One should not assume that the free blacks’ call to arms meant that they
agreed with the Confederate cause, as clearly evidenced in the Confederate leaders’
decision not to employ the free black “Home Guard” regiment, formed in New
Orleans.506 One noted scholar concluded that this disinclination of the state militia
to use the colored regiment evidenced their distrust of the free black soldier,
evidenced a Confederate policy not to use black troops, or evidenced some free
black soldiers were forced to join the Confederacy.507 One free black, Charles
Gibson, testified he was taken from his home, and forced to join the Confederacy.
Another colored officer reportedly said, “We were ordered out and dared not
refuse, for those who did so were killed and their property confiscated.”508 These
examples show the complexity of the motives that free blacks had for joining the
Confederate Army.
While the Confederacy apparently chose not to employ free black soldiers,
the Union leaders used them; they were outstanding soldiers in the Battle of Port

506

Id.

507

See BERRY, supra note 477, at 169.

508

Id. at 172.
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Hudson.509 Andrew Cailloux, a free black from New Orleans, was reportedly one
hero of the Battle.510 While the black mistress and her children were engaged in
some aspect of the Civil War, many of them who had thrived against legal
obstacles during the antebellum period did not live to see the ravages of the Civil
War.

C. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE CIVIL WAR

As for most southerners of every background, the Civil War had devastating
effects on the black mistress’s property ownership.511 For those black mistresses

509

Id. at 179-89.

510

Id.

511

See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 190:

Despite such professions of ‘common sympathy,’ the war and its aftermath
spelled disaster for the great majority of affluent free persons of color in the
Lower South. This is especially true in rural areas that had experienced the brunt
of Union attacks, but even in towns and cities, despite the ability of some wealthy
families to maintain their real estate holdings, there was a marked decline in the
wealth holdings of the majority.
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and their offspring, who owned enslaved blacks, the Civil War’s most significant
effect economically was the loss of their investment in enslaved blacks, resulting
from the Emancipation Proclamation.512 Enslaved blacks were the most significant
capital investment and a great source of virtually free labor; hence, with the
emancipation, work greatly slackened and a large decrease in profits resulted.513

512

Id. at 191:

When war commence (sic) it purty (sic) hard on folks,’ a free Negro in St. Mary
Parish, Louisiana, recalled. First came the Confederates who swept up the slaves,
including those owned by blacks, and took them away to build fortifications.
‘Dey (sic) line my daddy up with de others, but a white man from town say, ‘Dat
(sic) a good, old man. He (sic) part Indian and he (sic) free’.... So dey (sic) let
him go.’ Then Yankee raiding parties rode through, burning, pillaging, and
looting. ‘Dey (sic) tak (sic) a whole year crop of sugar and corn and horses.’
Everywhere the Union army advanced free blacks told of death and destruction.
‘The road all the way to Natchitoches,’ one observer said, describing the region
where some of the wealthiest free persons of color in America owned their
plantations, ‘was a solid flame.’ His heart was ‘filled with sadness’ at the sight of
those lovely plantations being burned to the ground. (Footnotes omitted.)

513

See Joe Gray Taylor, Slavery in Louisiana During the Civil War, 8 LA. HIST. 27, 33

(1967). See also, SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 193-94:
In addition, free persons of color in the city (of Charleston) lost an estimated
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The black mistress class, especially those with significant wealth, lost substantial
fortunes as a result of the economic effects of the Civil War.514 Still, some free

$216,000 in slave property when they were forced to free their bondsmen. In
New Orleans, a close study of creoles of color in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
wards, the heart of the free mulatto community, reveals a similar decline. Among
the 98 free persons of color listed in the 1860 and 1870 census returns, nearly half
experienced losses, only one of four kept their holdings intact, and 23 expanded
their wealth... carpenter Casimir Labat... was joined by 31 other propertied
antebellum men and women in the three wards who had lost everything.
(Footnotes omitted.)

514

See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 191-93:

While some of the Metoyer family escaped destruction, in St. Landry Parish,
despite declarations of loyalty to the United States, Antoine Meullion lost 30 head
of cattle, 150 sheep, 26 hogs, 5,000 fence rails to a band of Union soldiers under
the command of Nathaniel Banks. Pierre and Cyprian Ricard, descendants of the
wealthiest free person of color in the State, lost virtually everything during the
war. In 1868, a final 161 acres was seized by the Iberville Parish sheriff for
nonpayment of debts and sold at public auction. Similarly, the Ponis family in St.
John the Baptist Parish, the Verdun family in St. Mary Parish, the Deslonde in
Iberville Parish, and the Porche family in Pointe Coupee Parish witnessed the
disintegration of their antebellum fortunes during the war.... As with their white
neighbors, the problems in securing farmhands, the flooding and crop failures in
1866 and 1867, and the difficulties in obtaining credit forced many landholders
off the land, while pushing others to the brink of disaster. Within a few years
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mistresses and their offspring thrived financially, as a result of the War.515
after the war the vast majority of the wealthiest rural Negroes in antebellum
America–Louisiana’s creoles of color–had lost not only their slaves, farm
machinery, livestock, buildings, and personal possessions, but their land was
well.... In 1860, 121 Negro real-estate owners in Charleston (including a few near
the city but in the county) boasted holdings of more than $2,000; they owned a
total of $618,900, or $5,115 per property owner. A decade later, only 81 realty
owners were listed in the same category; they held $423,000, still $5,222 per
owner, but a large majority of the 1870 group–two out of three–had acquired their
holdings during the postwar period. (Footnotes omitted.)
515

Id. at 193-94:

Only a few affluent free persons of color escaped the war years unscathed. Those
who did had usually invested heavily in urban real estate (rather than slaves) or
maintained profitable businesses. In Charleston and New Orleans, despite
occupational declines and wartime destruction, a few prosperous free blacks
actually improved their economic standing following the Civil War. Charleston
engineer Anthony Weston, wood dealers Richard Dereef and Robert Howard,
butcher George Shrewsberry, and realtor William McKinlay, among the richest
antebellum mulattoes, either maintained their estates or improved their economic
position.... A similar situation existed in the Crescent City. Land speculator
Thomy Lafon, who became a large contributor to various black charities,
increased his wealth from $10,000 to $55,000 by speculating in swampland
during the Union occupation... another broker, Drauzin Barthelemy McCarty,
increased his fortune from $45,000 to $77,300 during the same period... landlord
Edmond Dupuy, whose $200,000 worth of real estate made him the second
wealthiest Negro in the South. (Footnotes omitted.)
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An analysis of the 1870 federal manuscript census shows the devastating
effect the Civil War and post-War economy had on the black mistress’s property
ownership. But first, a caveat: despite the War and post-War economic disasters, it
has been suggested that, in analyzing the plantation system in Louisiana, it not only
survived the Civil War, but also grew.516 This observation may be true of the
plantation system, but it hides the devastating effect the War had on individual
owners. Therefore, in analyzing the effects of the Civil War on the economic
situation of the black mistress, it is important to follow the names of the black
plantation owners and their families.
The following conclusions about the social and economic effects that the
Civil War had on the black mistress class are based on the author’s analysis of the
1870 manuscript census for rural Louisiana. We begin with an analysis of black
mistress’s property ownership in rural Louisiana, as, prior to the Civil War, some
of the wealthiest black masters in the South resided in Louisiana.517
The black mistress class in Iberville Parish, for example, experienced a great

516

Roger Wallace Shugg, Survival of the Plantation System in Louisiana, 3 J. OF SO.

HIST. 311 (1937).
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decline in their property ownership.518 In 1860, there were six blacks in the black
mistress class, one of whom, Durand, was in partnership with Dubuclet, owning
plantations of over 3,299 acres (of which 1,595 were improved), valued at a total

517

See SCHWENINGER, supra note 29, at 191-92.

518

Id. at 121:

In Iberville Parish, by 1860, nine (black) plantation owners were listed as having
$646,000 in real estate, or $71,778 per family. Census takers probably included
some personal property in these valuations, but even so Zacharie Honore
increased his land holdings from $20,000 to $60,000; Antoine Dubuclet, from
$87,500 to $200,000; George Deslonde (and his wife), from $65,000 to $115,000;
and Madam and Pierre Ricard, from $80,000 to $200,000. In 1859, one observer
described the Ricard family as ‘doubtless the richest black family in this or any
other country. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)

Id. at 191-92:

Pierre and Cyprien Ricard, descendants of the wealthiest free person of color in
the state, lost virtually everything during the war. In 1868, a final 161 acres was
seized by the Iberville Parish sheriff for nonpayment of debts and sold at public
auction.... During the war, Antoine and Josephine Decuir, once among the richest
free mulattoes in America, were forced to mortgage their house, the adjoining
land, and even their crops.
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of $125,730.519 By 1870, only two of them–Augustin Dubuclet and Madame F. Z.
(sic) Honore –were still listed as “planters,” owning a total of 488 acres worth
$1,650 (in 1860, they owned a total of 348 acres, worth $42,006).520 (The reason
for the increase in the total acreage owned by the two was due to Madame C.
Ricard, who is not listed in the agricultural census, but as living on the Honore
household. It is likely that some of her property was credited to Honore.)
An example of the economic ruin suffered by the black mistress class
following the Civil War was that of the Ricard family. Before the Civil War,
Madame C. Ricard and her sons had purchased their second plantation; the two
plantations had been valued at a quarter of a million dollars.521 In the 1870
manuscript census, Widow P.C. Ricard, aged eighty years old, is listed as living in
the house of Madame F.Z. Honore, and is listed as not owning any real or personal
property.522 Her son, Pierre, is not listed and is presumably dead. And although
three of her other sons are listed Emile T. Ricard–music teacher; Joseph Ricard–

519

See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

520

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

521

See supra note 363.
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carpenter; and Lucien Ricard–carpenter, none of them is listed as owning any real
or personal property.523 The Ricard family, one of the wealthiest black families in
the country, had become impoverished.
A review of the changed fortunes of Claire Poland and Antoine Dubuclet
shows how some black mistresses faced economic ruin following the War. In
1852, the succession papers of Dubuclet’s wife, Claire Polard Dubuclet, show that
she left $82,076.25 of real property and enslaved blacks to her family.524
According to the 1860 manuscript census, Antoine Dubuclet owned real property
worth $200,000.525 But, by 1870, the value of his real property was $40,000.526
And, in 1888, in Antoine Dubuclet’s succession papers, he left his family

522

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

523

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

524

Succession papers of Claire Polard Dubuclet, November 18, 1852, Iberville Parish

Courthouse.
525

See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

526

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
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$1,130.76 of real estate, rights, and credits.527
The free black mistress class went from landed gentry to other occupations,
including Antoine Dubuclet, who became Louisiana’s State Treasurer; Alcide
Durand (probably Pierre Durand’s son) who became a carpenter (along with Pierre
Cyprien Ricard, who was not listed and was perhaps dead; and his mother Widow
P.C. Ricard, listed as “at home,” probably retired).528 The most accomplished of
all the Iberville Parish black mistress class was Antoine Dubuclet. He became
State Treasurer during Reconstruction, using the accounting skills that he learned
as a planter to help the freedmen and the State of Louisiana to “keep the books.”
White critics sought to hold him responsible for the heavy spending on social
programs (like the first public school system) and accused him of corrupt dealings
during his service from 1868 to 1879. One free black writer, Rodolphe Lucien
Desdunes, defended Dubuclet’s integrity and his accounting abilities:
Some of the most eminent politicians of Louisiana came–determined
to find irregularities in Dubuclet’s records, but to no avail. The
Aldiger Committee was at this time actually created for the one

527

Succession papers of Antoine Dubuclet, April 2, 1888, Iberville Parish Courthouse.

528

Id.
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purpose of examining Dubuclet’s accounts.
The men of the committee, in order to achieve this end, secured the
services of three of the most reliable experts in the field of accounting.
For six months the investigation continued. The group made every
effort to prove Dubuclet guilty but his integrity prevailed. In any
other case, a person who had proved himself so clean would have
been given high commendation but not Dubuclet, for he was a Creole
of color.529
Another effect that economic ruin had on the black mistress class was a
social one: the loss of status that the white enslavement social-economy provided,
and the fear of being classified commonly with the newly freed, formerly enslaved
blacks.530 As in the case of Antoine Dubuclet and others, the response was one of

529

See DESDUNES, supra note 374, at 74-75.

530

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 390-92:

Black life from Reconstruction to present cannot be fully understood without
taking into account the long-standing differences between these free Negroes and
the masses of the former slaves. Well into the twentieth century, the descendants
of the free Negro elite maintained their lofty status within black society.... The
legacy of the free Negro caste was not confined to these lingering enmities. Most
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leadership, about 30% of the black leadership in New Orleans during
Reconstruction had owned enslaved blacks before the War.531 Some of the black
mistress class “passed over” into the white race if they could. Two such cases of
“passing over” that appear in the 1870 manuscript census, were those of Augustin
Dubuclet and Emile T. Ricard.532 Both had been listed in previous censuses as
being “mulattoes.”533 But, in the 1870 census, they were listed by the census-taker,
who happened to be P.G. Deslondes, a free mulatto and a family friend, as being
free Negroes did not belong to the elite and felt little sympathy for its pretensions.
Tied closely to the former slaves by blood, marriage, religious affiliation, and
work habits and alienated from whites, the vast majority of free blacks greeted
Emancipation with the same wild enthusiasm as did the mass of enthralled blacks.
If freedom within the slave society had made free Negroes leaders without a
following, Emancipation restored their constituency.... Economic changes
unleashed by Emancipation also pushed freemen and freedmen together.
Emancipation eroded the paternalism which had encouraged whites to patronize
free Negro tradesmen by depriving these whites of the gratification they received
from being served by those of lower status than themselves.

531

See David C. Rankin, The Origins of Black Leadership in New Orleans During

Reconstruction, 40 J. SO. HIST. 417 (1974) [hereinafter RANKIN].
532

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

533

See the 1850 and 1860 manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
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“white.”534 (Pierre G. Deslonde was Louisiana’s Secretary of State during
Reconstruction, 1872-1876.)
Some black mistresses were less affected by the Civil War. One group in
Louisiana that prospered, for example, despite the War, was the sugar and rice
planters in Plaquemines Parish.535 In Plaquemines Parish in 1850, there were three
in the black mistress class who were sugar planters–Andrew Durnford, Charles
Reggio, and Adolphe Reggio–who produced a total of 730 hogsheads of cane sugar
and 36,000 gallons of molasses (the Reggio brothers had produced 530 hogsheads
of cane sugar and 2,000 gallons of molasses of those total figures).536 Andrew
Durnford died shortly before the Civil War and the 1870 manuscript census does
not list any Durnfords in Plaquemines Parish.537 And Charles and Adolphe Reggio
were not listed in the 1870 agricultural census.538
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See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

535

Id.
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Id.
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Id.

538

Id.
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However, there is a strong indication that the Reggio brothers did continue
sugar production after the Civil War. In the 1850 manuscript census, Charles
Reggio is listed as a “sugar planter,” who owned $18,000 of real property,539 and
Adolphe Reggio is listed as a “sugar planter,” who owned $70,000 of real
property.540 In the 1870 manuscript census, they are both still listed as “sugar
planters,” with Charles owning $35,000 of real property, and Adolphe owning
$25,000 of real property.541 It seems obvious that the Reggio brothers of
Plaquemines continued their economic holdings and production after the Civil
War.
Black mistresses who were rice planters in Plaquemines Parish did even
better. The 1850 manuscript census listed the names of six black masters families
who grew rice: Duplessis, Lafrance, Larche, Barthelemy, Paul, and Baptiste,
producing 178,000 pounds of rice in 1850.542 According to the 1870 manuscript
census, they continued rice production, after the War: Duplessis, Lafrance,

539

See the 1850 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

540

See the 1850 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

541

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
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Barthelemy, and Baptiste, with their relatives Ancar, St. Anne, Sylve, File,
Lightell, Dinet, Encalador, Moliere, and possibly others, producing 131,220
pounds of rice, or 1.5% of the 8,639,026 total pounds of rice produced in
Plaquemines Parish according to the 1870 agricultural census.543
After the Civil War, the black mistress class spread its landholdings to
family members. With the loss of their enslaved labor, the black mistresses faced
the problem of holding on to the land and farming it. For example, in 1860, Jesse
Ashworth of Calcasieu Parish owned $31,500 of real property and personal
property;544 in 1870, he is listed as owning $1,500 of real and personal property.545
Yet in 1870, there are four other Ashworth households, listed in 1870, with a total
of $1400 of real property and personal property.546
Another example of the black mistress distributing land to her family was

542

See the 1850 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

543

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

544

See the 1860 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.

545

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

546

See the 1870 manuscript census for rural Louisiana.
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that of the Boutte family of St. Mary Parish (Iberia in 1870). The 1860 census
listed four families named Boutte in St. Mary Parish, owning a total of $8,800 of
real property, two of which owned a total of 22 enslaved blacks.547 With the
emancipation of their 22 enslaved blacks, the Bouttes apparently divided their
farms between their children and relatives to continue production. In the 1870
census, there are fifteen families named Boutte listed as owners of a total of
$15,200 of real property.548 So that the Bouttes, in distributing their land to
relatives, increased (nearly doubled) the value of their land.
Was it possible that the same Bouttes named in the 1870 census were the
former enslaved blacks that the Bouttes owned? This seems unlikely, because all
of the Bouttes’ enslaved blacks, according to the 1860 “slave” schedule, were
listed as “black,” while all of the Bouttes listed in 1860, were listed “mulatto.”549
In 1870, all the Bouttes who owned property were listed as “mulatto,” and
probably were not former enslaved blacks (this assumes that having real property
did not automatically “change” one’s skin color in the census-takers’ eyes).

547

See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

548

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
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In some cases after the Civil War, some blacks, other than of the black
mistress class, obtained large tracts of land, including some former enslaved blacks
and some Northern blacks who fought for the Union in the Civil War. An example
of the former was Arthur Sheff, a black born in Louisiana, and listed in the 1870
manuscript census as being 27 years old and owning an estate in Iberville Parish
worth $20,000.550 An example of a Northern black owning property in Louisiana
was Edward Butler of Plaquemines Parish, who was 27 years old, born in
Massachusetts, was the parish recorder of Plaquemines, and owned $1,900 in real
and personal property.551
The black mistress class that survived the Civil War faced economic
depression and increased taxes in the 1870s. There was a decrease in the value of
the property in Natchitoches Parish, for example, from $8 million in 1861, to about
$1.25 million by 1873. The result was an increase in the parish tax from 1.6 mills
in Natchitoches Parish in 1861, to 64.5 mills in 1873. The result of this economic
depression and increased taxes was the forced tax sales of land. The Natchitoches

549

See the 1860 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.

550

See the 1870 population and agricultural manuscript censuses for rural Louisiana.
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People’s Vindicator reported 30,000 acres of land “offered at sale for taxes.” The
Shreveport Times a few weeks sooner had protested: “Under the present
government [William Pitt Kellogg, who led white rule against black political
leadership during the Reconstruction] of thieves, in God’s name, what hope have
the people of Louisiana before them?”552
Hence, the black mistress class was impacted by the Civil War and
Reconstruction. The social response varied–some became leaders for the newly
freed, formerly enslaved blacks, while some “passed over” to the white race.
Some continued their land ownership, by distributing it to their relatives, but few
continued their production after the War. While different black mistresses
experienced the War in different ways, one fact is clear: the group was generally
economically ruined by the Civil War, and by the depression and rise in taxes,
during the following Reconstruction. Few were to enjoy the property and social
status they had once enjoyed during the enslavement period.

D.

RECONSTRUCTION: U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL EFFORTS AT

551

Id.

552

See E. A. DAVIS, supra note 500, at 274.
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BLACK CITIZENSHIP AND MISCEGENATION553

As a result of the Civil War and its aftermath, the legal status of enslaved
blacks changed radically.554 The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

553

See generally Charles Vincent, Black Constitution Makers: the Constitution of 1868, in

IN SEARCH OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW: LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONS 1812-1974 (Warren M.
Billings & Edward F. Haas, eds., 1993); ROGER A. FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN
LOUISIANA 1862-1877 (1974); Germaine A. Reed, Race Legislation in Louisiana, 1864-1920, 6
LA. HIST. 379 (1965); HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH Ch. 8
(1978); BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27, HOWARD ASHLEY WHITE, THE FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU IN LOUISIANA (1970).
554

See BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 55-63:

Historians have cited humanitarian concerns, political realities, and a desire to
punish the South as factors explaining the enactment of the civil rights
amendments. But Dr. Mary Frances Berry suggests that the necessity and selfinterest in utilizing large numbers of black troops during the conflict largely
determined the measures aimed at securing emancipation and granting citizenship
and suffrage during the postwar years.... Even without Dr. Berry’s theory, it is
beyond dispute that the Republicans recognized that unless some action was taken
to legitimate the freedmen’s status, Southerners would utilize violence to force
blacks into slavery, thereby renewing the economic dispute that had led to the
Civil War. To avoid this result, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and
Civil Rights Acts of 1870-1875 were enacted. They were the work of the Radical
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legally abolished enslavement.555 Unfortunately, it did not abolish or eradicate
Reconstructionists, some of whom were deeply committed to securing the rights
of citizenship for the freedmen. For most Republicans, however, a more general
motivation was the desire to maintain Republican party control in the Southern
states and in Congress.

See also, RECONSTRUCTION, AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS (Kenneth M. Stampp &
Leon Litwack eds., 1969) [hereinafter STAMPP, RECONSTRUCTION], especially Chapter 9, Joel
Williamson’s “The Meaning of Freedom,” at 193-219:

Thus, even in the early days of freedom, former slaves with amazing unanimity
revealed– by mass desertion, migration, idleness, by the breaching of the infinite
minor regulations of slavery, by a new candor in relationships with whites, and by
their ambition to acquire land–a determination to put an end to their slavery.... In
a sense, far from being the disaster so often described, Reconstruction was for the
Negroes of South Carolina a period of unequal progress.

555

The Thirteenth Amendment provides:

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.

as cited in BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 56 n.6.
But see BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 56 (“Enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment
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economic enslavement.556 In order to ensure their citizenship, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, expressly recognizing that former enslaved blacks, now
called “freedmen,”557 required the right to property and the right to contract.558

ended the Constitution’s protection of slavery, but did not resolve the issue of the newly freed
slaves’ political status.”) Nor did it resolve the issue of the newly free blacks’ economic status!
556

See generally BLASSINGAME, BLACK, supra note 27.

557

The term “freedmen” is the term that the federal government used to describe the

newly freed, formerly enslaved black following the Civil War. From a critical perspective, it
hints of white property rights in the newly freed blacks. An alternative, liberating term, such as
“free people,” would have been better descriptive of blacks’ self-determination, and of their new
and inherent status as full citizens. On the contrary, the term “freed”-men has as an underlying
connotation, that someone (Northern whites) had freed enslaved black “men,” and, as a result,
the “freedmen” should be politically grateful, and, therefore, had a debt or obligation to pay
(northern white Republicans) for their “emancipation” or freedom.
558

The rights of the formerly enslaved blacks, to contract for property, and to enjoy other

property rights, were expressly provided for in Section One of the Civil Right Act of 1866:

That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full
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That effort at guaranteeing freedmen full rights of citizenship resulted in the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.559 The Fifteenth Amendment provided the
freedmen the right to vote, but only freed black men.560 On the other hand, the
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains
and penalties and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis added in bold-faced.)

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
559

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
persons of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

as cited in BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 56, n.7.
560

See BELL, RACE, supra note 36, at 55, n.10:

Adopted in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited the denial of the right to
vote to United States citizens because of ‘race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.’ Congress was empowered to enforce the provision ‘by appropriate
legislation.’ The fate of post-Civil War laws is reviewed in name Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH L. REV. 1323 (1952) (sic).
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black woman’s struggle for full economic and legal equality in America was not
won, either by constitutional amendments or by federal legislation; it had merely
entered into another phase.
After Reconstruction, a new era of white oppression of blacks would
begin.561 In the meanwhile, during Reconstruction, many blacks especially those

Of course, the Fifteenth Amendment did not provide protection for the right to vote, on the basis
of gender!
561

See generally VAN WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64. See also supra note 129:

See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 76, 77: ‘Reconstruction’s egalitarian spirit had
posed challenges to antimiscegenation laws, but these challenges were typically
short-lived. South Carolina’s history is instructive in this regard. Prior to the
Civil War, the state had declined to prohibit interracial marriage, but immediately
following the abolition of slavery, white authorities enacted an antimiscegenation
statute. Reformers removed the barrier in 1868, only to see it be reenacted in
1879. In 1895 white supremacists embedded the prohibition in the state
constitution, where it remained for 103 years.’

Professor Kennedy also points out:

The same dynamic led to revisions of existing antimiscegenation laws in Alabama
and Mississippi. Alabama changed its laws to render all interracial marriages null
and void, while Mississippi increased the punishment for the violation of its
prohibition on interracial marriage: persons engaged in such unions, the state
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who were formerly enslaved enjoyed the many benefits of American citizenship
for the first time.562 That included the right to contract to marry with a person of
the opposition race; the interracial sexual order was changed briefly during
Reconstruction, allowing for many, for the first time, the right of interracial
couples to legally marry.563 This change provided some Reconstruction state
declared, could be confined to the penitentiary for life. See Alabama Constitution
of 1865, art. 4, sec. 31; Miss. Session Laws ch. 4, sec. 3 (1865). See also Peter
W. Bardaglio, Reconstructing the Household: Families, Sex, and the Law in the
Nineteenth-Century South (1995), 179.

Id. at 77, n.*.
562

See generally STAMPP, RECONSTRUCTION, supra 554.

563

See supra note 126:

See KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 254: ‘During Reconstruction, the color bar at the
altar was breached in several places. For a brief period, Alabama’s supreme court
invalidated that state’s antimiscegenation law, and when reformers friendly to
Reconstruction overhauled the laws of Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina,
they dropped existing antimiscegenation provisions from the statute books.
Reconstructionists likewise repealed Louisiana’s bar on mixed marriages.
(Footnotes omitted.)’

See, e.g., infra note 577, Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss & Elder, Administrators, 1874 WL 3865
(La. 1874), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court validated a “marriage” between E.C. Hart, a
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Supreme Courts the opportunity to remedy some of the wrongs committed during
enslavement. In Louisiana, this changed how antebellum laws on concubinage
operated, by focusing in on the “afterwards married” exception in the statute.564

white man, and Cornelia Hart, a colored woman.
But see, supra note 127:

See MORAN, supra note 112, at 5-6: ‘During Reconstruction, the state high court
in Alabama declared a ban of interracial marriage unconstitutional but reversed
itself shortly thereafter. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld an antimiscegenation
statute in Pace v. Alabama (106 U.S. 583 (1883)) in 1883, thereby cementing the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ marriages and families. Only one state court
declared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional after the Pace decision. In
1948, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Sharp(32 Cal. 2d 711, 948 P.2d
17 (1948)) concluded that prohibition of interracial marriage violated the principle
of racial equality and interfered with liberty to choose a spouse. (Footnotes
omitted, case citations added.)
See also KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 22:

During the reaction against Reconstruction, white supremacists exploited fears of
interracial intimacy as perhaps the major justification for subverting the civil and
political rights that had been granted to blacks, and the major reason for confining
blacks to their degraded ‘place’ at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

564

See LA. CIV. CODE, art. 1481 (1870), repealed by 1987 La. Acts No. 468, § 1:
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Louisiana Reconstruction courts were, for a short time, presented a rare
opportunity to provide long-overdue property inheritance rights to black women.
These cases, as were those during the antebellum period, involved “concubine”
relationships, between white men and their now formerly, enslaved black women,
and her miscegenational children.565 The following cases show how the politicaleconomic order changed in the South during Reconstruction.566
In 1873, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the case of Fowler, Morgan
and als. (sic) v. Ellen Morgan Individually and as Tutrix.567 In Morgan, the
deceased James S. Morgan was a white man whose legitimate white children from
a prior marriage (“forced heirs” under Louisiana law) sued to void an inter vivos
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively
incapable of making to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa,
any donation of immovables, ; and if they make a donation of movables,
it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value of their estate. Those
who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule. (Emphasis added.)
565

See supra, Section IV, for a discussion and analysis of Louisiana’s antebellum statute

and cases on concubinage.
566

See supra note 126, on the changes concerning miscegenation law in the South, during

Reconstruction.
567

Fowler, Morgan and als. (sic) v. Ellen Morgan Individually and as Tutrix, 25 La. Ann.
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gift Morgan made to his then enslaved mixed-race daughters. Morgan had also
granted them along with their then enslaved black mother, Ellen Morgan, their
freedom at a future time.568 Morgan’s inter vivos to his mixed-race children was
given before the parish recorder, where he also legally acknowledged them,569 and
was accepted by a third party to hold until the children were freed.570 (Today we
would analyze such a transaction as a semi-secret trust.571)

206, 1873 WL 6956 (La. 1873).
568

Id.

569

Id.

570

Id. at *2.

571

Id., although Louisiana did not, at the time, embrace trust law. Morgan is a precursor

of the “semisecret” trust. See, e.g., Pfahl v. Pfahl, 10 Ohio Misc. 234, 225 N.E.2d 305 (1967).
The semisecret trust came into vogue in the 1920s, when wealthy white, married “gentlemen”
established financial security for their “flapper” mistresses. See also JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUST, AND ESTATES 616-17 (2000) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Trust § 55, Comment h (1959), as expressing the viewpoint that a constructive trust
should be imposed in favor of the intended beneficiary in the semisecret, as well as secret, trust
situation. But see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 18, Comment c (T.D. No. 1, 1996), agrees, but
admits that enforcing a semisecret trust by imposing a constructive trust “probably does not
reflect the current weight of authority.”)
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The Court noted that under Article 193 of the Louisiana Civil Code572
Morgan’s miscegenational children whom he had legally acknowledged could
receive gifts when they became free and, thereby, could inherit.573 The Court held
that, as these events had occurred, it “could see no circumstances in this case
which would have defeated the rights of the (miscegenational) children of the
defendant, whatever may be the moral view of the question. (Emphasis added.)”574
In 1864, Louisiana as well as all Southern states amended its State
Constitution to comply with the federal constitutional changes which represented a

572

Fowler, Morgan and als. (sic) v. Ellen Morgan Individually and as Tutrix, 25 La. Ann.

206, 1873 WL 6956, at *2 (La. 1873), quoting La. Civ. Code, art. 193 (1825) stated:

The slave who has acquired the right of being free at a future time, is from that
time capable of receiving testament or donations. Property given or devised to
him must be preserved for him, in order to be delivered to him in kind, when his
emancipation shall take place. In the meantime it must be administered by a
curator.

In this author’s mind, this arrangement is very similar if not identical to a semisecret trust.
573

Morgan, 1873 WL 6956 (La. 1873) at *2.

574

Id.
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sea change from the “Black Code” of antebellum enslavement days.575 The effects
of this change are seen in the case of Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss and Elder,
Administrators.576 In that case, there was a battle over a large estate in Caddo
Parish, Louisiana, for which succession was opened in 1869.577 Cornelia Hart, a
former enslaved black woman, sued on behalf of her children with E. C. Hart, who
was a white man.578 The black Cornelia Hart and white E. C. Hart had lived in
open concubinage for several years and produced several children. They were
married in November, 1867.579
E. C. Hart’s white collateral heirs also sued claiming that Cornelia Hart was

575

See generally QUIGLEY, supra note 51.

576

Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL

3865 (La. 1874).
577

Id. at *1.

578

Id.

579

Id. at *1-2. According to the Court, a Roman Catholic priest performed the marriage,

and the verbal process was written out and signed by the couple, three witnesses, and the
officiating priest. “No marriage license was issued, and no return was made of the act of
celebration for record. Subsequently the children were baptized by the same priest, of which he
furnished a certificate.” Id. at *2.
Page 271 of 302

Blackness as Property
a woman of color and was legally prohibited from marrying E. C. Hart and their
miscegenational children “could not be legitimated by a marriage subsequent to
their conception and birth.”580 They also claimed that even if the marriage
occurred, it was a “private marriage,” and that “proof of that class of marriages can
only be made by notarial act executed by the parties in conformity with the
provisions of that act.”581 They further claimed that illegitimate children could not
inherit until they were legitimated.582
The black Mrs. Hart’s counsel argued that “at the date of the marriage of E.
C. Hart to Cornelia there was no law prohibiting the marriage; that the children of
that marriage may and have availed themselves of the existing laws of the State to
establish their legitimacy and their right to inherit their father’s estate. Civil Code,

580

Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL

3865, at *2 (La. 1874).
581

Id., citing Louisiana Statute “of 1868, No. 210, pages 278 and 279.”

582

Id. at *2, citing Louisiana Civil Code, articles 180, 198, and 200. . . 204 (sic), stating

that acknowledgment of an illegitimate child should not be made in favor of children whose
parents were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception, and that legitimization,
as prescribed in articles 180, 198, and 200 of the Louisiana Civil Code, could only occur by the
formal acknowledgment of a white father, before a notary and two witnesses.
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articles 208 and 209.”583 As such, the moment the law was changed permitting
interracial marriage, it was arguably lawful to legitimate the black children of
white men in the same way that their white children were legitimated.
In disposing of the case, the Court first reviewed the language of the Civil
Rights Act.584 The Court next noted that, under Louisiana’s State Constitution of

583

Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL

3865, at *2 (La. 1874).
584

The first section of the Civil Rights Act declares ‘that all

persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.’

Id. at *3, Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
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1864, title 1, article 1, “Slavery and involuntary servitude, except a punishment for
crime, whereof the party shall have been convicted, are hereby forever abolished
and prohibited throughout the State.”585 The Court found that Louisiana law
considered marriage as a civil contract (C.C. art. 86),586 “Cornelia Hart, therefore,
in November 1867, was vested with the right to enter into a contract of
marriage.”587 The Court concluded that the religious ceremony that the Harts used
to marry fulfilled the requirements for a valid marriage,588 and, as the Louisiana
Constitution (Article 149), retroactively recognized prior “marriages made in good
faith,”589 their marriage was valid.590

585

Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL

3865, at *3 (La. 1874).
586

Id., citing Article 90 of the Code: “As the law considers marriage in no other view

than that of a civil contract, it sanctions all those marriages where the parties at the time of
making them were, first willing to contract; second, able to contract; and third, did contract
pursuant to the forms and solemnities presented by law.” Id. at *3.
587

Id.

588

Id.

589

Id. at *4, citing Code, Art. 149, in pertinent part: “All... marriages and executed

contracts, made in good faith and in accordance with existing laws in this State, rendered, made
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The Court next discussed the issue of the legitimacy of the Harts’ mixedrace children.591 The issue was whether E. C. Hart could legally recognize the
children in that “acknowledgment,” under Louisiana law, must be proven by “a
transcript from the birth or baptism kept agreeably to law or the usages of the
county,”592 and other means of proving legitimacy.593 The Court decided that Mrs.
Hart, on behalf of her children, had met those tests.594 Hence, the Court awarded
the E. C. Hart’s estate to his black wife and mixed-race children.595

or entered into between the twenty-sixth day of January 1861, and the date when this constitution
shall be adopted, are hereby declared to be valid....” Id. at *4.
590

Cornelia Hart, Tutrix v. Hoss and Elder, Administrators, 26 La. Ann 90, 1874 WL

3865, at *4 (La. 1874).
591

Id.

592

Id.

593

Id. at *4-5, wherein the Court found that according to La. Rev. Civ. Code, article 198,

acknowledgment may be made by the contract of marriage; or under article 208, there were other
ways that legitimacy could be proven, such as private writings, public acknowledgments,
education, and open concubinage.
594

Id. at *5.

595

Id.
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In summary, for a brief time during Reconstruction, Southern state
legislatures recognized the importance of transferring wealth from white men to
their black wives and mixed race children. In Louisiana, the Reconstruction
Legislature did so, by permitting interracial marriage contracts, and by making it
easier than it had been for antebellum miscegenational children to prove paternity.
This allowed miscegenational families born out of “concubinage” to receive the
state’s blessings of marriage and legitimacy, and allowed them to prove paternity
in the same way as for white children.596

E.

THE BLACK WOMAN’S STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL AND
SEXUAL EQUALITY

During the post-Reconstruction period, the black woman entered into
another phase in her continuing legal battle for economic and civil equality, if not

596

See La. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 208. See also Blasini v. Succession of Silvestre Blasini, 30

La. Ann. 1388, 1878 WL 8609 (La. 1878), wherein “colored” children of a white man and a
Mexican women established their parents lived in “open concubinage” and thereby were
awarded to share in their father’s estate along with their white half-brothers and half-sisters.
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civility.597 In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson598 set the legal
standard for three decades of legal racial discrimination.599
Less known is the case of Mrs. Josephine Decuir, a black women of the
black mistress class, who, like Plessy, fought for racial equality, in addition, to
sexual equality.600 In 1873, “Madame” Decuir filed suit against a steamboat

597

See generally KEITH WELDON MEDLEY, WE AS FREEMAN: PLESSY V. FERGUSON

(2003). In 1890, as Reconstruction was failing, the New Orleans Comite des Citoyens was
founded to fight “Jim Crow” racial segregation legislation. It targeted an 1890 local statute
requiring passenger railroads in Louisiana to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the
white, and the colored races.”

In Louisiana ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 74

(La. 1892) the Louisiana Supreme Court held the segregation statute unconstitutional, as applied
to interstate commerce. As a result, the Comite encouraged Homere Plessy to challenge the
applicability of the statute vis-a-vis interstate transportation. Plessy established the
constitutionality of racial segregation under the banner of “separate but equal,” which meant
social and economic inequality became the law of the land until Brown v. Board of Education,
387 U.S. 483 (1954).
598

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

599

See generally ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE,

CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
600

Mrs. Josephine Decuir v. John G. Benson, Docket #7800, Supreme Court of Louisiana

Collection, Department of Special Collections, University of New Orleans; Frederick Way, Jr.,
comp., Way’s Packet Directory, 1848-1943 (Athens, Ohio, 1983), as cited in Kathryn Page,
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owner, citing Article 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1868, and a state statute,
both of which forbade racial discrimination in certain public places.601 Decuir, like
many black mistress, faced the loss of favored status, that white society had

“Defiant Women and the Supreme Court of Louisiana,” in BILLINGS, supra note 140:

On 20 July 1872, the widow boarded the steamboat Governor Allen at New
Orleans. Because she was of mixed white and black racial background, a femme
de couleur, Decuir was denied a stateroom in the so-called ladies cabin, an area
reserved for the exclusive use of white women. Instead, the cabin steward
directed her to a stateroom set aside for freedwomen and freedmen located in an
area called the ‘colored bureau.’ Decuir declined to accept such accommodations
and spent the night sitting in a chair at the rear of a public area reserved for white
women. She was not permitted to eat in the dining area with other cabin
passengers; instead, her meals were brought to her, and a second chair served as
her table. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 184-85.

It is noteworthy that although there was a designated white women’s cabin separate from the
white men’s cabin, there was no distinction made between the sexes in the area reserved for
African Americans. Female and male black passengers were assigned rooms in the same area.
(Footnote omitted.)

Id. at 186. See also FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 30.
601

See BILLINGS, supra note 140, at 185.
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provided her prior to the Civil War.602 Madame Decuir won the case at the trial
level, and was awarded a thousand dollars in actual damages.603
Benson, the ship’s owner, appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and

602

Id., at 186-87.

Madame Decuir’s presence before the bar posed a dilemma. Here was an
educated woman, described by the white trial judge... as a genteel ‘lady of color’
who was modest, neat, and ‘quite fair for one of mixed blood’ and whose facial
features were ‘rather delicate.’ Decuir was never a slave, but the color of her skin
defined her not as a ‘lady’ but as a black woman. Were she white, there would be
no question that Josephine Decuir fit the southern definition of an ideal ‘lady’; a
woman of purity, modesty, and refinement, fully deserving of male protection–be
they black or white. (Footnote omitted.)

Id. at 187.

One of her attorneys attempted to establish her claim for equal treatment, arguing
that a lady such as Decuir plainly could not undress for bed on deck ‘on account
of delicacy.’ Furthermore, he averred, she was shocked, shamed, and mortified
when subjected to the vulgar conversation of the crew and everyone else on the
boat who passed by her.

Id.
603

Id.
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lost.604 He then took the case to the United States Supreme Court, who, in 1877,
found that the Louisiana State Constitutional provision prohibiting racial
desegregation was unconstitutional, as it involved interstate commerce which was
under federal jurisdiction.605 The Court then concluded that the steamboat owner
had the right to adopt such “reasonable regulations,” as appropriate to conduct his
business, including racially discriminating against black women.606 Hence, the
Court held that a state could not prohibit segregation on a common carrier.607

604

Id.

605

Id. at 188.

606

Id.

607

See VAN WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64, at 70-71:

The cumulative weakening of resistance to racism was expressed also in a
succession of decisions by the United States Supreme Court between 1873 and
1898 that require no (sic) review here. In the Slaughter House Cases of 1873 and
in the United States v. Reese and United States v. Cruikshank in 1876, the court
drastically curtailed the privileges and immunities recognized as being under
federal protection. It continued the trend in its decision on the Civil Rights Cases
of 1883 by virtually nullifying the restrictive part of the Civil Rights Act. By a
species of what Justice Harlan in his dissent described as ‘subtle and ingenious
verbal criticism,’ the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress
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Hence, Mrs. Josephine Decuir, a black mistress’s offspring, joined the ranks
of other African-American women, including the modern day Rosa Parks,608 in

the power to restrain states but not individuals from acts of racial discrimination
and segregation. The court, like the liberals, was engaged in a bit of
reconciliation- reconciliation between federal and state jurisdictions, as well as
between North and South. Having ruled in a previous case (Hall v. de Cuir, (sic)
1877) that a state could notprohibit segregation on a common carrier, the Court
in 1890 (Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railroad v. Mississippi) ruled that a
state could constitutionally require segregation on carriers. In Plessy v. Ferguson,
decided in 1896, the Court subscribed to the doctrine that ‘legislation is powerless
to eradicate racial instincts’ and laid down the ‘separate but equal’ rule for the
justification of segregation. Two years later, in 1898, in Williams v. Mississippi,
the Court completed the opening of the legal road to proscription, segregation,
and disenfranchisement by approving the Mississippi plan for depriving Negroes
of the franchise.
608

See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE, AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS,

1954-1965, 66-67 (1987):

In 1955, Rosa Parks was a quiet but strong-willed woman of forty-three.... On
Thursday, December 1,... Parks boarded a bus at Court Square. She sat down in
the first row of the middle section of seats, an area open to blacks as long as no
whites were left standing. At the next stop–the Empire Theatre–some whites got
on, filing all the white-only seats. One white man was left standing. The bus
driver... told Parks and the other three blacks in the fifth row to get up so that the
white man could sit down. Nobody moved.... Parks was taken in a police car to
the city jail, where she was booked for violating the law banning integration. She
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fighting for both racial and sexual equality. Their legacy and perseverance have
served all Americans.
*

*

*

Black women who were enslaved enjoyed no property rights, were legally
deemed property, and did not control their own sexuality. Black women who were
free enjoyed limited property rights, but as friendly aliens, not as full citizens. For
a time during the Civil War, free and enslaved blacks fought, voluntarily and
involuntarily, for the Confederacy. During Reconstruction, many of the
restrictions on black property rights, including prohibitions against interracial
marriage, were lifted, allowing some miscegenational relationships to receive the
property benefits of marriage. But this was short lived, and post-Reconstruction,
“Jim Crow” laws were harsher than the antebellum, anti-miscegenation laws.
While black enslavement was formally abolished with the Thirteenth Amendment,
black women were just beginning to face new and long-lasting struggles for racial
and sexual equality.

longed for a drink of water to soothe her dry throat. ‘But they wouldn’t permit
me to drink out of the water fountain,’ she recalls. ‘It was for whites only.’
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VII. BLACKNESS AS PROPERTY AND CURRENT REFLECTIONS ON
BLACK PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

A.

MISCEGENATION, BLACK WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND BELL’S “INTEREST-CONVERGENCE” PRINCIPLE

Antebellum, Southern legal principles, regulating sexual relationships
between white men and black women, and black women’s property rights, test
Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle. Bell’s “interest-convergence”
principle, relative to Critical Race Theory, states: “Translated from judicial
activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this principle of ‘interest
convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”609
This article described and analyzed the nature of sex, race, status, and
wealth, through the law of miscegenation and black women’s property rights, in
the antebellum South. It found that black people in the antebellum South were
generally enslaved and legally treated as property. Black women’s sexuality was

609

BELL, supra note 4.
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merely another aspect of property ownership that white men controlled. In rare
instances, in which white men chose to reward their black sexual partners with the
gift of freedom, the law often denied white men the power to do so. Even granted
a legacy of freedom, white society often deemed black people as incapable of
being freed and made them indefeasible property of white families, passed on from
one generation to the next. It is clear that when it came to enslaved black people,
their property rights reflected Bell’s interest-convergence principle, in that they
had no property rights, and were legally deemed property, because it was in white
society’s best interests to keep blacks powerless and dependent on white support.
This article also evaluated private property principles through their
application to the antebellum South’s ultimate anomaly: nineteenth-century,
southern black women who owned property; the black mistress. The relationship
between wealthy white men and black women, and how the law regulated white
men’s attempts at property transference to black women, is particularly challenging
to Bell’s interest-convergence principle.
The existence of the black mistress in the antebellum South is a peculiar
legal anomaly or perhaps “a mystery wrapped in an enigma.”610 The black

610

BLASSINGAME, supra note 3, at viii, used this phase to describe George Bentley’s
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mistress existed within the context of the property-enslavement-sexual paradigm
nexus, which held that enslaved black women were white men’s private economic
and sexual property. Their existence and success challenged that doctrine.
This article served to answer three probing questions about the relationship
between sex, race, status, and wealth: first, why did the law allow some blacks to
be freed and to remain free, despite the general legal proposition of enslavement
law that all blacks be enslaved? The answer to that question is that the laws of
manumission and the legal status of free blacks reflect Bell’s “interestconvergence” principle, in that those laws allowed wealthy white males to
manipulate enslaved blacks to do their masters’ bidding. White men’s bidding
included sexual favors from enslaved black women, family loyalty from the white
master’s mulatto children, and extraordinary military accomplishments and heroic
ministry:

One Lynn Creek, Giles country, Tennessee, there is a Hardshell Baptist Church,
supported by a number of wealthy communicants of that “persuasion,” who for
several years past have had for their regular pastor a negro man, black as the ace
of spades, named George.... George is the “preacher in charge” of a large
congregation, nearly all of whom are slaveholders, and who pay him a salary of
$600 to $700 for his personal services.
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achievements from enslaved black men.
Second, why did the law allow free blacks to own private property, despite
the general legal proposition that all blacks be property-less? The right to private
property was the greatest operative paradigm of nineteenth century America.611 It
is what drove the American economy, the opportunity to achieve wealth, power,
and status, through the acquisition of and development of property, particularly
land and enslaved blacks in the antebellum South. Even for non-property-holding
whites in the Promised Land of America, the promise of land and enslaved blacks
(at least in enslavement states and territories) was a driving force. To deny free
blacks the opportunity to own property would be to negate the single driving
element of frontier expansion, indeed the core value of American society.
And third, why have African-American women been stereotyped as unindustrious, helpless victims of white domination, despite a history of selfdetermination and achievement? This study showed that black women, even in the
most difficult of enslavement times, were able to acquire property, develop it, and
accumulate wealth. It serves to explode the “helpless, defenseless” black woman

(citing the African Repository 1859 reprint from a Tennessee newspaper, at vii).
611

See supra note 78.
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myth that plagues the contemporary mind.
Why is our contemporary view of African Americans so far removed from
our history? It is because negative African-American stereotypes are a part of
white America’s historical attempt to maintain America as “white man’s
country.”612 Such that, as Reconstruction ended in the South, and Union troops
were removed, there grew a white “democratic” movement, promoting white
domination over the black population, requiring that the status of the lowest white

612

See JORDAN, supra note 49, at 73-74:

The history of the proposition that America was and is meant to be “a white
man’s country” is found in words of a “liberal” patriarch: “Benjamin Franklin,
who was as attuned to American destiny as anyone, nervously expressed the idea
that the continent belong to ‘White People.’ ‘I could wish their Numbers were
increased. Why increase the Sons of Africa, by Planting them in America, where
we have so fair an Opportunity, by excluding all Blacks and Tawneys, of
increasing the lovely White and Red? But perhaps I am partial to the Complexion
of my Country,’ he concluded with his usual self-conscious good sense, ‘for such
Kind of Partiality is natural to Mankind.’ Franklin was expressing an important
feeling, one which a famous Virginian, William Byrd, expressed more directly:
‘They import so many Negros (sic) hither, that I fear this Colony will some time
or other be confirmed by the Name of New Guinea.’
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be the ceiling for the highest black.613 For the formerly prosperous black mistress,
reflecting their failed ties to the wealthy white men, this new political order
required a great reduction in their status. This also coincided with a renewed status
of white women, as “pure, lily white,” “innocent,” and “frail,” there to serve the
sexual needs of white men.614
Ultimately, antebellum society even controlled white men’s property rights.
Despite their success in transferring freedom and wealth to some fortunate blacks,
white men were eventually prohibited by white legislatures and courts from

613

See generally WOODWARD, STRANGE, supra note 64, at 31:

The Redeemers who overthrew Reconstruction and established ‘Home Rule’ in
the Southern states conducted their campaign in the name of white supremacy....
Separation of the races continued to be the rule in churches and schools, in
military life and public institutions as it had been before (during Reconstruction).
(Emphasis added.)

See also C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION, THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1966). Compare WILLIAM IVY HAIR, BOURBONISM AND AGRARIAN
PROTEST, LOUISIANA POLITICS 1877-1900, 107 (1969) (for a state-focused study of the change in
post-Reconstruction politics and racially-based brutality, and of a “regime remarkably powerful,
backward, and corrupt”).
614

See generally FOX-GENOVESE, supra note 30.
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effectively transferring wealth to black families. This is one of the roots of today’s
wealth gap between whites and African Americans, and of American society’s
failure to assimilate African Americans. As seen in antebellum cases involving
white heirs who challenged property transfers to black women and miscegenational
children, the law failed to provide white men the right to will wealth, and blacks
the right to inherit or obtain wealth, consistent with Bell’s interest-convergence
principle.
A.

“BLACKNESS AS PROPERTY” DOCTRINE

This legal history study of antebellum Southern anti-miscegenation laws and
of black women’s private property ownership rights evidences the existence and
features of the “blackness as property” legal doctrine. In addition, it provides
insights into the development of American private property (wealth) law.
America’s private property ownership paradigms promoted the development of
property, particularly land, through principles of free alienation, inter vivos by gift
or sale, and causa mortis, by will. It sacrificed the traditional property principle of
primogeniture and reduced family inheritance obligations and expectations. That
paradigm represents the victory of development, living for today, property as a
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commodity, and the struggle for wealth and greed.
Consistent with the private property ownership paradigm, America’s
enslavement paradigm promoted many of the same aspects of the private property
paradigm. As enslaved blacks were legally deemed to be “property,” they were, in
the antebellum South, a major (if not the major) investment in property. But the
enslavement system was more than a business; it was a political-racial-sexual
economy.615 And enslaved blacks were more than mere property. They were
people with feelings, aspirations, and needs.
America’s sexual paradigm stripped enslaved and free black women of their
sexual freedom. It allowed white men the right to rape black women without
criminal or civil sanctions. It took from black women the personal and economic
value of their person, thus de-valuing their position as stakeholders.
Paradoxically, even in light of these legal, economic, and personal barriers,
in many instances, the black mistress enjoyed great property rights and privileges
in the antebellum South. Many were virtually on par with their white male
counterparts, as related to private property acquisition. A few, such as Madame

615

See PHILLIPS, supra note 14, at 401 (“Plantation slavery had in strictly business aspects

at least as many drawbacks as it had attractions. But in the large it was less a business than a
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Ricard, held exceptionally large tracts of land and impressive plantation homes,
exceeding the success of their white counterparts in wealth creation and personal
gain.
Black mistresses’ property ownership, like their freedom, did not come
easily or go unchallenged. They faced many legal obstacles specifically designed
to prevent obtaining property, hindering their ownership, and defeating their
success. It was the strength of the private property paradigm, along with their
personal perseverance and determination, and concurrent interests and support of
their white benefactors that created their success as property owners.
In the post-Reconstruction days of “Jim Crow,” the political economy
changed from wealthy-white master-driven to powerful-white male politiciandriven. The privileged position of the black mistress was greatly marginalized,
reduced to that of the newly freed enslaved black. As a result, many former black
mistresses led the legal battle for equality and civil rights for all Americans,
seeking to regain the great property and civil rights privileges they enjoyed during
the antebellum period. Many of them were truly sympathetic with the plight of the
freedmen. Others merely sought to protect their own interests, seeking to escape

life; it made fewer fortunes than it made men.”)
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the political and social forces “lowering” them in society. A few left the South,
and along with some who stayed, “passed for white” (if they were light enough),
abandoning their enslaved, African heritage.
The existence of the black mistress, then, represents the triumph of the
private property paradigm over the enslavement paradigm. It clearly challenged
the enslavement paradigm that all blacks should be enslaved property and never
free. It also challenged the enslavement paradigm that no black should own
property. On the other hand, the black mistress’s existence and her ownership of
property resulted directly from the legal operation of the private property paradigm
that promoted the interests of wealthy white men. Hence, the political economy,
the sexual economy, and the enslavement economy had one main defining feature:
the domination, supremacy, and privilege of the wealthy white men.
As reflective of Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle, black
women’s exercise of property rights needed to coincide with the interests of the
wealthy.616 Educated, physically attractive and available, socially-sophisticated,
and even wealthy free black women served all the sexual, political, economic, and

616

See BERLIN, supra note 7, at 182 (noting “The desire to keep the South a (wealthy)

white man’s country governed white racial thoughts and policies throughout the antebellum
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social needs of the wealthy white men. In the end, they are, at best, reminders of
the struggles that black women endured and overcame against all odds. At worst,
they are examples of the universality of greed and abuse in a political economy.
And lastly, their success, as competent business leaders, debunks the antiempowerment myth, which is an underpinning of contemporary sexism and
racism.
Hence, the antebellum South developed legal principles that exhibited the
“blackness as property” doctrine. Its elements included the supposition that black
people were an inferior race, and legal principles that enslaved blacks were legally
white property; enslaved black women’s sexuality belonged to their white masters;
white men could legally rape black women; concubinage or consensual sex
between white men and black women was legally regulated; free blacks were
legally friendly aliens, not citizens; and all blacks, no matter their status, remained
subject to the political whims of white society. Unfortunately, the blackness as
property doctrine did not die with the legal end of black enslavement, but
continues as a part of today’s constitutional framework.

years.” (Emphasis added.))
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B.

THE CONTEMPORARY BLACK WOMAN’S ECONOMIC
PLIGHT

This article analyzes how the antebellum South developed legal principles,
regulating miscegenation and black women’s property rights. Miscegenation and
enslavement laws have contemporary effects on African-American wealth and
wealth creation.617 This article casts new light on an old myth, relative to sex, race,
status, and private property, that of the “helpless, defenseless black woman.”
According to the myth, it is believed that black women are helpless, incapable of
controlling their destiny. This is a disturbing image, for it seems to reflect the
apparent plight of many African-American women (and families) enslaved in
today’s capitalist political-sexual-racial economy.618

617

See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 42.

618

Contrary to Professor Davis’s findings (see DAVIS, supra note 9, at 282-84), this author

believes that today there is a unitary racial-sexual political economy. At the core of that
economy are the impoverished, inner city poor blacks, for whom limited educational
opportunities, limited access to capital, and high unemployment are continuously taking its toll
on African-American women, men, and, most importantly, their families. Evidence of the
unitary nature of that economy is its duplication throughout each and every region of the country,
in black ghettos, in Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York,
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In today’s political-sexual-racial economy, the welfare mother parallels the
nineteenth century enslaved black woman. Not only is she practically devoid of
property in the world’s richest economy, she is downtrodden and generally denied
opportunities for property advancement.619 She is enslaved (along with her family)
in a world of crime, drug-abuse, public housing, HIV and other STDs, mental
illness, and sometimes spiritual hopelessness.620 She is often legally denied even
the minimum of property interest: that of her welfare benefits.621
The low-to-non-existent legal status of the welfare mother vis-a-vis property
rights reflects Professor Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle,622 in that her
interests have little-to-no convergence with the interests of the white, male power
structure. No value to rich white America equals no private property rights. These
African-American women are often propertyless, not due to their inability to

and Washington D.C., and in every major and minor city and town, where African Americans
reside in great number.
619

See FISS, supra note 61 .

620

Id.

621

See generally BROWN, supra note 61.

622

See BELL, supra note 4.
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achieve or lack of talent, but due to society’s failure to value their worth. (This
case study demonstrates how, despite the nineteenth century enslavement sexual
economy, black women were often masters of their destiny and were capable
business leaders.) They are, unfortunately, like the enslaved black women of the
nineteenth century, who served white men’s sexual and labor needs: the victims of
an often brutally unfair society.
Then there is the African-American middle class woman. She parallels the
free black women of the antebellum South. Consistent with Bell’s “interestconvergence” principle, she is given greater property rights, such as limited
educational opportunities, when and as those rights converge with the interests of
the white, male power structure. It is the African-American middle class woman,
who is perhaps most affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter.623
Grutterhas the effect of increasing the number of college -bound AfricanAmerican women, attending elite, predominantly white (male) campuses.624 As

623

Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), supra note 18.

624

See JOURNAL, supra note 25. It does so without regard to the effects on the African-

American, such as adding to wealth-gender imbalance: the preponderance of educated AfricanAmerican women over the dearth of educated black men. (The author suggests that there should
be a conscious effort to add more African-American men to elite, predominantly white,
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such, she is allowed to participate in, and exercise the benefits of, a “white”
university education, but solely to add “diversity” or enrichment to the white
(male) majority.625 An abundant number of educated, sophisticated black and
brown women, provides white men a trophy of political-racial-sexual conquest.626
And last, but not least, there is the wealthy and powerful African-American
woman. She parallels the antebellum black mistress, who was at the height of
society’s power and wealth. She assuages the guilt of white society. These rich
and successful African-American superstars, such as Oprah Winfrey and
Condoleezza Rice, exemplify today’s American Dream, achieving economic or
political success against all odds, through their own extraordinary talent, hard
work, and good fortune. Their property rights support Bell’s “interest-

educational institutions (and not just as athletes). The author does not suggest reducing the
numbers of African-American women on those campuses.) Due to the fact that there are more
African-American men in America’s prisons than on its college campuses, we have inherited a
social order founded upon our racist, enslavement past. That is, except as laborers, soldiers in
time of war, and the hero (today, the gifted athlete), the dominate white male culture has little
use for African-American men (similar to society’s attitude towards poor, uneducated AfricanAmerican women).
625

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct 2325, 2733 (2003), supra, note 19.
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See generally ELRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1969).
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convergence” principle, in that, for white America, these African-American
superstars serve as symbols of racial progress, and the triumph of America
democratic-capitalism, over all other forms of political economy. They also allow
the white, male power structure to ignore the need to develop meaningful solutions
to persistent problems of gender and racial wealth disparity in this country. (One
needs only to visit local and state prisons or inner city schools throughout this
country to appreciate the failing of our present political-sexual-racial economy.)

VIII. CONCLUSION

In analyzing contemporary constitutional issues, Critical Race Theory and
legal history are valuable tools. This article utilizes such tools to seek the roots of
the Supreme Court’s rationale in the Grutter case. The result of that inquiry is that
Grutteris rooted in the antebellum Sout h’s “blackness as property” legal doctrine.
The blackness as property doctrine embodied the political-economic-sexual
tenets of antebellum Southern society. It was based upon the then politicallycorrect assumption that black people were an inferior race and, therefore, required
white control. It justified society’s treatment of enslaved black people as legally
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classified white people’s property. It devalued black women’s sexuality, treated it
as a commodity or a mere dividend of a white’s purchase of a black woman. It
dictated the legal status of free blacks, who were legally permitted to exercise
some property rights, not as citizens, but as friendly aliens. It even prevented
wealthy white men from controlling their own property when they attempted to
bequest freedom to their enslaved black sexual partners and their children. The
blackness as property doctrine derived from antebellum Southern legal principles,
regulating miscegenation and black women’s property ownership rights.
The blackness as property doctrine also reflects and supports Professor
Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” principle. As such, enslaved black women
were given no property rights, as it was in white society’s interest to keep them
powerless and dependent on white support. They were also denied the right to
their own sexuality. When it came to concubinal sexuality, between white men
and black women, at least one state’s law provided black women some limited
property interest, as it was in white society’s interest to give white men an
incentive to encourage black women to participate as concubines. And when it
came to the black mistress, white society allowed them to exercise many property
rights, as friendly aliens as it was in white society’s interest to create black allies,
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supportive of a corrupt enslavement social order. Hence, the law regulating and
negotiating the sexual-racial economies of property acquisition and transfers,
including testamentary transfers and intestate succession, served to reinforce a
greater social and economic order in the antebellum South: the domination,
supremacy, and privilege of wealthy white men.
As it relates to Grutter and contemporary constitutional matters, Justice
O’Connor’s rationale in Grutter has its roots in the antebellum South’s blackness
as property doctrine. First, it reiterates the racist foundation of that doctrine, by
finding that African Americans who apply to elite, predominantly white, public
universities and professional schools are intellectually inferior to their white
counterparts. Second, it ignores a critical legal history analysis of black property
disenfranchisement and white immorality, by finding that African Americans are
undeserving of any consideration for wealth reparations, as victims of centuries of
white wealth oppression. And third, it treats African Americans as white property,
by expressly stating that those few chosen African Americans that whites pick to
integrate these elite educational institutions, are merely “diversity commodity” (the
author’s term, not the Court’s), expressly there to enhance the white majority’s
educational experience. Overall, Grutter adopts the blackness as property doctrine,
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reducing African Americans to white property, by assuming the power to control
their destiny, and by permitting a selected number of them, for some uncertain (but
limited) time, to integrate elite, predominantly white, educational institutions.
Grutter’s “anti-affirmative action” rationale also reflects Professor Bell’s
“interest-convergence” principle, in that it provides some chosen African
Americans a chance at wealth transference, while providing whites with many
benefits. These white benefits, supporting the contemporary constitutional
blackness as property doctrine, include the appearance of an open and free society
(particularly to world opinion during the “war on terror”), a source of sexual
exploitation (particularly of black women), athletic exploitation (usually of black
men), military leadership (especially important to the Iraqi invasion), and an
expected cadre of African Americans, loyal to the American Dream (a source of
Republican converts, such as Justice Clarence Thomas). The blackness as property
doctrinal analysis may also prove valuable in analyzing other contemporary
constitutional disenfranchisement questions, relative to the right to control one’s
sexuality.627
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The blackness as property doctrine and the regulation of miscegenation and of black

women’s property rights parallels the contemporary, constitutional debate on same-sex marriage.
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See generally EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004)
(wherein the author analyzes the legal debate relating to same-sex marriage, and whether the
courts or the electorate should settle the question: “Does the Constitution protect the right to
same-sex marriage?”)
As this article shows, many times antebellum Southern Supreme Courts denied a white
“husband” and father the right to free his enslaved black mistress and their children, through an
act of inheritance. The single reason that state justices provided in these cases was “defense of
the family.” By “family,” these justices did not mean the miscegenational family, but the “white
family.” The result was to ignore the miscegenational family, and to abandon its black
members, so that they remained the property of the white family. One is compelled to compare
the contemporary debate concerning the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and ask, what
effect does a narrow legal definition of heterosexual “marriage,” have on the homosexual
family? See in DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2000)), Congress bars federal recognition for as-of-then,
nonexistent same-sex marriages. See also, Rebra Carrasquillo Hedges, The Forgotten Children:
Same-Sex Partners, Their Children’s Unequal Treatment, 410 B.C. L. REV. 883 (2002).
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